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INTRODUCTION

One of the most significant issues facing the United States
Supreme Court in its 1989 Term is the extent to which the Constitution recognizes a right to refuse mental health treatment.' Involuntary treatment, provided in mental hospitals, prisons, and increasingly
in the community as a condition for release from these institutions,
has produced an expanding body of case law 2 and commentary3 con1. Washington v. Harper, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989), granting cert. to Harper v. State, 110
Wash. 2d 873, 759 P.2d 358 (1988) (en banc).
2. E.g., United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (antipsychotic
drugs); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985)
(antipsychotic drugs); Lojuk v. Quandt, 706 F.2d 1456 (7th Cir. 1983) (electroconvulsive
therapy); Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 458
U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc) (psychotropic drugs);
Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers,
457 U.S. 291 (1982), on remand, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984) (psychotropic drugs); Scott v.
Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1101, on remand, 691
F.2d 634 (3d Cir. 1982) (psychotropic drugs); Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir.
1973) (aversive conditioning); Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Center, 196 Cal. App. 3d
1388, 243 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1987), appeal dismissed, 259 Cal. Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698 (1989)
(psychotropic drugs); In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 500 N.E.2d 216 (Ind. 1986),
superseded, 510 N.E.2d 645 (1987) (antipsychotic drugs); Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of
Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct. [Wayne Cty.] July 10, 1973), excerpted

at 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (July 31, 1973), reprinted in A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 902 (1974) (psychosurgery); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 504
N.Y.S.2d 74, 495 N.E.2d 337 (1986) (antipsychotic drugs); Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873,
759 P.2d 358 (1988) (en banc), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989) (antipsychotic drugs).

3. Eg., R.

SCHWITZGEBEL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ENFORCED TREATMENT OF
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cerning the "right to refuse treatment." Psychotropic drugs, which
by definition affect mental processes, intellectual functioning, and perception, mood, and emotion,4 is the treatment technique that usually
provokes the controversy, and the one most easily administered on an
involuntary basis. In 1982 the Supreme Court considered the right to

refuse treatment in Mills v. Rogers,5 in which the Court reviewed a
class-wide injunction restricting the involuntary administration of
psychotropic medication at the Boston State Hospital. The Court,
however, avoided resolving this difficult issue, remanding the case to
determine whether an intervening state court decision grounded in
state law had rendered unnecessary resolution of the federal constitutional questions.'

Lower federal courts and state courts have contin-

(DHEW Pub. No. (ADM) 79-831, 1979); Appelbaum, The Right to Refuse
Treatment with Antipsychotic Medications.: Retrospect and Prospect, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
413 (1988); Brooks, The Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medications, 8 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 179 (1980); Friedman, Legal Regulation of Applied Behavior
Analysis in Mental Institutions and Prisons, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 39 (1975); Plotkin, Limiting the
Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients'Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 461 (1977);
Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the Coercive Use of
Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237 (1974); Wexler, Token and Taboo. Behavior
Modification, Token Economies and the Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 81 (1973); Winick, Legal
Limitations on CorrectionalTherapy and Research, 65 MINN. L. REV. 331 (1981); Winick, The
Right to Refuse PsychotropicMedication: CurrentState of the Law and Beyond, in THE RIGHT
TO REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION 7 (D. Rapoport & J. Parry eds. 1986) [hereinafter
The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Medication]; Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies
Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 616 (1972); Comment, Madness and Medicine: The Forcible Administration of
Psychotropic Drugs, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 497.
Some states have also enacted statutory protection for the right to refuse treatment. E.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2670-2680 (West 1982); FLA. STAT. § 394.459(3) (1987); IDAHO CODE
§ 66-346(a)(4) (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.92.040(3) (1987); see also Keyhea v. Rushen,
178 Cal. App. 3d 526, 223 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1986) (enforcing statutory right of prisoners to
refuse psychotropic medication); Conservatorship of Waltz, 180 Cal. App. 3d 722, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 436 (1986) (enforcing statutory right of competent patients to refuse electroconvulsive
OFFENDERS,

therapy). See generally S.

BRAKEL, J. PARRY

& B.

WEINER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND

347 & n.242, 357-65 (table 6.2, col. 13) (3d ed. 1985) (statutory compilation);
Plotkin, supra, at 504-25 (statutory compilation). According to a survey published in 1985, 20
states had statutory provisions relating to the administration of psychotropic medication. S.
BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra, at 347 & n.242. According to a survey published in
1983, 45 states recognized at least a qualified right to refuse psychotropic drugs. Callahan &
Longmire, PsychiatricPatients' Right to Refuse PsychotropicMedication: A National Survey, 7
MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 494, 495 (1983).
4. See generally Winick, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Medication,supra note 3, at 10;
Winick, PsychotropicMedication and Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
769.
5. 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
6. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), vacating Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (Ist Cir.
1980), on remand, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984). The Court vacated the decision of the court of
appeals, which had recognized a federal constitutional right to refuse medication, and
remanded to the lower court to consider-the effect of Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421
N.E.2d 40 (1981), an intervening decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
THE LAW
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ued to contend with these constitutional questions, and in Washington
v. Harper,the Court has recently granted certiorari to consider a decision of the Washington Supreme Court which imposed constitutional
limits on the administration of psychotropic drugs in a state correctional facility.'
In 1976, Walter Harper was convicted of robbery in Washington
state court.8 No question was raised concerning Harper's competency
to stand trial, and he did not assert an insanity defense. 9 Harper was
sentenced to the Washington State Penitentiary. Between 1976 and
1980, he was housed primarily at a mental health unit in the prison,
where he voluntarily underwent antipsychotic drug therapy. He was
paroled in 1980 on the condition that he participate in continued psychiatric treatment. He thereafter spent time at the psychiatric ward
of a general hospital and at a state mental hospital to which he was
civilly committed. In December of 1981, Harper's parole was
revoked for assaulting two hospital nurses. Upon his return to prison,
Harper was sent to the Special Offenders Center, a 144-bed correctional facility which provided diagnosis and treatment for convicted
felons having "serious behavioral or mental disorders."" ° Harper was
diagnosed as mentally ill by psychiatrists at the center, and given
antipsychotic drugs.1 ' He voluntarily submitted to continued psychotropic drug treatment at the center, but in November 1982, refused to
continue taking the prescribed drugs. Harper had a history of assaultive behavior in the institution, which his psychiatrists attributed to his
mental illness, and which they believed increased when he did not
take his medication.'" His treating physician therefore initiated an
administrative proceeding before a hearing committee at the center to
determine whether medication should be administered against
Harper's will. Following a hearing, the committee, finding Harper to
which had recognized a right to refuse grounded in state law. See Mills, 457 U.S. at 306. The
Massachusetts courts subsecuently reiterated a right to refuse antipsychotic drugs in Rogers v.
Commissioner of Department of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983), and
the court of appeals thereafter approved the state procedures adopted in that case, finding
them to "equal or exceed the rights provided in the federal Constitution." Rogers, 738 F.2d at
9.
7. 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989). Harper was argued on October 11, 1989, and is awaiting
decision. 58 U.S.L.W. 3270 (Oct. 24, 1989).
8.Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 874, 759 P.2d 358, 360 (1988).
9. Brief of Respondent at 1, Washington v. Harper, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989) (No. 88-599).
10. 110 Wash. 2d at 874-75, 759 P.2d at 360.
11. Brief of Respondent at 2, Washington v. Harper, 109 S.Ct. 1337 (1989) (No. 88-599).
Harper was variously diagnosed as suffering from manic depression, schizo-affective disorder,
or schizophrenia. Id. He was treated with a wide variety of antipsychotic drugs, including
Trilafon, Haldol, Prolixin, Taractan, Loxitane, Mellaril, and Navane. Id. at 3 n.L
12. Id. at 2.
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be mentally ill and a danger to others, authorized involuntary medication. This decision was upheld by the superintendent of the center
upon Harper's appeal.'I
Between November 1982 and June 1985, Harper was administered antipsychotic drugs on an involuntary basis, the committee
reviewing and approving of continued treatment approximately every
two weeks. 4 In February of 1985, Harper filed suit to challenge his
forced medication. Upon the dismissal of his complaint following
trial, Harper appealed directly to the Washington Supreme Court.15
The court considered Harper to have a fundamental right to refuse
the drugs, and applied traditional strict scrutiny. 6 . The court held
that involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs implicated a
constitutionally protected liberty interest and required a prior judicial
hearing, rather than the administrative hearing Harper received at the
facility."' Furthermore, the Washington court held that in order to
administer medication involuntarily, the state at a judicial hearing
must show "(1) a compelling state interest to administer antipsychotic
drugs, and (2) the administration of the drugs is both necessary and
effective for furthering that interest."'"
The right to refuse treatment controversy raises significant theoretical constitutional issues, and has enormous practical implications
concerning the treatment of hundreds of thousands of mental hospital
patients and prisoners. The impact extends to even larger numbers of
individuals residing in the community who are released from civil
hospitals, diverted from the criminal justice system, or paroled from
prison, on the basis that they accept treatment as a condition of their
release. Moreover, although Harper involves antipsychotic drugs, the
Court's decision will have inevitable implications for the application
of other types of mental health treatment and correctional rehabilitation, both more and less intrusive than these drugs.
Most of the lower court cases recognizing a right to refuse treatment have grounded the right in constitutional privacy and substantive due process. 9 Several, without extended analysis, have also
13. 110 Wash. 2d at 875, 759 P.2d at 360.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 875-76, 759 P.2d at 360-61.

16. Id. at 878, 759 P.2d at 362.
17. Id. at 881, 759 P.2d at 363.

18. Id. at 883, 759 P.2d at 364.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(antipsychotic drugs intrude sufficiently upon "bodily security" to implicate a "protectible
liberty interest"); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1393 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1214 (1985) (constitutional "liberty interest in freedom from physical and mental restraint of
the kind potentially imposed by antipsychotic drugs"); Johnson v. Silvers, 742 F.2d 823, 825
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alluded to a first amendment right to be free of interference with
mental processes as a supplemental basis. 20 Among other claims,
Harper's complaint asserted that his involuntary medication with
antipsychotic drugs violated his first amendment "right of freedom of
speech and the right to freely generate ideas .
,,.' Although the
(4th Cir. 1984) ("the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs presents a sufficiently
analogous intrusion upon bodily security [to the bodily restraints involved in Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)] to give rise to such a protectible liberty interest"); Project
Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 971-79 (2d Cir. 1983) (liberty interest in refusing
medication), aff'g 551 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("Forcible medication can alter
mental processes and limit physical movement, and therefore is analogous to bodily
restraint."); Lojuk v. Quandt, 706 F.2d 1456, 1465 (7th Cir. 1983) (electroconvulsive therapy
implicates constitutional privacy interest in "bodily integrity, personal security and personal
dignity"); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653 (Ist Cir. 1980) (constitutional right "in being left
free by the State to decide.., whether to submit to the serious and potentially harmful medical
treatment that is represented by the administration of antipsychotic drugs" derived from "the
penumbral right to privacy, bodily integrity or personal security"); Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d
939, 946 n.9 (3d Cir. 1976) ("right to bodily privacy"); Osgood v. District of Columbia, 567 F.
Supp. 1026, 1032 (D.D.C. 1983); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 930 (N.D. Ohio 1980)
("bodily integrity" and "personal dignity"); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J.
1978) ("the right of privacy is broad enough to include the right to protect one's mental
processes from governmental interference" and the "individual's autonomy over his own
body"); Anderson v. State, 135 Ariz. 578, 582, 633 P.2d 570, 574 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (due
process liberty interest in freedom from bodily restraint "[t]o the extent that medication is
administered forcibly and/or for the purpose of accomplishing bodily restraint"); Rogers v.
Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314 (1983) (right to
refuse psychotropic medication "has constitutional and common law origins... which protect
each person's 'strong interest in being free from nonconsentual invasion of his bodily
integrity' "); Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 554, 559, 465 A.2d 484, 488 (1983) (state
constitution affords mentally ill persons "a right to be free from unjustified intrusion upon
their personal security"); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 749-50 (Okla. 1980) (psychotropic drugs
tare intrusive in nature and an invasion of the body" in violation of constitutional right to
privacy).
20. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d at 1393-94 (because psychotropic drugs could affect the
"ability to think and communicate," their involuntary administration implicates the first
amendment, which implicitly protects "the capacity to produce ideas"); Lojuk v. Quandt, 706
F.2d at 1465 (electroconvulsive therapy implicates a first amendment interest "in being able to
think and communicate freely"); Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d at 946 (The "involuntary
administration of drugs which effect mental processes ... could amount ... to an interference
with ... rights under the First Amendment."); Girouard v. O'Brien, No. 83-3316-0 (D. Kan.
April 4, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) (1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4342) (antipsychotic
drugs can affect the "ability to think and communicate" and thus raise first amendment
concerns) (quoting Bee, 744 F.2d at 1393-94); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1366-67 (D.
Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982) (the "right to produce a
thought-or refuse to do so" is protected by the first amendment, and is implicated by
antipsychotic drugs, which have "the potential to affect and change a patient's mood, attitude
and capacity to think"); Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434AW (Mich. Cir. Ct. [Wayne Cty.] July 10, 1973), reprintedin A. BROOKS, supra note 2, at 917
(psychosurgery, by impairing the power to "generate ideas," implicates the first amendment).
21. Complaint § 5.3, Joint Appendix at 7, Washington v. Harper, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989)
(No. 88-599).
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lower court in Harper found that the antipsychotic drugs involved
there "are by intention mind altering; they are meant to act upon the
thought processes, 2 2 the court based its decision, without elaboration, on a constitutional liberty interest, and did not expressly invoke
23
the first amendment.
Since the replacement of the moderate and centrist Justice Lewis
Powell with Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court seems disinclined to expand substantive due process protections, 24 and indeed,
has embarked on a retrenchment of such protections in the abortion
context.25 In its 1988 Term, surely the most conservative in several
decades, the Court, however, continued to demonstrate considerable
deference to the first amendment. 6 Thus, whether the Court views
22. 110 Wash. 2d at 877, 759 P.2d at 361.
23. Id. at 876, 878, 759 P.2d at 361-62. Significantly, however, in rejecting the state's
suggestion that the court apply the "reasonable relation analysis" of such first amendment
prison cases as Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (censorship of incoming inmate mail), and
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (regulation of prisoner work rules having an
impact on religious practices), the Washington Supreme Court found the "uniquely intrusive
nature of antipsychotic drug treatment" to be distinguishable from "the First Amendment
interests involved" in these prison cases, and hence deserving of greater protection. Harper,
110 Wash. 2d at 883 n.9, 759 P.2d at 364 n.9.
24. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1989)
(rejecting the claim that a state's failure to protect a child against a known risk of physical
abuse by his father violated due process; "the Due Process clauses generally confer no
affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life,
liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual");
id. at 1012 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (The Court's attempt "to draw a sharp and rigid line
between action and inaction" constitutes "formalistic reasoning" which "has no place in the
interpretation of the broad and stirring clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989) (plurality opinion) (rejecting contention that substantive
due process protects a biological father's relationship with a child whose mother was married
and cohabiting with another man at the time of the child's conception and birth); id. at 2349
(Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall & Blackmun, J.J.) (criticizing "the plurality
opinion's exclusively historical analysis" of due process and suggesting that it "portends a
significant and unfortunate departure from our prior cases"); see also id. at 2351 ("[T]he
plurality acts as if the only purpose of the Due Process Clause is to confirm the importance of
interests already protected by a majority of the States. Transforming the protection afforded
by the Due Process Clause into a redundancy mocks those, who, with care and purpose, wrote
the Fourteenth Amendment.").
25. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). The Court's recent
grant of review in three additional abortion cases has prompted speculation concerning further
retrenchments. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989); Turnock v. Ragsdale, 109
S. Ct. 3239 (1989); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 109 S. Ct. 3239 (1989).
26. See Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989) (seizure under a state
civil RICO statute of a large quantity of sexually explicit material prior to an adversary
determination that it was obscene held an impermissible prior restraint in violation of the first
amendment); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 109 S. Ct. 1013 (1989)
(election code prohibiting official governing bodies of political parties from endorsing
candidates in party primaries, and dictating the organization and composition of political
parties, held to abridge first amendment free speech and association rights); Texas v. Johnson,
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the issues framed by the right to refuse treatment through the lens of
substantive due process doctrine or that of the first amendment may
have an important impact on the resolution of the complex questions
presented.27 The lower court opinions which have suggested a first
amendment basis for a right to refuse treatment, however, have done
so in a conclusional fashion or without extended analysis. 21 Moreover, the commentators have not discussed the first amendment issues
in any detail.2 9
This Article addresses the first amendment implications of involuntary mental health treatment, analyzing whether the first amendment should be read to provide constitutional protection against
governmentally imposed treatment that interferes with mental
processes. That the Constitution places thought control beyond the
power of government cannot be doubted, although there is no clear
doctrinal source for this principle. Because government has not pos109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) (conviction for burning American flag in political demonstration held to
violate first amendment); id. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joining "without reservation"
the opinion of Justice Brennan for the Court, which broadly reaffirms traditional first
amendment doctrine); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2753 (1989) (music is
within the protection of the first amendment); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989)
(imposing damages on newspaper for publishing name of rape victim held to violate first
amendment); Massachusetts v. Oakes, 109 S. Ct. 2633, 2639-40 (1989) (opinion of 5 justices,
concurring and dissenting in part) (first amendment overbreadth doctrine may be invoked to
challenge a statute that has been amended or repealed); Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC,
109 S.Ct. 2829, 2836-39 (1989) (prohibition on indecent but nonobscene "dial-a-porn" held to
violate first amendment). In its 1988 Term, the Court has continued to apply traditional strict
scrutiny in first amendment cases. E.g., Eu, 109 S.Ct. at 1021, 1024-25; Johnson, 109 S.Ct. at
2543-44; Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2613; Sable Communications, 109 S. Ct. at 2836.
Nonetheless, the Court has in some circumstances rejected strict "least restrictive alternative"
analysis in favor of somewhat more relaxed scrutiny. E.g., Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2756-59
(content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on speech); Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109
S. Ct. 3028, 3032-35 (1989) (commercial speech); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874,
1879-85 (1989) (prison censorship of materials entering a correctional facility). For a further
discussion of Thornburgh, see infra notes 485-91 and accompanying text.
27. Presumably because the Washington Supreme Court did not address Harper's first
amendment claim, his brief in the United States Supreme Court merely refers to the first
amendment implications of involuntary antipsychotic medication in two footnotes. Brief of
Respondent at 11 n.12, 42 n.108, Washington v. Harper, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989) (No. 88-599).
Harper instead grounded his constitutional contentions in "two separate aspects of the right to
privacy." Id. at 9. In any event, the first amendment issue is plainly comprehended by
Question II of the petitioner's brief on writ of certiorari:
If an incarcerated felon possesses a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in refusing medically prescribed antipsychotic medication, must the State prove a
compelling state interest to administer antipsychotic medication or does the
"reasonable relation" standard of Turner v. Safley, [482] U.S. [78], 107 S. Ct.
2254 (1987), control?
Brief of Petitioners at i,Washington v. Harper, 109 S.Ct. 1337 (1989) (No. 88-599).
28. See supra note 20.
29. See supra note 3 (articles & books).
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sessed the ability to intrude directly and powerfully into an individual's mental processes prior to the emergence of the organic treatment
techniques of modem psychiatry, the Supreme Court has had no
occasion to develop the doctrinal basis for this principle. Although a
liberty interest in freedom from such intrusions into mental processes
can be located in the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, this Article argues that the first amendment can and
should be construed as a source for this protection. In order to ascertain the extent to which free speech doctrine can be used in resolving
the right to refuse treatment question, the Article reviews existing first
amendment jurisprudence developed in a variety of contexts. It then
considers whether the values underlying the first amendment are
implicated by treatment affecting mental processes. The Article gives
special consideration to the question of whether the first amendment
protects "insane" or "disordered" thoughts, and whether it should
apply to treatment that has the effect of restoring mental processes to
a "normal" or "healthy" state. The Article then analyzes the various
mental health treatment techniques, including psychotropic medication, in an effort to construct a rough continuum of intrusiveness
along which these treatment methods may be considered based on
their effects on first amendment values. The Article determines that
first amendment scrutiny is appropriate for some but not all of these
techniques, and that with several minor exceptions, involuntary
administration of psychotropic drugs should be examined under traditional first amendment standards. The Article concludes with an
analysis of these standards. The circumstances under which these
standards can be satisfied when either civil patients or criminal
offenders are subjected to these treatment methods, however, are
beyond the scope of this Article, as is the extent to which procedural
due process protections may apply.3 0 The Article merely suggests a
framework through which these issues should be resolved.
II.

THE ORIGINS AND SCOPE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem30. For a more detailed analysis of these issues, see Winick, The Right to Refuse
PsychotropicMedication, supra note 3, at 16-21 (mental patients); Winick, Legal Limitationson
Correctional Therapy and Research, supra note 3, at 373-83 (criminal offenders). The author
will provide an extensive treatment in his forthcoming book, B. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO
REFUSE

TREATMENT:
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ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."'"
This language does not immediately seem applicable to involuntary
mental health treatment; indeed, it does not even seem to reach the
activities of state hospitals or prisons. By its terms, the first amendment restricts only the exercise of federal power, and it does not purport to apply to the states.3 2 Let us, as a preliminary matter, consider
whether the principles of the first amendment can serve as limitations
on state and local mental health and correctional institutions.
The first amendment is one of the first ten amendments to the
Constitution, collectively known as the Bill of Rights. These amendments were passed by the First Congress and ratified by the states in
1791 in order to protect individual liberties against the new national
government. 3 During the debates on ratification of the Constitution
in the thirteen colonies, opponents of ratification suggested that the
absence of a Bill of Rights guaranteeing individual liberty created a
grave potential for tyranny by the new federal government. Indeed,
five of the eleven colonies that ratified the Constitution by early 1789
proposed amendments guaranteeing individual liberty against
encroachment by the federal government.3 4 In response to these concerns, the Bill of Rights was adopted as a limitation on federal
authority.
Although the original Constitution imposed several relatively
minor limitations on state legislatures,3 5 with these exceptions it did
not place direct restrictions on the authority of the states to abridge
personal rights until the adoption of the post-Civil War amendments:
the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. The fourteenth
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
32. E.g., Baron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of
New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 (1845); see Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV, 431, 433-36 (1926). Moreover, the first
amendment does not restrict the actions of private persons. E.g., Public Utils. Comm'n v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952).
33. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 406 (11th ed. 1985); M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1.01, at 1-2 to 1-3 (1984); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 315 (3d ed. 1986); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12, at 3-4 (2d ed. 1988); Levy, Bill of Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 258, 260, 266-67, 277 (L. Levy 2d ed. 1987).
34. See 1 J. ELLIOTT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 328, 334 (1891); 3 id.
at 659; 4 id. at 244. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND 119-59
(1977).
35. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. I ("No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex
post facto Law, or Law Impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... "); id at art. IV, § I ("Full

Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State."); id. at art. IV, § 2 ("Citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."); see J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 33, at 314-15.
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amendment was ratified on July 28, 1868. It effected a fundamental
reordering of the American constitutional system, providing considerably greater protection for individual liberties than was provided originally in the Constitution.36 The fourteenth amendment by its terms
prohibits the states from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law," and from denying "to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 37 These
broad and general provisions embody an evolving concept of liberty
subject to constitutional protection against state encroachment.

As

the second Justice Harlan put it, with characteristic eloquence and
wisdom:
[T]he very breadth and generality of the Amendment's provisions
suggest that its authors did not suppose that the Nation would
always be limited to mid- 19th century conceptions of "liberty" and
"due process of law," but that the increasing experience and evolving conscience 38of the American people would add new "intermedi'
ate premises.

The Supreme Court has read the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment broadly, construing it to incorporate, on a selective basis,
various protections of the Bill of Rights, thereby making these fundamental guarantees applicable to the states.39 Although the Court
stated in 1922 that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any
other provision of the Constitution ... imposes upon the States any
36. See R.

CORTNER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS 11

(1981); Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew. Congress, Citizenship and Civil Rights After
the Civil War, 92 AMERICAN HIST. REV. 45 (1981). See generally W. NELSON, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:

FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988).

37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 175 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
39. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 33, at 315-18, 360-72; L. TRIBE,
supra note 33, § 11-2, at 772-74; see, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (fifth
amendment right against double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth
amendment right to jury trial); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (sixth
amendment right to speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment
right of confrontation); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth amendment ban
against cruel and unusual punishments); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth
amendment exclusionary rule); Wolff v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (fourth amendment
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (sixth
amendment right to public trial); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (first
amendment ban on establishment of religion); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (first
amendment right to petition); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (first amendment right
to petition); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (first amendment right to freedom of
press); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (first amendment right to freedom of speech);
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (fifth amendment right to just
compensation).
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restrictions about 'freedom of speech,' "40 it backed away from that
statement one year later,4 and in 1925 recognized that the first
amendment applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.4 2

That recognition came in the case of Benjamin Gitlow, the New
York Socialist whose conviction for advocating criminal anarchy the
Court affirmed.4 3 An official of the radical Left Wing Section of the
Socialist Party, Gitlow printed and distributed the "Left Wing Manifesto," a statement of the faction's policies, published in its official
organ, The Revolutionary Age." The Manifesto repudiated the goal of
introducing Socialism through legislative means and advocated a militant "revolutionary Socialism" based on the "class struggle," which
through the "power of the proletariat" would produce "revolutionary
45
mass action" to bring about a new "dictatorship of the proletariat.
As business manager of The Revolutionary Age, Gitlow was convicted
in New York state court for advocating the overthrow of the government by unlawful means. Gitlow's counsel had challenged the applicable New York statute as "in contravention of" the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment,4 6 arguing first, "[t]hat the 'liberty' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the liberty of
speech and the press," and second, that the statute infringed Gitlow's
first amendment liberty interests. 47 Although the Court rejected the
40. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922).
41. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court invalidated a state statute
forbidding the teaching in school of any language other than English, and offered the following
expansive definition of the "liberty" protected by the fourteenth amendment:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus
guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included
things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates
of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Id. at 399. Plainly, the right of an individual to worship according to the dictates of his conscience, referred to by the Court, is protected by the free exercise clause of the first
amendment.
42. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (dicta). For a discussion of the
inclusion of the first amendment within the liberty protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, see Warren, supra note 32, at 455-59. The Court first used the first
amendment to invalidate a state abridgement of free speech in Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380
(1927).
43. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
44. Id. at 655.
45. Id. at 657-58.
46. Id. at 660.
47. Id. at 664.
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second contention,4 8 it accepted the first, stating that "[flor present
purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the
press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgement by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and
'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by the States." 49 In subsequent decisions the Court has repeatedly considered the various protections of
the first amendment to be limitations on state authority." Indeed, a
plurality of the Court recently had occasion to "recall how firmly
embedded in our constitutional jurisprudence is the proposition that
the several States have no greater power to restrain the individual
freedoms protected by5 the First Amendment than does the Congress
of the United States." '
The first amendment thus serves as a limitation on governmental
action at all levels-federal, state, and local. 52 The critical question is
whether it can be construed to apply in the context of involuntary
mental health treatment. Does the first amendment restrict the gov48. In finding that the statute's application to Gitlow was constitutional, the Court
invoked the metaphor of speech as fire:
A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a- time, may
burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration. It cannot be said that the
State is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when in the exercise of its judgment as
to the measures necessary to protect the public peace and safety, it seeks to
extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled the flame or blazed
into the conflagration.
Id. at 669. Justice Holmes, in dissent, responded: "Eloquence may set fire to reason. But
whatever may be thought of the redundant discourse before us it had no chance of starting a
present conflagration." Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by Brandeis, J.). Responding
to the argument that the Manifesto was "more than a theory," but was an "incitement,"
Holmes noted that "[e]very idea is an incitement." Id.
49. Id. at 666.
50. E.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49-50 (1985) (plurality opinion) (ban on
establishment of religion); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 855 n.l (1982)'(plurality
opinion) (right to receive information and ideas); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714
(1977) (right against being required to display an offensive state motto); Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (right to free speech); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 1516 (1947) (ban on establishment of religion); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 637-38 (1943) (right of students not to participate in flag salute); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (right to free exercise of religion); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 519
(1939) (right to petition); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (right to assembly);
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) (right to free press); Fiske v.
Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927) (right to free speech).
51. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 48-49.
52. Although the fourteenth amendment restricts the actions of the states, its coverage
extends to all state action, including that taken by local agencies. E.g., Barnette, 319 U.S. at
637-38 ("The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen
against the State itself and all of its creatures ....

There are village tyrants as well as village

Hampdens, but none who acts under color of law is beyond reach of the Constitution.").
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ernment when it seeks to treat mental patients or rehabilitate
offenders?
III.
A.

CONSTRUING "FREEDOM OF SPEECH": DOES THE FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECT MENTAL PROCESSES?

The Supreme Court's Methodology.- Deriving Corollary Rights
from Freedom of Speech

Aside from the protection of the free exercise of religion, the only
.right mentioned in the first amendment that could conceivably apply
to involuntary mental health treatment is freedom of speech, a right
that at most seems to be only indirectly affected. Like other constitutional provisions, however, the protection of freedom of speech, one of
the "majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights,""3 is an ambiguous and
open-ended concept capable of being construed broadly to realize the
basic purposes the provision was designed to accomplish. While the
first amendment "literally forbids the abridgement only of 'speech,'"
the Supreme Court has long recognized that its protection "does not
end at the spoken or written word." 4 In the most recent example,
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, recognized that music is "a
form of expression and communication" within the protection of the
first amendment." Similarly, in a variety of contexts the Court has
derived from freedom of speech a number of corollary rights deemed
essential to effectuate the purposes of the first amendment.
53. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639; see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596, 604 (1982) ("[W]e have long eschewed any 'narrow, literal conception' of the [First]
);
for the Framers were concerned with broad principles ....
Amendment's terms ....
Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) (Holmes, J.) ("[T]he provisions of the
Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are
organic living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is vital not
formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering
their origin and the line of their growth."); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword:
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1, 11 (1979).
54. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2539 (1989). The Court in Johnson held that flagburning when done for expressive purposes is within the protection of the first amendment. In
so doing, the Court followed a long line of cases that recognized various kinds of conduct to be
"sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments." Id. (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)); see,
e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983) (picketing); Spence, 418 U.S. at 409-10
(attaching a peace sign to a flag); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) (wearing of
American military uniform in a dramatic presentation criticizing Vietnam War); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (wearing of black arm
bands to protest Vietnam War); Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 313-14 (1968) (picketing); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131,
141-42 (1966) (sit-in demonstration); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632 (refusing to salute the flag);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1931) (displaying a red flag).
55. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2753 (1989) (Kennedy, J.).
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Illustrations of this methodology are useful in analyzing whether
the first amendment can be read to limit involuntary mental health
treatment. A leading example is freedom of association. The
Supreme Court has recognized "a right to associate for the purpose of
engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendmentspeech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion."56 The Court has deemed freedom of association to
be guaranteed by the Constitution because it is "an indispensable
means of preserving" these enumerated liberties. 7 These explicitly
guaranteed freedoms "could not be vigorously protected ... unless a
correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were
not also guaranteed." 58 Thus, the Court has long found "implicit in
the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a
corresponding right to associate with others" in pursuit of these activities.59 Although freedom of association "is not expressly included in
the First Amendment its existence is necessary in making the express
guarantees fully meaningful." 6 Without protection for association
and other "peripheral rights the specific rights would be less
61
secure."
Not only is freedom of association a derivative safeguard of the
liberties explicitly guaranteed by the first amendment, but other rights
have in turn been derived from the freedom to associate. These
include, for example, the right to make financial contributions to an
organization for the purpose of spreading a political message.6 2
Because making such a contribution "enables like-minded persons to
pool their resources in furtherance of common political goals,"' 63 the
Court has reasoned that limitations on the freedom to contribute
"implicate fundamental First Amendment interests."'
Moreover,
56. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984); see, e.g., NAACP v.
Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977); Elrod
v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 355-57 (1976) (plurality opinion); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477,
487 (1975) (right to choose political party); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972); United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 n.7 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (group
legal practice); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958). See
generally L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 12-23, at 977-86.
57. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
58. Id. at 622.
59. Id.
60. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
61. Id.
62. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
63. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22.
64. Id. at 23.
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the Court has held that the first amendment protects not only the
right of an individual to associate with others in an organization and
to contribute to that organization, but also a right not to be compelled
by the government to join an organization 65 or to contribute financially to the support of an organization's efforts to advance an ideological cause he may oppose. 66 "Freedom of association ... plainly
67
presupposes a freedom not to associate.
An additional first amendment right derived from the freedom of
association is the right to "privacy in one's associations"-the right to
be free of compelled disclosure of membership in an association.68
Because of the "vital relationship" between this right and the freedom
to associate, the Court has deemed privacy in group association to be
"indispensable to [the] preservation of freedom of association ....69
Similarly, the Court has construed the first amendment to protect not only the right to Speak freely, but also "the right to refrain
from speaking at all."' 7° The Court reasoned that "[a] system which
secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological
causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster
such concepts."' 7' The right to speak and the right to refrain from

speaking are, in the Court's words, "complementary components,"
and are thus both within the protection of the first amendment.72
In a 1982 case, the Court employed this methodology to recognize a "right to receive information and ideas" as "an inherent corollary of the right of free speech and press that are explicitly
guaranteed" by the first amendment. 73 The Court stressed that effec65. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 363-64 & n.17 (1976) (city prohibited from compelling
individual to associate with a political party as a condition of retaining public employment).
66. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977) (Public school teachers could
not be required, as a condition of employment, to contribute union dues to be used for union's
expenditures for ideological causes not germane to collective bargaining.).
67. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
68. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
69. Id.
70. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (state could not require motor vehicles
to bear license plates embossed with the state motto-"Live Free or Die"-over objection of
Jehovah's Witnesses who viewed the motto as repugnant to their moral, religious, and political
beliefs); see also West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943) (public
school students could not be required to participate in compulsory flag salute).
71. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714; see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475
U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly") (quoting
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985)).
72. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.
73. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (plurality opinion) (Constitution
prohibited school board from removing disagreeable books from school library). The plurality
opinion, authored by Justice Brennan, cited prior cases recognizing a "right to receive
information and ideas." Id.; see First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Lamont
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tive speech requires listeners,7 4 and that recognition of a right to
receive information was thus necessary to give meaning to the first
amendment rights of speakers. Further, the Court found that the
right to receive ideas and information was a "necessary predicate to
the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press,
and political freedom.""
Thus, in a number of contexts, by stressing that the right of freedom of speech "has broad scope," 7 6 the Court has construed freedom
of speech to protect other rights that it found to be "corollary" rights,
"complimentary components" of the right, "concomitant rights,"
''corresponding rights," "peripheral rights," or rights that are
"implicit in," "presupposed" by, "indispensable to" or "a necessary
predicate" to the exercise of the right of freedom of speech." In these
cases the Court viewed these derivative rights as necessary to protect
the purposes underlying the first amendment, and did not hesitate to
read "freedom of speech" expansively to cover them as well. 8
B.

Supreme Court Protectionfor "'Freedomof Belief" "'Freedomof
Mind," and "'Freedomof Thought"

The Supreme Court has applied this same approach in differing
contexts to protect "freedom of belief," "freedom of mind," or "freedom of thought." Although the Court has never considered the application of the first amendment in the context of involuntary treatment
of mental patients or criminal offenders, there is ample support in
these cases for construing the first amendment to place limits on at
least the more intrusive therapies. Indeed, a number of state and
lower federal court decisions have applied the language in these
v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); see also Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 8 (plurality opinion) ("the
First Amendment protects the public's interest in receiving information"); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940); infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
74. Pico, 457 U.S. at 867.
75. Id.
76. E.g., Martin, 319 U.S. at 143; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) (The first
amendment "must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in
the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow.").
77. See supra notes 53-75 and accompanying text.
78. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) ("The First
Amendment is thus broad enough to encompass those rights that, while not unambiguously
enumerated in the very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment
of other First Amendment rights."); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("It is true that the First Amendment contains no specific guarantee
of access to publications. However, the protection of the Bill of Rights goes beyond the
specific guarantees to protect from congressional abridgment those equally fundamental
personal rights necessary to make the express guarantees fully meaningful.").
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Supreme Court cases to extend first amendment protection against
such intrusive therapies as psychosurgery,79 electroconvulsive therapy,8 0 and psychotropic medication."1
Perhaps the Court's first reference to first amendment protection
forniental processes came in Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in
Whitney v. California.2 In Whitney, Brandeis set forth his frequently
quoted philosophy of the first amendment:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end
of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties; and
that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over
the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.
They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to
be the secret of liberty. They believed thatfreedom to think as you
will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and
assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion
affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of
noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert
people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this
should be a fundamental principle of the American government.
They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through
fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable
government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that
the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the
power of reason as applied through public discussion, they
eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its
worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing
majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and
79. Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir.
Ct. [Wayne Cty.] July 10, 1973), reprinted in A. BROOKS, supra note 2, at 902, 916-19 (1974).
80. Lojuk v. Quandt, 706 F.2d 1456 (7th Cir. 1983).
81. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1393-94 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214
(1985); Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1101
(1982); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 933 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F.
Supp. 1342, 1366-67 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 634 F.2d
650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mill v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on

remand sub nom. Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984); see also Mackey v. Procunier, 477
F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973) (The involuntary use of succinycholine as part of an aversive
conditioning program would raise serious constitutional questions concerning "impermissible

tinkering with the mental processes.").
82. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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assembly should be guaranteed.

3

The Court again treated the first amendment as providing protection
for such a right in Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut.84
Cardozo referred to "freedom of thought" together with freedom of
speech as "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every
other form of freedom." 85 In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas
also listed "freedom of thought" as one of the rights comprehended
by freedom of speech.86 In addition, the Court in a number of contexts has referred to the first amendment as protecting "freedom of
mind." 87
C. Freedom to Believe Distinguishedfrom Freedom to Act
In a number of Supreme Court cases that distinguish between the
government's power to regulate conduct and its power to regulate
thought or belief, the Court has recognized a first amendment freedom to believe. In a 1940 case, Cantwell v. Connecticut,8 the Court
upheld the breach of peace conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who
stopped persons on a public street and played a phonograph record
attacking Catholicism. In discussing the scope of the free exercise of
religion clause of the first amendment, the Court distinguished "freedom to believe" from freedom to act. 89 "The first," the Court noted,
"is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be." 90
The Court later reiterated the notion that freedom of belief is
absolute in American Communications Association v. Douds.9 ' The
83. Id. at 375-76 (emphasis added).
84. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
85. Id. at 326-27; see also id. ("liberty of the mind"). In an essay, Cardozo expounded on
the importance of freedom of thought:
We are free only if we know, and so in proportion to our knowledge. There
is no freedom without choice, and there is no choice without knowledge,-or
none that is not illusory. Implicit, therefore, in the very notion 'ofliberty is the
liberty of the mind to absorb and to beget .... At the root of all liberty is the
liberty to. know. . . . Experimentation there may be in many things of deep
concern, but not in setting boundaries to thought, for thought freely
communicated is the indispensable condition of intelligent experimentation, the
one test of its validity.
B. CARDOZO, The Paradoxes of Legal Science, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN
NATHAN CARDOZO 317-18 (M. Hall ed. 1947).
86. 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).
87. E.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
531 (1945); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
88. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
89. Id. at 303-04.

90. Id.
91. 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (plurality opinion).
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Court upheld the constitutionality of a section of the Taft-Hartley
Act, which prohibited unions from receiving the benefits of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) unless each union officer filed
an affidavit stating that he was not a member of the Communist Party
and did not support an organization that advocated the overthrow of
the government by force or other illegal means.92 Because no union
could survive without access to the collective bargaining system established by the NLRA, this had the effect of denying Communists the
right to hold union office and'union members the right to elect leaders
of their choice. Chief Justice Vinson, writing for a plurality of the
Court in Douds, again distinguished between the regulation of
thought and the regulation of "conduct." 93 Citing Cantwell, the plurality found that although the government may regulate conduct,
"[b]eliefs are inviolate. ' 94 In a strong dissent noting that "[f]reedom
to think is inevitably abridged when beliefs are penalized by imposition of civil disabilities," 95 Justice Black recalled prior Supreme Court
language which established that "[flreedom to think is absolute of its
own nature; the most tyrannical government is powerless to control
the inward workings of the mind." 96 Of course, given the emergence
of the more intrusive mental health treatment techniques, the "inward
workings of the mind" are now within the reach of government control, but Justice Black could not have had these developments in
mind. Accusing the Court's plurality of merely mouthing the fundamental principle that "[b]eliefs are inviolate," Black's dissent warned
that "[i]ndividual freedom and governmental thought-probing cannot
97
live together."
92. Id. at 385-86, 415.
93. Id. at 391-93. The stated purpose of the challenged legislation was to remove the
obstructions to the free flow of commerce resulting from disturbances instigated by
Communists who had infiltrated the management of labor unions. Consequently, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the legislation as a permissible protection of the free flow of
commerce, even though such legislation was not content-neutral. Id. at 387-93.
94. Id. at 393; see also id. at 408 ("[O]ne may not be imprisoned or executed because he
holds particular beliefs.").
95. Id. at 446 (Black, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 445 (quoting Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 618 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 319 U.S. 103 (1943)).
97. Id. at 446. Justice Douglas has also expressed these views. See Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 714-15 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he people, the ultimate governors,
must have absolute freedom of, and therefore privacy of, their individual opinions and
beliefs."); Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("The First Amendment in its respect for the conscience of the individual honors the sanctity
of thought and belief. To think as one chooses, to believe what one wishes are important
aspect of the constitutional right to be let alone."); W. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE
110-11 (1958) ("Belief is entitled to refuge under the First Amendment where belief has not
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In Adler v. Board of Education,9 8 the Court considered a New
York statute which also reflected the fear of Communism that gripped
the country in the 1950's.9 9 The state prohibited the New York
school system from employing members of certain listed organizations that advocated the overthrow of the government. In upholding
the constitutionality of the statute, the Court again distinguished the
regulation of thought and the regulation of conduct. Under our Constitution individuals have the right to "think and believe as they will,"
the Court noted, but "they have no right to work for the State in the
school system on their own terms.'
In dissent, Justice Black criticized the Court's opinion as inconsistent with the policy embodied in
the first amendment "that government should leave the mind and
spirit of man absolutely free." ' ' '
In these cases the dispute between the dissenters and the majority
focused on whether the regulation of certain kinds of conduct will
diminish impermissibly the freedom of the individual to think and
believe as he will. Both the majority and the dissenters recognized
that freedom of thought and belief are immune from governmental
control. Assuming the viability of a distinction between thoughts and
beliefs on the one hand and conduct on the other, it would seem that
most mental health interventions affect both. Although all of these
treatment techniques will undoubtedly have an effect upon behavior,
all except the behavioral techniques seek to bring about a change in
mental processes-to affect attitudes, emotions, thoughts, and beliefs.
Of course, not every attempt by government to change attitudes
or beliefs raises first amendment problems. Government in America'
has enormous power to disseminate ideas and information. It seeks to
inculcate values in public school students, to warn consumers about
health and safety hazards, and to persuade the public to give its
crossed the line into action ....
Freedom to believe has been conceived as absolute under the
First Amendment, only action being subject to regulation in the public good.").
98. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
99. See generally C. BELFRAGE, THE AMERICAN INQUISITION: 1945-1960, at 117-52
(1973); A. BESSIE, INQUISITION IN EDEN (1965); D. CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTICOMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER (1979); J. COGLEY, REPORT ON

BLACKLISTING (1956); F. DONNER, THE UN-AMERICANS (1961); A. LINK & W. CATrON,
AMERICAN EPOCH 682-87 (2d ed. 1963); P. STEINBERG, THE GREAT 'RED MENACE':
UNITED STATES PROSECUTIONS OF AMERICAN COMMUNISTS 1947-1952, at 3-14 (1984); THE
NEW AMERICAN RIGHT (D. Bell ed. 1955); Millis, The Rise and Fall of the Radical Right, 44

VA. L. REV. 1291 (1958); Winick, ForfeitureofAttorneys'Fees Under RICO and CCE and the
Right to Counselof Choice.- The Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 765, 854-55 (1989).
100. Adler, 342 U.S. at 492.
101. Id. at 497 (Black, J., dissenting); see also id. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("the
Constitution guarantees freedom of thought").
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approval to a variety of policies and programs. 10 2 Indeed, government is the largest communicator in our society. 1 3 Much of what
government does undoubtedly has the effect of changing attitudes and
beliefs, but it is sensible to distinguish between methods which individuals are free to resist, and the more systematic and intrusive methods of mental health treatment, which unwilling subjects may not
resist. While not all of these treatments will intrude sufficiently on
mental processes to trigger first amendment inquiry, the more intrusive of the treatment techniques do seem to implicate the first amendment values reflected in the Supreme Court cases.
D. When Government Attempts to Impose Orthodoxy of Belief
Another area of first amendment jurisprudence that suggests
constitutional protection for thought and belief arose in response to
various governmental attempts to impose orthodoxy of belief. In the
seminal case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,1°
the Supreme Court considered a challenge to a school requirement
that all teachers and pupils participate in a flag salute ceremony
involving a "stiff-arm" salute and the repeating of the Pledge of Allegiance. Jehovah's Witnesses challenged the compulsory ceremony as
inconsistent with their religious beliefs, asserting what the Court characterized as "a right of self-determination in matters that touch individual opinion and personal attitude."' 5 The Court distinguished
instruction concerning the meaning of the flag, which would not
offend the Constitution, from "a compulsion of students to declare a
belief."' 1 6 The Court considered a requirement that the individual
"communicate by word and sign his acceptance of the political ideas
...[the flag] bespeaks,"' 1 7 to be an "affirmation of a belief and an
attitude of mind."'' 0 8 Furthermore, the Court noted that determining
whether the first amendment permitted the government to order
observance of such a ritual did not depend upon the Court's assess102. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987) (Department of Justice designation of foreign
films as "political propaganda" held not to violate first amendment); Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d
1303, 1312-14 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.) (discussing government speech designed to influence

decision making). See generally J.

TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND

(1977).

103. See generally M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND
GOVERNMENT

EXPRESSION

IN AMERICA

(1983); Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A

Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 27-30; Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV.
565 (1980); Ziegler, Government Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of Official
Partisanship,21 B.C.L. REV. 578 (1980).
104. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
105. Id. at 631.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 633.
108. Id.
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ment of the value of the exercise, 0 9 nor on whether the objection to
0
participation in the compulsory ceremony was religious in nature.°"
Finally, the Court rejected the notion that the benevolent motives of
the school authorities would save the constitutionality of the requirement, noting that "[s]truggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in
support of some ends thought essential to their time and country have
been waged by many good as well as by evil men.""'1
In emphatic language, the Court invalidated the compelled flag
salute as an unconstitutional invasion of "the sphere of intellect and
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from official control.""' 2 "If there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation," the Court declared, "it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein." ' 13 According to the
Court, the first amendment erects a constitutional preference for
"individual freedom of mind" over "officially disciplined uniformity
for which history indicates a disappointing and disastrous end."' 1 4
Central to our American freedoms is the "freedom to be intellectually
and spiritually diverse.""' 5 "We can have intellectual individualism
and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional minds,"
noted the Court, "only at the price of occasional eccentricity and
' 16
abnormal attitudes." "
The Court has followed the Barnette doctrine in other contexts,
both within and without the school. In Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District,"' the Court relied on Barnette in concluding that the first amendment prohibited the suspension of students who refused to remove black arm bands worn to
protest the Vietnam War.1 '8 The Court also reiterated its earlier
109. "[V]alidity of the asserted power to force an American citizen publicly to profess any
statement of belief or to engage in any ceremony of assent to one, presents questions of power
that must be considered independently of any idea we may have as to the utility of the
ceremony in question." Id. at 634. The Court held that the students' liberty of conscience
could not be infringed in the name of "national unity" or "patriotism." Id. at 640-41.
110. Id. at 634-35.
111. Id. at 640.
112. Id. at 642.
113. Id.; see also Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961) (finding a state
constitutional requirement that a notary public declare his belief in God in order to receive his
appointment, to be an unconstitutional invasion of the freedom of belief and religion).
114. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
115. Id. at 641.
116. Id. at 641-42.
117. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
118. Id. at 507, 514.
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repudiation of the principle that a state could conduct its public
schools so as to "foster a homogeneous people." 119 "In our system,"
the Court warned, "students may not be regarded as closed-circuit
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate." 12
The Court also relied on Barnette's ban on government attempts
to impose orthodoxy of belief in Elrod v. Burns,' 2 ' holding unconstitutional the discharge of Republican employees of a sheriff's department solely because of their political party affiliation.122 The Court
explicitly recognized freedom of belief as a first amendment guarantee, stating that "freedom of belief and association constitute the core
of those activities protected by the First Amendment." '2 3 The Court
subsequently reaffirmed Burns and Barnette in Branti v. Finkel,'2 4
another patronage dismissal case, in which the Court concluded that
the first amendment protects a public employee "from discharge
based on what he believes." '25
The Court again invoked the principle of Barnette in two 1977
cases. In Wooley v. Maynard,126 the Court considered a New Hampshire statutory requirement that noncommercial motor vehicles bear
licence plates embossed with the state motto, "Live Free or Die."
Two Jehovah's Witnesses attacked the requirement as repugnant to
their moral, religious, and political beliefs. The Court invalidated the
statute as inconsistent with "the right of freedom of thought protected
by the First Amendment," which the Court found to include both the
"right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.' 1 27
The Court considered the right to speak and the right to refrain from
speaking to be "complementary components of the broader concept of
'individual freedom of mind.' ",128 As in Barnette, the statutory
requirement in Wooley was a "state measure which forces an individual ... to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable."'' 29 The Court found this
to invade "the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of
119. Id. at 511 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)).
120. Id.
121. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
122. Id. at 356.
123. Id.
124. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
125. Id. at 515.
126. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
127. Id. at 714; accord Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539
(1985) ("Freedom of thought and expression 'includes both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all.' ") (quoting Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714).
128. 430 U.S. at 714 (quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943)).
129. Id. at 715.
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the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official
control."' 3 ° "The First Amendment," the Court noted, "protects the
right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority
")131

In Abood v. DetroitBoard of Education,132 the Court considered a
state statute that conditioned employment of public school teachers,
whether or not union members, on their paying a service charge
(equal in amount to union dues) to the union. The union used a portion of the revenue to advance various political and ideological activities.

The Court held that this requirement violated the first

amendment rights of teachers who objected to compulsory financial
support for an ideological message with which they disagreed. The
Court found that "at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion
that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a
free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State."' 133 Moreover, the Court
noted, this "freedom of belief is no incidental or secondary aspect of
34
the First Amendment's protections."'1
Wooley and Abood thus extend the Barnette principle to recognize a negative speech right-the right of the individual to refrain
from speaking or being compelled to associate with ideological views
with which he disagrees. This principle had earlier been applied in
Miami HeraldPublishingCo. v. Tornillo,13 which invalidated a statutory requirement that newspapers provide a right of reply to candidates whose character or record they had criticized. 36 The right-toreply statute was unconstitutional because it required the newspaper
to disseminate a message with which it disagreed. 137 The Court
recently expanded the concept of negative speech rights in Pacific Gas
& Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission.131 In Pacific Gas, the
Court held that an order of the Public Utilities Commission granting
a consumer group access to the utility billing envelopes of a power
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
Id.
431 U.S. 209 (1977).
Id. at 234-35; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 816 (1978) (White, J.,

dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, J.J.) (individuals have first amendment "right to
adhere to [their] own beliefs and to refuse to support the ...

views of others"); Elrod v. Bums,

427 U.S. 347, 372 (1976) (first amendment recognizes the rights of every citizen "to believe as
he will and to act and associate according to his beliefs"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 164 (1944) ("freedom of the mind").

134. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235.
135. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).

136. Id. at 258.
137. Id.
138. 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1

company violated the company's first amendment rights. This
"forced association with potentially hostile views burdens the expression of views different from" those of the consumer group and "risks
forcing [the utility company] to speak where it would prefer to remain
silent."1 39 "[T]he choice to speak," the Court affirmed, "includes
within it the choice of what not to say."' 140
Barnette and its progeny thus recognize a broad constitutional
142
interest in "freedom of conscience"'' 4 and "freedom of mind."'
These cases provide further support for a first amendment right to be
free of the invasions of mental processes brought about by at least the
more intrusive of the mental health treatment techniques. If there is a
"sphere of intellect and spirit" reserved from official control, 43 then
that sphere must include the individual's basic personality, his emotions, attitudes, and beliefs. Again, not every government interference
will constitute "official control"; certainly governmental attempts to
influence attitudes, emotions, and beliefs will rarely rise to the level of
"control." However, intrusive mental health treatment techniques,
like psychosurgery, that effect massive changes in the individual's personality, mental processes, and emotional responsiveness which the
individual is unable to resist, clearly constitute a direct and serious
invasion of "individual freedom of mind."'" If "at the heart of the
First Amendment is the notion that.., one's beliefs should be shaped
'' 4
by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State, 1 1
then treatment techniques that coerce beliefs, attitudes, and mental
processes certainly implicate the values protected by the first amendment. Just as a public school may not require its students to affirm "a
belief and an attitude of mind,"'' 46 or "to confess by word or act their
faith" in some official orthodoxy, 47 the state may not subject mental
patients and offenders to treatment which requires them to discard
particular attitudes or beliefs and affirm attitudes and beliefs prescribed by state rehabilitators. Like car owners, 48 newspapers, 49 and
139. Id. at 18.
140. Id. at 16.
141. Id. at 32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by White & Stevens, J.J.).
142. Id. (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)); see also West Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
143. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642, quoted in Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
144. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).
145. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977).
146. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633.
147. Id. at 642.
148. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
149. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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power companies,"15 mental patients and offenders may not be subjected to "forced association" 5 ' with particular views. Moreover,
Barnette teaches that the state may not justify coerced orthodoxy by
the high value it places upon the objectives it seeks
to achieve, or by
1 52
officials.
governmental
of
motives
benevolent
the
E. FirstAmendment Protection of Private Thoughts
The 1969 Supreme Court case of Stanley v. Georgia '51 provides
an additional and significant source of support for the existence of a
first amendment right to be free of interference with mental processes.
Stanley involved a prosecution for the private possession of obscene
materials that the defendant had kept in his home. The defendant
asserted a constitutional "right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home," and a "right to be free
from state inquiry into the contents of his library."'' 54 In broad language, the Court stated that "[o]ur whole constitutional heritage
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's
minds."'15 5 "Whatever the power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality," the Court noted,
"it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of
controlling a person's private thoughts."'' 56 So sweeping is this language that Professor Tribe has suggested it may place "the activities
actually 57
going on within the head" absolutely beyond government
control. 1
Significantly, the Court in Stanley rejected Georgia's argument
that just as it could protect the bodies of its citizens by prohibiting the
possession of things thought detrimental to their welfare, it could also
protect their minds from the effects of obscenity."5 ' The Court, noting that obscenity is suppressed primarily for the protection of the
individual rather than for that of the community,' 59 expressed doubt
"that this argument amounts to anything more than the assertion that
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
Id. at 18 (plurality opinion).
See supra text accompanying notes 109 & 111.
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Id. at 565.

155. Id.
156. Id. at 566.
157. L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 15-5, at 1315.
158. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 560, 565.
159. "Much of it is suppressed for the purity of the community and for the salvation and
welfare of the 'consumer.' Obscenity, at bottom, is not crime. Obscenity is sin." Id. at 565 n.8
(quoting Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391,

395 (1963)).
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the State has the right to control the moral content of a person's
thoughts."' 6 "To some," the Court noted, "this may be a noble purpose, but it is wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First
Amendment."''
Although in subsequent cases the Court narrowed Stanley to the
private possession of obscenity in the home and refused to extend it to
prohibit state control over the public display or distribution of
obscene material, 62 the Court continued to recognize the validity of
the principle Stanley had announced. Unlike in Stanley, the state in
these subsequent cases was not attempting "to control the minds or
thoughts" of those who patronized the theaters in question; the prevention of distribution of obscenity "is distinct from a control of reason and the intellect."'' 61 Stanley thus provides first amendment
protection for the possession and use of material that itself is unprotected by the Constitution; although the state may make criminal the
importation, mailing, or display of such material, or its sale to a willing buyer, it may not punish its private possession. The state's action
was not unconstitutional merely because some human " 'thoughts'
may be incidentally affected" by the restrictions imposed." 64 The
Court saw an analogy in the government's power to regulate the sale
of drugs, although the Court conceded that "[t]he fantasies of a drug
addict are his own and beyond the reach of government ....
Justice Harlan, concurring in United States v. Reidel, 66 described the
constitutional interest protected in Stanley as "the First Amendment
right of the individual to be free from governmental programs of
thought control, however such programs might be justified in terms of
permissible state objectives,"' 6 7 and the "freedom from governmental
manipulation of the content of a man's mind .... ,16
If government lacks the "power to control men's minds"'' 69 by
regulating the content of their libraries, then surely it also must lack
the power to do so more directly by imposing powerful therapies that
160. Id. at 565.
161. Id. at 565-66.
162. See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); United States v. Twelve 200-Foot
Reels, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); United States
v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
163. ParisAdult Theater, 413 U.S. at 67; see also Reidel, 402 U.S. at 356 ("freedom of mind
and thought" protected by Stanley does not require recognition of a right to distribute or sell
obscene materials).
164. Paris Adult Theater, 413 U.S. at 67.
165. Id.
166. 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
167. Id. at 359 (Harlan, J., concurring).
168. Id.
169. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
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regulate the content of the mind itself. Again, governmental programs or even imposed therapies that only incidentally affect thoughts
and beliefs will not implicate the first amendment. Intrusive therapies
that can be said to "control" the mind, on the other hand, would
appear to raise first amendment problems. And, as Stanley teaches,
the government's desire to protect the patient's welfare by rehabilitating his mind, however legitimate this motive may be, cuts strongly
against the grain of first amendment jurisprudence.
F. The FirstAmendment Right to Receive Information and Ideas
An additional line of Supreme Court cases that supports first
amendment protection of mental processes deals with the developing
first amendment "right to receive information and ideas." 7 ' The
Court has found this right, like freedom of association, to be an
"inherent corollary" of the first amendment. 7 ' Thus, in Board of
Education v. Pico, 72 the Court invoked the right to receive information in preventing the removal of unpopular books from a school
library. 7 3 The Court expressed concern that a contrary ruling would
encourage the kind of "officially prescribed orthodoxy" that the first
amendment condemns. '74 "Our Constitution," the
Court stressed,
' 75
"does not permit the official suppression of ideas."'
If the first amendment forbids government suppression of ideas
through removal of certain books from the school library, then it
clearly should forbid government suppression of ideas through the
more direct methods of psychotechnology. If anything, the prospect
of "officially prescribed orthodoxy" imposed surgically or pharmacologically is more ominous than the orthodoxy that could be brought
about by controlling the contents of the school library. Indeed, as
Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissenting opinion in Pico, "the denial
of access to ideas inhibits one's own acquisition of knowledge only
170. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (plurality opinion); see also Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (plurality opinion); Globe
Newspaper Co., Inc. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
408 (1974); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972); Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564;
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). See generally Emerson, Legal Foundationsof
the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1.
171. Pico, 457 U.S. at 867 (plurality opinion).
172. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
173. Id. at 871-72.
174. Id. at 871.

175. Id.
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when that denial is relatively complete."' 7 6 Because "the removed
books are readily available to students and non-students alike at the
'
corner bookstore or the public library," 177
in Justice Rehnquist's view
the removal of books from the school library did not materially deny
access to ideas in violation of the first amendment. Moreover, as the
dissent pointed out, there is an inherent difference between official
actions which impede access to ideas and official suppression of the
178
ideas themselves.
Compared to the control of books in the school library, intrusive
mental health therapy presents a much greater potential for suppression of ideas and the imposition of an "officially prescribed orthodoxy." Moreover, unlike censorship in the library, mental patients
and offenders cannot resist such therapy or even mitigate its effects
through exposure to competing ideas. To the extent that intrusive
mental health treatment techniques can effectively suppress ideas and
substitute new ones, the first amendment values protected by the
Court in the school library case would be at much greater risk. If the
Constitution protects "the right to receive information and ideas" as
an "inherent corollary" of the right of free speech, then it would seem
even more necessary that it protect the right to hold information and
ideas-to maintain beliefs, attitudes, and emotions free of direct and
irresistible government manipulation of mental processes.
G.

Freedom from Intrusion into Mental Processes as an
Indispensable Condition for Freedom of Expression

Several different strands of first amendment theory thus converge
to support the existence of a first amendment right to be free of at
least serious and irresistible intrusions on mental processes. The principles of "freedom of the mind," "freedom of belief," and "freedom of
thought," apply in the context of coerced mental health treatment.
"Freedom of belief" at its core concerns the right of individuals "to
form and hold ideas and opinions which are not communicated to
others.' 79 This freedom must be a prerequisite to freedom of speech;
without protection for freedom of the mind, freedom to speak would
be meaningless. In fact -the "inward activities" of thought, belief, and
emotion are the very essence of speech, "for speech has meaning and
176. Id. at 913 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 916.
179. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL
(Random House ed. 1966).

THEORY OF THE

FIRST AMENDMENT

64
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value only insofar as it reflects these [inward] activities.","s Thus,
although thoughts and beliefs are not literally speech, they are so
interdependent with speech that a system of freedom of expression is
inconceivable without protection for the integrity of mental
processes. 18 A Supreme Court faithful to the principle that freedom
"to believe" lies "at the heart of the First Amendment"' 82 should
have little difficulty extending first amendment protection to the
inward activities of the mind.
A right to hold ideas and opinions free of government coercion,
even more than the freedom to associate with others or the right of
access to ideas, "makes it possible for citizens generally to exercise
their rights of free speech and press in a meaningful manner .... 183
In the context of government imposition of mental health treatment,
both courts' 84 and commentators 8 5 have recognized this necessary
connection between freedom from intrusion into mental processes and
freedom of expression. Freedom of expression would be illusory if
government could intrude directly into mental processes to alter the
86
very thoughts, beliefs, or attitudes that would be expressed.1
180. Note, Content Regulation and the Dimensions of Free Expression, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1854, 1862 (1983).
181. T. EMERSON, supra note 179, at 64; see also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION 21-22 (1970). Emerson commented:

Belief ... is not strictly "expression." Forming or holding a belief occurs
prior to expression. But it is the first stage in the process of expression, and it
tends to progress into expression. Hence safeguarding the right to form and hold
beliefs is essential in maintaining a system of freedom of expression. Freedom of
belief, therefore, must be held included within the protection of the First
Amendment.
Id.
182. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977); see also Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he First Amendment was adopted to curtail the
power of Congress to interfere with the individual's freedom to believe .... ").
183. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 868 (1982) (plurality opinion).
184. E.g., Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1367 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remandedsub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S.
291 (1982) (first amendment protection for the communication of ideas "presupposes a
capacity to produce ideas," which therefore "is entitled to comparable constitutional
protection"); Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Mich.
Cir. Ct. [Wayne Cty.] July 10, 1973), reprinted in A. BROOKS, supra note 2, at 902, 917 ("To
the extent that the First Amendment protects the dissemination of ideas and the expression of
thoughts, it equally must protect the individual's right to generate ideas.").
185. E.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 15-7, at 1322 ("The guarantee of free expression is
inextricably linked to the protection and preservation of open and unfettered mental activity
..... "); Shapiro, Legislating the Control ofBehavior Control. Autonomy and the Coercive Use of
Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 255-57 (1974) (If the first amendment protects
communication, it must also protect "mentation"-

ideas and mental activity.").
186. One commentator stated:

"a person's power to generate thought,
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Indeed, if the first amendment protected communication of ideas but
allowed government manipulation of mental processes, "totalitarianism and freedom of expression could be characteristics of the same
society. "1 87

The right to hold ideas and opinions, because it is a predicate to
the exercise of other first amendment protected rights, must be
accorded special protection. Whatever limited power government
may have to interfere with freedom to express ideas, it must enjoy
even less power to interfere with the holding of ideas. When the government attempts to coerce beliefs, it "[i]nvades the innermost privacy
of the individual and cuts off the right of expression at its source." 18 "
Thus, government interference with thought processes and beliefs
functions as a form of prior restraint on expression. 8 9 Like a prior
restraint, such coercive intrusion into mental processes has "an immediate and irreversible" impact that irretrievably prevents exercise of
the right of expression. 9 ° Like other prior restraints, such intrusions
should be subject to a strong presumption of unconstitutionality. 191
[T]he notion of a right of freedom of speech presupposes that the beliefs,
opinions, and viewpoints expressed are not the products of deliberate
governmental efforts to shape and condition those beliefs. The first amendment
could serve no meaningful function in a society in which government
preconditioned the speaker. Such a society could dispense with the right of
freedom of speech as an irrelevancy.
van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Government Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62
TEX. L. REV. 197 (1983).
187. Arons & Lawrence, The Manipulation of Consciousness: A First Amendment Critique
of Schooling, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309, 312 (1980); see also id. at 313 ("Today, the
opportunity to manipulate consciousness precedes and may do away with the need to
manipulate expression.").
188. T. EMERSON, supra note 179, at 64; see also id. at 6-7; West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (school may not "strangle the free mind at its source").
189. For applications of the prior restraint doctrine, see Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,
109 S. Ct. 916 (1989); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138
(1988); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Kunz v. New York,
340 U.S. 290 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, supra note 33, at 865-74; M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS 127-71 (1984); Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66
MINN. L. REV. 11 (1981); Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 648 (1955); -Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409 (1983); Mayton,
Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment,
and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245 (1982); Redish, The
Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53
(1984). The prevention of prior restraints on expression "may have been the main purpose" of
the first amendment. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919); see Patterson v.
Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907); G. GUNTHER, supra note 33, at 1157.
190. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559.
191. "Any prior restraint on expression comes to . . . [the] Court with a 'heavy
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Indeed, Professor Emerson has argued that "the holding of a belief"
should be "afforded complete protection from state coercion."192
Emerson's arguments for absolute protection, as well as those of other
first amendment theorists,' 93 have not, however, been judicially
accepted, at least in other first amendment contexts. Although the
first amendment clearly states that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech,"' 194 and commentators have debated
whether first amendment rights are "absolute,"'' 95 the Supreme Court
has never accepted this view.' 96 Rather, the Court's approach gives
"nearly absolute" protection to certain expression, requiring that government demonstrate that any abridgment be justified as necessary to
further a "compelling state interest."'' 97 Because the Court uses this
approach for restriction of protected expression, governmental efforts
to intrude on private thoughts and ideas should receive scrutiny at
least as exacting. Thus, at a minimum, mental processes should be
presumptively protected by the first amendment against intrusive
interference by the state, and the presumption should be strong.
Unless the government can demonstrate a compelling necessity to justify such interference, a person's private thoughts and mental
processes should remain undisturbed.
IV.

MENTAL PROCESSES AND THE VALUES OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT

Reading the first amendment to protect mental processes from
the kind of direct governmental intrusion presented by at least some
of the mental health treatment techniques thus is supported by the
language of various Supreme Court cases, and by the logical and facpresumption' against its constitutional validity." Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe,
402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
192. T. EMERSON, supra note 179, at 64.
193. See, e.g., Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT.REV. 245,
257-58 ("A citizen may be told when and where and in what manner he may or may not speak,
write, assemble, and so on. On the other hand, he may not be told what he shall or shall not
believe. In that realm, each citizen is sovereign. He exercises powers that the body politic
reserves for its own members.").
194. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
195. See, e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 33, at 838-39; L. TRIBE,
supra note 33, § 12-2, at 791-93; Frantz, The FirstAmendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J.
1424 (1962); Mendelson, On the Meaning of the FirstAmendment: Absolutes in the Balance,
50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962).
196. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (Harlan, J.); id. at 56-80 (Black, J.,
dissenting); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Even the vigorous protection against prior restraints is not
absolute. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
197. See L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 12-8, at 832-36.
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tual connection between such protection and freedom of expression.
In addition, recognition of such protection is essential to the values
underlying the first amendment. The framers of the first amendment
"were concerned above all else with spiritual liberty: freedom to
think, to believe, and to worship." 19 8 In wording the amendment,
they therefore placed freedom of conscience first in their enumeration
of rights, moving only then to freedom of speech and press, and then
to the political rights of assembly and petition for the redress of grievances. 19 9 Although the framers considered these political rights to be
critical, they recognized that such rights depended on the more basic
freedoms to think and to believe. Jefferson, Madison, and the other
makers of our Constitution were children of the Enlightenment: 2°°
They believed above all else in the power of reason, in the search
for truth, in progress and the ultimate perfectibility of man. Freedom of inquiry and liberty of expression were deemed essential to
the discovery and spread of truth, for only by the endless testing of
debate could error be exposed, truth emerge, and men enjoy the
opportunities for human progress.2 ° 1

The first amendment serves a number of values central to our
constitutional scheme. A frequently cited cataloguing of these basic
values is that of Professor Emerson, a leading First Amendment
scholar:
First, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment ....
Second, freedom of expression is an
essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth
.... Third, freedom of expression is essential to provide for participation in decisionmaking by all members of society .... Finally,
freedom of expression is ... an essential mechanism for maintaining the balance between stability and change.2 °2

Each of these values would be served by affording constitutional
protection for mental processes. Emerson derives the value of individual self-fulfillment "from the widely accepted premise of Western
198. 'Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term-Forward: Freedom of Expression in the Burger
Court, 94 HARV. L. REV.. 1, 1.(1980).
199. Id.
200. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 26-30
(1967). See generally- H. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA (1976); G. WILLS,
INVENTING AMERICA (1978); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787 (1969); Cox; supra note 198, at 1-2; Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 175, 176-81 (1982).
201. Cox, supra note 198, at 2.

202. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 181, at 6; see
also T. EMERSON, supra note 179, at 3; M. REDISH, supra note 189, at 9 (citing Emerson and
describing him as "probably the leading modern theorist of free speech"); Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 24-25 (1971).
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thought that the proper end of man is the realization of his character
and potentialities as a human being. ' 20 3 This widely shared premise
shapes much of our constitutional heritage, for as Justice Brandeis has
noted, "[t]hose who won our independence believed that the final end
of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties ....
Brandeis' emphasis on "freedom to think"2 °5 makes it clear that he
was referring to man's mental faculties. Our mental faculties are
what distinguish our species from others that do not possess our
unique cognitive and communicative capacities. 0 6 Suppression of
belief is thus "an affront to the dignity of man, a negation of man's
essential nature. 20 7
Development of the mind and the process of conscious
thought-including the ability to think in abstract terms, to imagine,
and to have and communicate emotions and thoughts-are essential
to the identification and achievement of the goals of self-fulfillment.
Indeed, these mental processes are central to the development of individual identity itself. Both man's individual and social nature are
203. T. EMERSON, supra note 179, at 4; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
804-05 (1978) (White, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, J.J.) ("[S]ome have
considered . . . the principal function of the First Amendment [to be] the use of
communication as a means of self-expression, self-realization and self-fulfillment....") (citing
T. EMERSON, supra note 179, at 4-7); id. at 777 n. 12 (opinion of the Court) (citing T.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 181, at 6); Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (referring to "the autonomous control over
the development and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personality" as "rights
protected by the First Amendment") (emphasis omitted); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
95-96 (1972) (recognizing the assurance of "self-fulfillment for each individual" as an
important goal of the first amendment); G. GUNTHER, supra note 33, at 978-79; M. NIMMER,
supra note 33, § 1.03, at 1-49 to 1-52; F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRY 47-59 (1982); L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 12-1, at 787-89; Redish, The Value of Free
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593-94 (1982) (emphasizing the value of "individual selfrealization"); Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974); Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972) (emphasizing the value of personal autonomy); Stone, Content
Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 193 (1983) ("individual
self-fulfillment").
204. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring, joined by
Holmes, J.).
205. Id. (referring to "the deliberative forces" and "freedom to think as you will"); see also
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
206. See T. EMERSON, supra note 179, at 4; M. REDISH, supra note 189, at 18 (first
amendment viewed as a "recognition of the overriding importance of developing the uniquely
human abilities to think, reason and appreciate"); Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 545.
207. T. EMERSON, supra note 179, at 5; see also ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS X.7
(J. Thomson trans. 1953) (the intellect is the "true self of the individual"; intellectual activity is
the "best and pleasantist for man, because the intellectual more than anything else is the
man"); L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § i2-1, at 785-87; Blasi, supra note 206, at 544-45; Cox, supra
note 198, at 1.
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dependent upon intellectual activities of thought, belief, and emotion.
A constitutional scheme valuing individual self-fulfillment therefore
must protect a right to form and hold beliefs and opinions, indeed
must protect the right of each individual to develop his own unique
personality.2"' The makers of our Constitution recognized that individual self-fulfillment and the development of what Justice Brandeis
characterized as "man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect ' 20 9 are essential to the pursuit of happiness. To achieve these
values the first amendment must protect not only outward manifestations of expression but also mental processes, those "inward activities" that are the essence of expression.2 10
Thus, both freedom of mind and freedom of expression are central to our constitutional scheme, and worthy of protection because of
their intrinsic and not merely instrumental value.2 11 Of course, both
serve significant instrumental values as well,2 12 and these also support
the argument for constitutional protection of freedom of mind and
belief. Both freedoms are important social goods, and together constitute "the best process for advancing knowledge and discovering
truth. 21 3 Brandeis defended "freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think" as "means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth. ' 2 4 The classic invocation of these values as
justifications for freedom of expression came in a World War I era
opinion authored by Justice Holmes. Holmes spoke of the marketplace of ideas in a celebrated dissenting opinion:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of
208.
209.
210.
211.

T. EMERSON, supra note 179, at 4-5.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See Note, supra note 180, at 1862-63.
L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 12-1, at 786-89; Blasi, supra note 206, at 545; see also
ARISTOTLE, supra note 207, at X.7 ("the activity of contemplation is the only one that is
praised on its own account").
212. "The constitutional guarantee of free speech 'serves significant societal interests'
wholly apart from the speaker's interest in self-expression." Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public
Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (plurality opinion) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
213. T. EMERSON, supra note 179, at 7.

214. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring, joined by
Holmes, J.).
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our Constitution.2 1 5

The marketplace of ideas metaphor has emerged as a dominant
motif in first amendment jurisprudence. 2 16 This model admits all
beliefs and opinions to the marketplace, for "the usefulness of an
opinion is itself [a] matter of opinion. ' ' 2 17 Just as the attainment of
truth will suffer if opinions are excluded from the marketplace
because they are deemed to be incorrect, the exclusion of the ideas of
those regarded as insane or criminal will also frustrate this goal. Differentiating the sane from the insane may be no easier than distinguishing true from false opinions; 2 18 indeed, similar assumptions of
infallibility are involved.2 19 Professor Chafee, an eminent first amendment scholar, noted that:
Whenever we authorize a particular restriction on liberty we ought
not to forget that we are entrusting to fallible human beings a
power over the minds of others. Benjamin Franklin... stated...
that the desirability of stamping out evil thought is obvious, but the
215. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting, joined by
Brandeis, J.); see also Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (defending "freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think" as "means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth").
See generally J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 19-67 (Liberal Arts Press ed. 1956) (Chapter II: Of the
Liberty of Thought and Discussion); J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 51-52 (J. Hales rev. ed. 1949)
(1st ed. 1644) ("Let . . . [Truth] and Fals[e]hood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the
wors[e], in a free and open encounter?").
216. E.g., Texas v. Johnson, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2546 (1989); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public
Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (plurality
opinion); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981); Citizens Against Rent Control v.
City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981) (first amendment protects "a marketplace for the
clash of different views and conflicting ideas"); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-38 (1980); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 760
(1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 382 (1966); Dennis v, United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951); Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH
IN THE UNITED STATES

136-38, 298 (1948);

A.

MEIKLEJOHN,

FREE SPEECH

AND

ITS

RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 82-89 (1948); F. SCHAUER, supra note 203, at 15-34; L.
TRIBE, supra note 33, § 12-1, at 785; see also Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2546 ("the joust of
principles protected by the First Amendment"). See generally Baker, Scope of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 967-81 (1978); Cole, Agon at Agora:
Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857 (1986); Ingber,
supra note 103; Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning and the Cognitive
Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1188-95 (1989).
217. J. MILL, supra note 215, at 27.
218. See Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250 (1973); infra notes
266-317 and accompanying text; see also J. MILL, supra note 214, at 83-84. See generally T.
SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL (1966).
219. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 216, at 520; J. MILL, supra note 215, at 21-22; M.
NIMMER, supra note 33, § 1.02[A], at 1-8 to 1-9.
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question remains whether any human being is good and wise

enough to exercise it.2 2 °
Clearly, if sophisticated treatment techniques are used to suppress
what the government considers to be the disordered thoughts of
mental patients and offenders, the competition of the marketplace of
ideas is thereby reduced, inevitably decreasing the potential for truth
to emerge. "[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the
First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. ' ' 22 1
The additional values Professor Emerson invokes to justify our
system of free expression are to some degree interrelated. The first
amendment permits public participation in decisionmaking through a
process of open discussion available to all members of society. This is
particularly significant for political decisions; indeed, the first amendment is "indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy. ' 222 In a
related sense, the system of free expression is essential to maintaining
the balance between stability and change in the community, helping
to legitimize the political process and to foster greater cohesion in
society.2 23

Not only is freedom of expression critical to securing these values, but freedom of mind and of belief, necessary predicates to any
meaningful freedom of expression, are also essential to their attainment. The Supreme Court has described the central meaning of the
first amendment as the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open. "224 Fostering such debate serves a "central purpose" of
the amendment, "to protect the free discussion of governmental
220. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 216, at 520; see also American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442-43 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring & dissenting) ("It is not the
function of our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the
citizen to keep the Government from falling into error. We could justify any censorship only
when the censors are better shielded against error than the censored.").
221. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
222. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978); see Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); T. EMERSON, supra note 179, at 10. See
generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 216; A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1965); F.
SCHAUER, supra note 203, at 35-46; Bork, supra note 202, at 26-28; Brennan, The Supreme
Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretationof the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1; 14-20
(1965); Stone, supra note 203, at 193.
223. T. EMERSON, supra note 179, at 11-12; Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the
Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 428 (1980); see also M. NIMMER, supra note 33, at
§ 1.04 (the "safety valve function"); Bork, supra note 202, at 25 ("safety valve for society").
224. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see Kalven, The New York
Times Case.: A Note on "The CentralMeaning of the FirstAmendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV.
191, 204-10.
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affairs." 22' 5 The Court has more recently reiterated that the "primary
aim" of the first amendment "is the full protection of speech upon
issues of public concern. "226
Clearly, mental patients and criminal offenders may not be
excluded from the public debate on governmental affairs.
"[C]onditions in jails and prison," as well as in mental hospitals, "are
clearly matters 'of great public importance,' "227 and "with greater
information, the public can more intelligently form opinions about"
these public issues.22 8 Indeed, in view of the high potential for abuse
within the closed institutions of the prison and mental hospital, it is
particularly important to encourage these groups to participate in
political dialogue in order to serve what Professor Blasi has described
as the "checking value" of the first amendment-the value that free
speech can serve in limiting the abuse of power by public officials.22 9
The writings of institutionalized mental patients from the asylum
have historically played an important role in reforming the mental
health system. 230 Courts have recognized that even convicted prisoners have a first amendment right to communicate outside the institu225. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (citing Abood, 431 U.S. at
259) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)); accord Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at
776-77; Mills, 384 U.S. at 218.
226. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985) ("speech on public issues occupies the
'highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.' ") (quoting NAACP v.. Clairborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)); id. at 759
(" '[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression'; it is the essence of selfgovernment.' ") (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 145; Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75

(1964)).
227. Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 830
n.7 (1974)).
228. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 8.
229. Blasi, supra note 206, at 523; e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560
(1976); see J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 4.01, at 101 (1981).

230. See R.

PORTER,

A

SOCIAL HISTORY OF MADNESS:

THE WORLD THROUGH THE

EYES OF THE INSANE 126-35, 167-209, 248-50 (1987) (discussing the work of a number of
patient/reformers, including John Perceval, founder of the Alleged Lunatics' Friend Society, a
pressure group to protect the interests of the improperly confined in mid-nineteenth century
England, and Clifford Beers, the leading figure in the National Committee for Mental Hygiene
and the evangelist of the influential Mental Hygiene Movement in early twentieth century
America). Perceval's protests against the institutions in which he was confined were published

in J.

PERCEVAL, A NARRATIVE OF THE TREATMENT RECEIVED BY A GENTLEMAN, DURING

A STATE OF MENTAL

DERANGEMENT,

contained in two volumes printed in 1838 and 1840,

and reprinted as PERCEVAL'S NARRATIVE:

A PATIENT'S ACCOUNT OF HIS PSYCHOSIS (G.

Bateson ed. 1974). See R. PORTER, supra, at 248. Beers' book, A MIND THAT FOUND
ITSELF, originally published in 1908, went through 22 editions in the next 25 years. See id. at
249.
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tion.231 Moreover, the public enjoys first amendment protection
against unjustified governmental interference with communications
from prisoners and patients.232 Although the Supreme Court has
upheld restrictions on the direct access of the news media to prison
facilities, it did so in view of "[a] number of alternatives [that] are
available to prevent problems in penal facilities from escaping public
attention. ' 233 In addition, both prisoners234 and mental patients 235
are accorded a right of relatively unrestricted communication with
attorneys, courts, and other public officials, not only to effectuate
their right to contest the legality of their confinement, but also to
ensure that institutional abuses may be brought to public attention
and redressed. The rights of prisoners and patients to communicate
to those outside of the institution-to assert legal rights, to criticize
officials, to report on conditions, or for other purposes-as well as the
reciprocal right of the public to receive such communications, would
231. E.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 824 (1974) (rejecting claims of news media to
conduct interviews with prisoners and of prisoners to participate in such interviews in order to
inform the public about prison conditions in light of right of prisoners to write letters to the
media); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (right of inmates to send written
communications outside the prison), overruled in part on other grounds, Thornburgh v. Abbot,
109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989); see J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 229, §§ 4.00-4.07. Mental
hospital patients also have a first amendment right to communicate outside the hospital. See,
e.g., Brown v. Schubert, 347 F. Supp. 1232, 1234 (E.D. Wis. 1972), supplemented, 389 F. Supp.
281, 283-84 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379-80 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974);
Stowers v. Wolodzko, 386 Mich. 119, 191 N.W.2d 355 (1971) (statutory right). See generally
Gostin, Freedom of Expression and the Mentally Disordered: Philosophicaland Constitutional
Perspectives, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 419 (1975); Note, The Committed Mentally Ill and Their
Right to Communicate, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 297 (1971).
232. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 412-13.
233. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978); see Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell, 417 U.S. at 824-28.
234. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (due process right of access to courts);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-80 (1974) (due process right of access to courts, first
amendment right of correspondence with attorneys); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941) (due
process right of access to courts); Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1976) (outgoing
mail to courts and judicial officials may not be opened); Craig v. Hocker, 405 F. Supp. 656 (D.
Nev. 1975) (outgoing mail to attorneys may not be censored or confiscated). See generally J.
GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 229, §§ 2.00-2.14.
235. See, e.g., Ward v. Kort, 762 F.2d 856, 858 (10th Cir. 1985) (constitutional right of
access to the courts); Johnson v. Brelje, 701 F.2d 1201, 1207 (7th Cir. 1983) (same); Coe v.
Maryland, No. K-83-4248 (D. Md. April 4, 1985) (consent decree funding legal assistance
program to secure constitutional right of access to courts); Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 379-80
(unrestricted right to send and receive sealed mail from attorneys, private physicians, courts
and public officials); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4-2 4 .2g(1) (West 1981) (statutory right to
communicate with lawyers); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 51.61(l)(c) (West 1987) (statutory right to
communicate with officials, committing court and mental health agency); Garvey, Freedom
and Choice in ConstitutionalLaw, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1756, 1772-73 (1981); Note, supra note
231, at 307-11.
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be meaningless if institutional authorities could materially alter the
mental processes of their charges through involuntary treatment techniques or modify the content of such communication or the individual's desire to engage in it.
The essential values justifying the first amendment thus would be
substantially undermined if speech were to remain unimpaired but
mental processes could be controlled. Governmental attempts to
intrude directly into mental processes to effect changes in thoughts,
beliefs, opinions, and emotions, must therefore be regarded as hostile
to the principles of the first amendment.
V.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR
MENTAL PROCESSES

A.

Does the FirstAmendment Protect Insane
or Disordered Thoughts?

The above conclusion must be examined against the contention
that although the first amendment protects thoughts, it does not protect insane or disordered thoughts. 23 6 This contention is arguably
supported by several Supreme Court cases holding that certain types
of speech are totally unprotected by the first amendment. This
approach was first articulated in the Court's 1942 opinion in Chaplin237
sky v. New Hampshire:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
"fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has
been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them 238
is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
From this dictum, the Court has derived a two-level theory of the first
amendment, fully protecting most kinds of speech against government
abridgement absent compelling necessity, but recognizing certain limited categories of expression as being so worthless that they are
236. See Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978) ("The court need not
reach the question of whether insane or disordered thought is within the scope of first
amendment protection."), aff'd in part, modified in part,and remanded, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir.
1981) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d
Cir. 1983) (en banc).
237. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
238. Id. at 571-72.
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beyond the amendment's protection.' 39 In addition to "fighting
words," the Court has excluded libelous utterances"4 and obscen" ' from constitutional protection.
ity24
Although the Court had appeared to be moving away from this
dichotomy between protected and unprotected speech,242 its recent
opinions continue to cite the distinction.243 In fact, in the 1982 case of
239. See L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 12-18.
240. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). But see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (some libelous statements concerning public officials protected by first
amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (The first amendment
protects defamatory statements in the absence of fault even for defendants who are not public
figures.); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (extending New York Times to
public figures). Although undercut, Beauharnaishas recently been cited for the proposition
that libelous utterances are not protected by the first amendment. Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union, 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984).
241. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2835-36 (1989); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). But see Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 561 (1969) (private possession and use of obscenity protected by first
amendment). In Miller, the Court adopted a three-part test for defining obscenity: It must
"appeal[] to the prurient interest"; it must portray specifically defined sexual conduct in a
"patently offensive way"; and it must lack "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value" when viewed as a whole. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
242. Chaplinsky has been substantially eviscerated in the "fighting words" context. See,
e.g., Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972); Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972);
Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In Texas v. Johnson, the recent flag-burning case, the Court
rejected an argument that the burning of a flag was within the "fighting words" exception of
Chaplinsky and stated that "[n]o reasonable onlooker would have regarded Johnson's
generalized expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of the Federal Government as a
direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs." Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct.
2533, 2542 (1989).
Beauharnais,the libelous utterances case, has been eclipsed by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam), Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), and New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Commercial advertising, once in the unprotected category, Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52 (1942), is now deemed protected. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989);
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S.
1 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v.
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). For the approach used by the Court in commercial
speech cases, see infra notes 262-64 and accompanying text.
Perhaps only the obscenity category of noncovered speech survives today. See Schauer,
Codifying the FirstAmendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 285, 303; see, e.g.,
Sable Communications, 109 S. Ct. at 2835-36; Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). But see
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 561 (1969) (private possession and use of pornography protected
by first amendment). See generally Schauer, supra, at 302-04.
243. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Buildings, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 & n.5 (1985)
(obscene speech and "fighting words" accorded no protection); Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union, 466 U.S. 485, 504 & n.22 (1984) (obscenity and libel considered unprotected); New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (child pornography unprotected).
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New York v. Ferber, the Court seemed to define distribution of child
pornography as a new category of unprotected speech. 2" Although
nonobscene, this material visually depicts sexual conduct by children.
Ferber, however, may not signal a return to the Chaplinsky doctrine
of noncovered expression. Whether the Court will actually treat child
pornography as outside the coverage of the first amendment is an
open question, for although the Ferber Court cited Chaplinsky and
other unprotected speech cases, it did not determine that child pornography was totally devoid of first amendment value.245 Furthermore, the Court's discussion of the strong state interest in the
regulation of child pornography246 would have been unnecessary had
this category of expression been treated as altogether beyond the
ambit of the first amendment. Citations to Chaplinsky and its progeny notwithstanding, the technique employed in Ferber thus does not
seem to be one of noncoverage.247
To whatever extent the Chaplinsky doctrine survives, and it
appears to have vitality at least in the obscenity area,248 it constitutes
a recognition that at least some limited categories of unprotected
speech are removed altogether from first amendment review, even
though they involve regulation of the content of expression-for
which exacting scrutiny is usually reserved. Rather than requiring a
showing that the government restriction is necessary to further a
"compelling state interest"-the usual standard for justifying abridgement of first amendment rights 249-the government will be permitted
to regulate these types of expression "subject only to the barest due
25 °
process scrutiny.
In a related doctrinal development, the Court or several members of it have begun to treat certain categories of speech as having a
"lower value" than, for example, political speech. 251 Restrictions on
such "lower value" speech are then scrutinized under a standard that
places a lesser burden of justification on government than would be
applied to speech within the core values of the first amendment. A
plurality of the Court in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., sug244. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 ("[C]hild pornography .
the First Amendment.").

like obscenity, is unprotected by

245. Id. at 763-64.
246. The Court described the state interest as both "compelling" and "of surpassing
importance." Id. at 757.
247. Schauer, supra note 242, at 303-04.
248. See supra notes 241-43.
249. See infra notes 525-32 and accompanying text.
250. L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 12-8, at 832, 837.
251. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 33, at 1101 & n.4, 1109-10; L. TRIBE, supra note 33,
§ 12-18, at 928-34.
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gested that nonobscene but sexually explicit speech deserves less constitutional protection than other types of protected speech.25 2 The
Court upheld a zoning ordinance restricting the location of theaters
showing sexually explicit "adult" movies, finding that the societal
interest in protecting the free flow of sexually explicit materials was of
"a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude" than the interest in protecting other kinds of expression.2 3 The Court applied a balancing
test, finding that the city's desire to protect its neighborhoods was

sufficiently compelling to justify the ordinance.254
Another plurality of the Court employed a similar balancing
approach in FCC v. PacificaFoundation,2 " upholding the authority of
the Federal Communications Commission to regulate radio broadcasts that the Court considered indecent although not obscene. 56 In
a somewhat ambiguous 1986 opinion, a majority of the Court for the
first time may have embraced the notion that nonobscene sexually
explicit speech deserves less protection than other kinds of protected
speech. In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,257 the Court
upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted the location of adult theaters, quoting in a footnote language from the American Mini Theatres
plurality opinion which suggested that such sexually explicit speech is
of a "wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest of
untrammelled political debate. ' 258 This approach, however, may be
limited to zoning restrictions and to radio or television broadcasting
during times of the day when children are exposed to it. A unanimous Supreme Court recently distinguished Pacifica on this basis
from indecent but nonobscene sexually oriented private commercial
telephone communications, known as "dial-a-porn." In Sable Com252. 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion).
253. Id. Only four Justices joined that part of the Court's opinion that suggested lesser first
amendment protection for sexually explicit speech. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the
Court, and this portion of it was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and
Rehnquist. Justice Powell concurred, but did not join Justice Stevens' opinion on this point.
Id. at 73.
254. Id. at 71-73.
255. 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion).
256. In this respect, Justice Stevens' opinion was joined only by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 729. Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice
Blackmun, refused to agree that offensive although nonobscene speech deserves less protection
than other types of speech:
I do not subscribe to the theory that the Justices of this Court are free generally
to decide on the basis of its content which speech protected by the First
Amendment is most "valuable" and hence deserving of the most protection and
which is less "valuable" and hence deserving of less protection.
Id. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring).
257. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
258. Id. at 49 n.2 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)).
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munications,Inc. v. FCC,25 9 the Court invalidated a total ban on such

communications, finding Pacifica to involve merely a partial ban on
broadcasting and to be limited to contexts involving the "captive
audience" problem presented there. 26° Applying traditional strict
scrutiny, the Court found that the total ban on such telephone communications "far exceeds that which is necessary to limit the access of
minors to such messages,"' 26 ' and was therefore unconstitutional. The
Court thus treated the sexually explicit speech before it as entitled to
full first amendment protection, although it acknowledged that at
least in certain circumstances sexually explicit speech would be scrutinized under a lesser standard.
In addition to nonobscene sexually explicit speech, the Court has
accorded "lesser value" to certain kinds of commercial speech under
the first amendment. In CentralHudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public
Service Commission,2 62 the Court explicitly recognized that "[t]he
Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to commercial speech

than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. "263 For commercial speech the Court employs a form of intermediate scrutiny,
permitting restrictions only if they directly advance substantial government interests and are narrowly tailored to achieve them.2 64
These cases, involving what the Court or some members of it
have regarded as "less valuable" speech, have not employed the
approach of Chaplinsky, under which such communication would be
excluded altogether from first amendment coverage. Rather, the
Court has accorded these kinds of speech some constitutional protection, applying a balancing approach or a form of intermediate scrutiny, rather than the strict scrutiny usually applicable to intrusions on
first amendment protected speech.
An argument could be framed based upon Chaplinsky and its
259. 109 S.Ct. 2829 (1989).

260. Id. at 2837-38.
261. Id. at 2839.
262. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).

263. Id. at 562-63; accord Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3033 (1989) (referring
to the "subordinate position [of commercial speech] in the scale of First Amendment values");
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.*v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985) (plurality

opinion) ("not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance"; distinguishing speech "on
matters of public concern" from speech "on matters of purely private concern," the latter
being "of less First Amendment concern").
264. Fox, 109 S. Ct. at 3033; Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328,
339 (1986) (applying these tests somewhat deferentially); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 628 (1985); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980). The Court in Fox recently clarified that the narrow
tailoring standard is not as demanding as the "least-restrictive-means" requirement. 109 S. Ct.
at 3032-35. For other commercial speech cases, see supra note 239.
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progeny, or based upon the recent cases suggesting that certain "lesser
value" speech be accorded lesser constitutional protection, that insane
or disordered thought is without value and therefore outside the
ambit of first amendment protection, or of lower value, and therefore
deserving only of lesser scrutiny.265 This argument must fail, however, for a number of reasons. First, the distinction between sane and
disordered thought is elusive,266 particularly in view of the imprecision of the diagnostic categories used in defining mental illness, as
26
well as of the lack of consistency by clinicians in their application. 1
Although the diagnostic criteria for mental illness have become more
specific in recent years,2 68 particularly with the 1980 adoption (DSM111)269

and 1987 revision (DSM-III-R)271 of the third edition of the

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorder, the criteria
remain imprecise and value laden. DSM-III-R, developed by the
American Psychiatric Association, is the official specification of diagnostic criteria widely used by mental health clinicians in America.
The approach of DSM-III and DSM-III-R is animated by a strong
commitment to Baconian empiricism in the definition of the diagnostic criteria,27 ' which the drafters characterize as "'descriptive' in that
the definitions of the disorders are generally limited to descriptions of
265. See supra note 236; Appelbaum & Gutheil, "Rotting With Their Rights On":
Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306, 312-13 (1979); Shapiro, supra note 157, at 270-71.
266. See Shapiro, supra note 185, at 270; Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against
Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 54, 64-65 (1982);
Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis ofMental Health Law, 51 S.CAL. L.
REV. 527, 540, 572-74, 632-35 (1978); Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32
UCLA L. REV. 921, 970-71 (1985); supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
267. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985) ("Psychiatry is not, however, an exact
science, and psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness, on
the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms, on cure and
treatment .... ."); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1979) (recognizing "the
uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis"); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 587 (1975)
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (referring to the "wide divergence of medical opinion regarding the
diagnosis of and proper therapy for mental abnormalities"). See generally J. ZISKIN, COPING
WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY (3d ed. 1981); Ennis & Litwack,
Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise. Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L.
REV. 693 (1974); Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health
Law, supra note 266, at 542-60.
268. Westermeyer, Psychiatric Diagnosis Across Cultural Boundaries, 142 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 798, 799 (1985).
269. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III].
270. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R].
271. Faust & Miner, The Empiricist and His New Clothes. DSM-III in Perspective, 143 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 962, 962 (1986).
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the clinical features of the disorders.

'272

A diagnosis of mental abnor-

mality calls for a clinician's interpretation of "behavioral signs or
symptoms. 2 73 Although this may appear to be an exercise in description, it inevitably involves "subjective cultural judgments about what
is abnormal." 274
The goal of strict empiricism has not and cannot be achieved
because the label "mental disorder" contains an inherently evaluative
component. Under DSM-III and DSM-III-R, "mental disorders" are
defined through use of the concepts of "distress" and "impairment" in
"important areas of functioning.

2 75

The concept of "mental disor-

der" presupposes a standard of normality against which unusual
behavior is measured. Consider the following hypothetical: Lawyers
(and their spouses) understand well the aphorism, "Law is a jealous
mistress." The work is demanding and frequently involves long
hours. Some law firms expect their attorneys to bill 3200 hours per
year, or even more. Indeed, some lawyers work so hard that their
work interferes with their ability to function effectively in other
apsects of their lives. Their role as spouses, parents, or friends may
suffer; they lack the time to enjoy nature, read literature, listen to
music, contemplate philosophy, or even to engage in physical exercise.
Their family and friends complain that they lack balance in their lives
and have become "workaholics." Some lawyers experience distress as
a result of their professional choice. Yet others love the law, including the long hours, citing their pleasure in the craft of the work, or the
economic rewards, or other reasons. For some, this behavior may
have its roots in childhood conflicts; for some it may constitute a form
of addiction to the adrenalin that the stress of the work stimulates.27 6
Suppose the American Psychiatric Association Board of Trustees was
to add "workaholism" to the categories of mental disorder, and that a
new medication was developed to treat this condition.2 77 Would these
developments render the first amendment inapplicable to the involun272. DSM-III-R, supra note 270, at xxiii; see also DSM-1II, supra note 269, at 7.
273. DSM-III-R, supra note 270, at xxiii.
274, Johnson, Contributions of Anthropology to Psychiatry, in REVIEW OF GENERAL
PSYCHIATRY 180, 184 (H. Goldman ed. 1984).
275. DSM-III, supra note 269, at 6; DSM-III-R, supra note 270, at xxii.
276. See Lyons, Stress Addiction: 'Life in the Fast Lane' May Have Its Benefits, N.Y.
Times, July 26, 1983, § C, at 1, col. I ("The Type A individual has perhaps become addicted to
his own adrenaline and unconsciously seeks ways to get those little surges ....");cf Roy,
DeJong & Linnoila, Extraversion in Pathological Gamblers: Correlates with Indexes of
NoradrenergicFunction, 46 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 679 (1989) (reporting on research
suggesting that gamblers may have an abnormality of the adrenergic system and may engage in
gambling behavior to increase the levels of certain brain chemicals).
277. See Machlowitz, A New Take on Type A, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1987, § 6, part 2
(Magazine) at 40 (predicting a pharmacological approach to treatment of "Type A" behavior).
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tary administration of such treatment to lawyers diagnosed as
"workaholics"? 278
The chair of the American Psychiatric Association committees
that developed both DSM-III and DSM-III-R concedes that "[t]he
concept of 'disorder' always involves a value judgment. ' 279 People
are diagnosed as mentally ill based on a judgment that their behavior
is abnormal. The criteria of "distress" and "impairment" in important areas of functioning "are permeated by dominant social values
and are shaped, in part, by the preference for a statistical definition of
normality and abnormality. ' 28 0 "Attitudinal, political, historical, and
perhaps even economic factors" can influence both the definition of
diagnostic criteria and their application. 8 '
A recent illustration of the impact of social and moral values on
the definition of diagnostic criteria concerns the classification of
homosexuality as a mental disorder.28 2 Although prior to 1973,
homosexuality per se was defined as a disorder, in that year the American Psychiatric Association Board of Trustees, following heated
debate, removed it from this category and substituted a new classification, "Sexual Orientation Disturbance," restricted to homosexuals
278. An example drawn from history provides an additional illustration of the inherent
manipulability of categories like "disordered" or "mentally ill" based on political or social
considerations masquerading as medical judgments. In the ante bellum South, a Louisiana
doctor, Samuel W. Cartwright, attributed the behavior patterns of some slaves that overseers
"erroneously" called "rascality," to a disease, peculiar to blacks, which he termed
"Dysaethesia aethiopica." K. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE
ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 102 (1968). The symptoms of this condition, which Dr. Cartwright
attributed entirely to "the stupidness of mind and insensibility of the nerves induced by the
disease," were described by the doctor as follows:
An.African who suffered from this exotic affliction was "apt to do much
mischief" which appeared "as if intentional." He destroyed or wasted
everything he touched, abused the livestock, and injured the crops. When he was
driven to his labor he performed his tasks "in a headlong, careless manner,
treading down with his feet or cutting with his hoe the plants" he was supposed
to cultivate, breaking his tools, and "spoiling everything."
Id. According to Dr. Cartwright, slaves who absconded from their masters suffered from a
second "disease of the mind" that was unique to blacks, termed "Drapetomania," "the disease
causing negroes to run away." Id. at 109. Most southern doctors rejected Cartwright's theories, and the Charleston Medical Journal criticized Cartwright's "mixture of medicine and
politics." Id. at 309. However, had the treatments of modern psychiatry then been available,
it is easily conceivable that their involuntary use for slaves afflicted with these "diseases of the
mind" could have been defended by the same principles of benevolence and social utility
advanced by Cartwright.
279. Spitzer, The Diagnostic Status of Homosexuality in DSM-III: A Reformulation of the
Issues, 138 AM. J.PSYCHIATRY 210, 214 (1981).
280. Faust & Miner, supra note 271, at 963.
281. Westermeyer, supra note 268, at 799.
282. See Spitzer, supra note 279.

1989]

RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT

disturbed by their sexual orientation or wishing to change it.283 DSMIII further modified the definition of this category and renamed it
"Ego-dystonic Homosexuality. '284 The category was subsequently
deleted in DSM-III-R, which merely lists "persistent and marked distress about one's sexual orientation," as an example of "Sexual Disorders Not Otherwise Specified. ' 285 In light of the focus in the
definition of mental disorders in DSM-III and DSM-III-R on the concepts of "distress" and "impairment" in "important areas of functioning,"' 286 homosexuals who do not experience distress as a result of
their sexual orientation could nonetheless be considered disordered
because of impairment in one or more important areas of functioning. 287 The individual's occupational life would undoubtedly be considered one such area of functioning. Consider the case of a welladjusted homosexual whose revelation of his sexual orientation
impairs his occupational functioning because of the negative attitudes
of his employer or co-workers. In this case, if such occupational
impairment is deemed to justify considering the individual's homosexuality a mental disorder, the social and moral values of these others
would constitute the determinitive factor. Another area of functioning that might be considered impaired is the homosexual's sexuality
itself. But whether sexual functioning should be deemed "an important area of functioning" and whether heterosexual functioning
should be used as the norm both turn on value judgments, not empirical determinations.288
Even for conditions that by wide or even universal agreement
produce distress and interfere in important areas of social and occupational functioning-schizophrenia, for example-and that, therefore,
we agree should be considered mental disorders-the clinical determination of who suffers from the disorder raises similar problems. Diagnostic reliability-the probability that two clinicians will agree with
each other's diagnosis-is only fifty to sixty percent for schizophrenia,
and thirty to forty percent for depression and affective disorder.289
There is wide disagreement within psychiatry concerning the nature
and causes of schizophrenia and many of the other mental illnesses.2 9°
There simply is no "litmus test" available for the diagnosis of these
283. Id. at 210.
284. Id. at 210-11.
285. DSM-III-R, supra note 270, at 296.
286. See supra note 275.
287. See Spitzer, supra note 279, at 212.
288. Id.
289. Westermeyer, supra note 268, at 801. See generally Ennis & Litwack, supra note 267,
at 697-708, 729-32.
290. See, e.g., P. MECHANIC, MENTAL HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 14-17 (1969).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1

conditions.29 1 Unlike physical illnesses, for which objective investigatory procedures are usually available for making and confirming diagnoses, the assessment of mental illness depends almost exclusively on
subjective clinical judgment. 292 The lack of theoretical consensus
among clinicians concerning schizophrenia and other conditions inevitably produces varying application of diagnostic criteria. DSM-III
and DSM-III-R seek to address this problem by claiming a "generally
atheoretical approach" to etiology,2 93 one which focuses on the consequences of a condition rather than its causes.294 This claim reinforces
the notion that clinicians applying the diagnostic criteria are merely
observing and describing "facts." Facts, however, are not theory neutral. Diverse work in philosophy of science has repeatedly demonstrated that the observation and reporting of facts are inevitably
theory driven.29 5 Medical diagnoses are by their nature "hypotheses
based on some underlying theory or set of assumptions."2 96 Given the
lack of consensus concerning the etiology of these conditions and the
imprecision of their symptoms, 297 divergence in the clinical application of the criteria used to define them is not surprising.298 Moreover,
291. Cancro, Introduction to Etiologic Studies of the Schizophrenic Disorders, in
PSYCHIATRY 1982 ANNUAL REVIEW 91 (L. Grinspoon ed. 1982) ("There is no independent
test to confirm or to reject the diagnosis of schizophrenia. There is no tissue or body fluid
which can be sent to the laboratory to ascertain which individuals are false positives or false
negatives.").
292. D. MECHANIC, supra note 290, at 17.
293. This excerpt is illustrative:
For most of the DSM-III-R disorders . . . the etiology is unknown. Many
theories have been advanced and buttressed by evidence-not always
convincing-attempting to explain how these disorders come about. The
approach taken in DSM-III-R with regard to etiology is that the inclusion of
etiologic theories would be an obstacle to use of the manual by clinicians of
varying theoretical orientations, since it would not be possible to present all
reasonable etiologic theories for each disorder.
DSM-III-R, supra note 270, at xxiii.
294. Spitzer, supra note 279, at 211-13.
295. See, e.g., W. GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING 2-3 (1978); R. HARE, THE
PHILOSOPHIES

OF SCIENCE

11

(1972);

T.

KUHN,

THE

STRUCTURE

OF

SCIENTIFIC

REVOLUTIONS 66 (2d ed. 1970); K. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 94-95
(1959); H. PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 54 (1981); N. RESCHER, EMPIRICAL
INQUIRY 18, 70-72 (1982); M. TURNER, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 1415 (1967); W. WEIMER, NOTES ON THE METHODOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 20-26
(1979); Faust & Miner, supra note 271, at 964-65; see also Casebeer, Work on a Labor Theory
of Meaning, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1637, 1638 (1989); Winter, supra note 216, at 1131.
296. B. MECHANIC, supra note 290, at 18.
297. The introduction to DSM-III-R itself concedes that the manual's classification of
mental disorders provides no "precise boundaries" or "sharp boundaries" for differentiating
one disorder from another or from no disorder at all. DSM-III-R, supra note 270, at xxii-iii.
298. Cancro, supra note 291, at 91 ("Diagnosis remains a clinical activity based on
arbitrarily selected clinical phenomena. The limitation of the diagnostic method guarantees
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although DSM-III and DSM-III-R narrow the definition of schizophrenia and deemphasize the role of such inherently subjective criteria as dysfunction in personal relationships, 99 many clinicians in
practice may continue to apply a broader notion of schizophrenia. 3"
The problem of subjectivity in the application of psychiatric diagnostic criteria is exacerbated when white, middle-class, and overwhelmingly male clinicians are called upon to interpret the signs and
symptoms of culturally foreign patients-a scenario that frequently
occurs in our urban communities and in mental hospitals and prisons
generally.3"' This problem produces erroneous commitment and
unnecessary harmful intrusive treatment not only of ethnic and racial
minorities,3 °2 but also increasingly of immigrant populations. Many
immigrants cannot communicate effectively in English, with the result
that their symptoms are easily misunderstood by clinicians whose cultural distance from these individuals is compounded by the additional
heterogeneity in the sample and in part accounts for the fact that
schizophrenic syndrome are less reliable than is desirable.").
299. Id. at 85-86, 90.
300. Many of the divergent diagnoses of John Hinckley offered
psychiatrists who testified at his celebrated trial were not contained in
illustrate that even expert psychiatric witnesses "do not feel bound by the

categories." A.

STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY

all studies of the

by the numerous
DSM-III, and thus
DSM-III diagnostic

84-85, 91 (1984). The tendency

of clinicians not to feel bound by DSM-lII may be augmented by criticism of DSM-II's
artificial clarity and abbreviated character, and the suggestion that clinicians "go on to a
broad-based assessment of other characteristics of the person, including his or her social
functioning, distortions of meaning, psychological conflicts, and coping mechanisms. Strauss,
The Clinical Pictures and Diagnosis of the Schizophrenic Disorders, in PSYCHIATRY 1982
ANNUAL REVIEW,

supra note 291, at 87, 90-91.

301. See Johnson, supra note 274, at 184. Indeed, DSM-III-R specifically cautions
clinicians concerning this problem. DSM-III-R, supra note 270, at xxvi-vii.
302. National statistics on admissions to state and county psychiatric hospitals reveal that
black men are hospitalized at a rate 2.8 times greater than white men, and black women at a
rate 2.5 times greater than white women. E. Rosenthal & L. Carty, Impediments to Services
for Black and Hispanic People with Mental Illness 3 (June 1988) (unpublished manuscript
prepared by Mental Health Law Project under contract with National Institute of Mental
Health) (citing 1987 NIMH statistics). While 48.9% of whites were hospitalized involuntarily,
56.6% of nonwhites were so hospitalized. Id. Moreover, these statistics show that black
inpatients were diagnosed as schizophrenics at almost twice the rate of white inpatients, and
that this disparity is even greater for black women compared to white women. Id. at 4.
Hispanic inpatients are diagnosed as schizophrenic at a rate 1.4 times that of white inpatients.
Id. There is a growing concern that these disparities, rather than reflecting some inherent
racial susceptibility to psychopathology, are the result of misdiagnosis caused by the sociocultural distance between clinicians and these minority group patients. See Adebimpe,
Overview.- White Norms and Psychiatric Diagnosis of Black Psychiatric Patients, 138 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 279, 279, 281-83 (1981); Jones & Gray, Problems of Diagnosing Schizophrenia
and Affective Disorders Among Blacks, 37 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 61, 61-65
(1986); E. Rosenthal & L. Carty, supra, at 4-7. "Language not understood is often considered
evidence of thought disorder; styles of relating are sometimes misinterpreted as disturbances in
affect; and unfamiliar mannerisms are considered bizarre." Jones & Gray, supra, at 63.
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language barrier. In an ironic variation of this problem, many institutional psychiatrists, accepting employment in state hospitals or prisons where full licensure often is not required, are foreign-born and
foreign-trained clinicians, frequently with an even greater cultural and
language distance from their patients.3 "'
Thus, for several reasons, "DSM-III's appearance of objectivity
is largely illusory." 3" Although mental illness is not a myth, a°5 the
criteria used to define it are subjective and imprecise and their application inevitably involves value judgments, often beyond the professional competence of clinicians. Indeed, except in the clearest of
cases, determining who is mentally ill is a social and moral judgment
as much as a clinical one. 0 6
As a result, allowing application of the first amendment to turn
upon this distinction is fraught with danger. 30 7 The most familiar
example is psychiatric practice in the Soviet Union, where there is no
equivalent of the first amendment. Dissident political beliefs have
been defined as disordered and their proponents declared mentally ill,
committed to hospitals, and subjected to intrusive mental health treatment to change their beliefs.30 8 Surely many of the Soviet psychiatrists who participated in these practices in the pre-perestroika era did
so out of what they considered to be benevolent motives.30 9 In the
social and political context within which these psychiatrists lived and
worked, political dissidents could be considered disordered, if only
because they were so obviously self-destructive.3 10 In any event, treat303. See E. Rosenthal & L. Carty, supra note 302, at 6; Solomon, Racial Factors in Mental
Health Service Utilization, 11 PSYCHOSOCIAL REHABILITATION J. 3, 10 (1988).
304. Faust & Miner, supra note 271, at 963.
305. In his many writings, psychiatrist Thomas Szasz argues that mental illness is a myth
and a metaphor. See, e.g., T. SZAsz, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS (1970); T. SZASZ,
THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961). Many of Szasz's criticisms of how the law treats
mental illness are valid. Compare, e.g., Winick, supra note 267 with T. SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC
JUSTICE (1965).

However, Szasz's basic analysis is flawed. See, e.g., D. MECHANIC, supra

note 290, at 17-19; Moore, Some Myths About "Mental Illness," 32 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 1483 (1975); Reiss, A Critique of Thomas S. Szasz's "Myth of Mental Illness,"
128 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1081 (1972).
306. See H. FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 37 (1972); Morse, A

Preference for Liberty. The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered,
supra note 266, at 559-60; Shapiro, supra note 185, at 270; Winick, supra note 266, at 966-67.
307. See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
308. See S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, PSYCHIATRIC TERROR: How SOVIET PSYCHIATRY
Is USED TO SUPPRESS DISSENT (1977); H. FIRESIDE, SOVIET PSYCHOPRISONS (1979);

Chalidze, A Comparison of Norms-Rights of the Mentally Ill and Allegedly Mentally Ill, 1
N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTS. ANN. 75, 85-86 (1983); Clarity, A Freed Dissident Says Soviet Doctors
Sought to Break His Political Beliefs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1976, at Al, 8.
309. See A. STONE, supra note 300, at 6; Wing, Psychiatry in the Soviet Union, BRITISH
MED. J. 433 (1974).
310. See A. STONE, supra note 300, at 21.
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ment could be justified as better for such individuals than the alternative treatment they would receive at the hands of the KGB.31 '
Such "benevolence" is not unknown among American psychiatrists. In the American criminal justice system, for example, many
psychiatrists have traditionally overdiagnosed incompetency to stand
trial based on the often mistaken belief that incompetency commitment would be better for the defendant than the criminal process.312
This has frequently resulted in lengthy commitment of defendants to
substandard forensic hospitals. When fundamental constitutional values are at stake, close judicial scrutiny of governmental action is
appropriate even (and perhaps especially) when that action is justified
by benevolent motives.3 13 Especially when first amendment values are
at risk, courts have traditionally been concerned with leaving unstructured discretion in the hands of enforcement officials.314 We can no
more trust the "good psychiatrist" than we can the "good cop."
The first amendment plays a central role in American society; in
many ways it is one of the most important defining characteristics of
our political system. A society often defines itself reactively by
renouncing alternative visions; we characterize ourselves by disavowing what we are not. This approach is reflected in Justice Kennedy's
recent opinion for the Court in Ward v. Rock Against Racism.3 1 5 In
analyzing why music, although, not speech, is protected by the first
amendment, Justice Kennedy compared our society to totalitarian
regimes in which certain kinds of music have been suppressed as
threatening the interests of the state. 316 The first amendment, Justice
Kennedy affirmed, "prohibits any like attempts in our own legal
'
order."317
The first amendment similarly demands strict scrutiny of
intrusive treatments of the kind employed to treat "disordered"
thought in the Soviet Union, and of any like attempts here.
311. See id. at 6.
312. See R. ROESCH & S.

GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 48-49 (1980);
STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 205-06 (DHEW Pub.

A.
No.
(ADM) 76-176, 1975); Hess & Thomas, Incompetency to Stand Triah Procedures,Results and
Problems, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 713 (1963); Winick, supra note 266, at 983.
313. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 724 (1989); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
314. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138, 2143-44
(1988); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969).
315. 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).
316. Id. at 2753 (citing 2 DIALOGUES OF PLATO, REPUBLIC, bk. III, at 231, 245-48 (B.
Jowett trans., 4th ed. 1953); Musical Freedom and Why DictatorsFear It, N.Y. Times, Aug.
23, 1981, § 2, at 1, col. 5; Soviet Schizophrenia Toward Stravinsky, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1982,
§ 1, at 25, col. 2; Symphonic Voice from China is Heard Again, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1987, § 2,
p. 27, col. 1).
317. Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2753.
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. Even if the potential for abusive application of categories like
"mentally ill" or "disordered" is considered small in our system,3 1 8
accepting the legitimacy of these categories as a basis for avoiding first
amendment scrutiny presents serious risks to basic first amendment
values. Even those who are clearly and seriously mentally ill-suffering from a severe case of schizophrenia, for example, a condition
manifested by gross disturbances in thinking and perception 31 9-have
fluctuating periods of relatively undisturbed thought.32 ° Many
schizophrenics engage in such creative activity as art and poetry.32 '
Although schizophrenia is undeniably a painful and distressing condition, it includes aspects that lead some psychiatrists to regard it as a
"great growth experience, an inner voyage of discovery. ' 32 2 "[S]ome
schizophrenic experiences... can be definitely seen as an enlargement
and enrichment of human life."' 323 Certain aspects of schizophrenic
thinking "permit an enlargement of the human experience, can open
new horizons and lead to new paths of feeling and understanding. "324
Indeed, some psychiatrists, although in a distinct minority, interpret
the condition "as a positive development that reveals truths to fellow
318. But see A. STONE, supra note 300, at 3-36 (discussing the political misuse of psychiatry
in the cases of Soviet general Petro Grigorenko and American general Edwin Walker).
319. Lehmann, Schizophrenia: Clinical Features, in 2 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY 1153, 1155-62 (3d ed. 1980); infra note 414 and accompanying text.
320. Lehmann, supra note 319, at 1155 ("A schizophrenic patient may be incapable, at a
certain time, of carrying on a rational, simple conversation, and yet half an hour later he may
write a sensible and remarkably well-composed letter to a relative."); Morse, Crazy Behavior,
Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, supra note 266, at 573, 588 (mentally
ill people have a significant capacity for normal and rational behavior); Winick, supra note
266, at 970-71. The fluctuating nature of mental illness is also revealed by empirical studies
demonstrating that competency of mental patients is intermittent. C. LIDZ, A. MEISEL, E.
ZERUBAVEL, M. CARTER, R. SESTAK & L. ROTH, INFORMED CONSENT:

A STUDY OF

DECISIONMAKING IN PSYCHIATRY 198-99 (1984); see also Appelbaum & Roth, ClinicalIssues
in the Assessment of Competency, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1462, 1465 (1981) (competency
fluctuates over time).
321. See S. ARIETI, INTERPRETATION OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 351-74 (2d ed. 1974). See
generally R. PORTER, supra note 230 (examining autobiographical writings of the mentally ill).
322. May & Simpson, Schizophrenia: Overview of Treatment Methods, in 2
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 319, at 1193. Gregory Bateson, in
his introduction to John Perceval's NARRATIVE, also invokes this metaphor, characterizing
schizophrenia as a "voyage of discovery" from which the patient "comes back with insights
different from those of the inhabitants who never embarked on such a voyage." Bateson,
Introduction to J. PERCEVAL, A NARRATIVE OF THE TREATMENT EXPERIENCED BY A
GENTLEMAN, DURING A STATE OF MENTAL DERANGEMENT at v, xiii-xiv (G. Bateson rev.
ed. 1961) (1840). Similarly, R.D. Laing portrays schizophrenia as a "journey" by the patient
"to explore the inner space and time of consciousness." R. LAING, THE POLITICS OF
EXPERIENCE 126-27 (1967). Laing suggests that in the future, we will come to see "that what
we call 'shizophrenia' was one of the forms in which, often through quite ordinary people, the
light began to break through the cracks in the all-too-closed minds." Id. at 129.
323. S. ARIETI, supra note 321, at 378-79.
324. Id. at 379.
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men and opens new paths toward greater moral values." 3'25 We may
have much to learn from schizophrenics: "From [their] protestations
we may learn many sociological truths, generally hidden from the
average citizen, and we may learn to recognize every day hypocrisies
which we meekly accept as ineluctable facts of life .... 326 As the
poet Emily Dickinson put it: "Much madness is divinest Sense-To a
discerning Eye. .. "327 In a sense, the mentally ill hold up a mirror to
the rest of society, and we look away only at our peril.328
Unlike "fighting words" and obscenity, which by definition is
"utterly without redeeming social importance, '329 the mentation and
expressive conduct of the mentally ill may well have social value, and
in any event may possess intrinsic value. Moreover, both of these are
within the core values protected by the first amendment. 33 1 Under the
Chaplinsky doctrine, the category of unprotected expression is limited
325. Id. at 125.
326. Id. at 379. Social historian Roy Porter's analysis of the autobiographies of the insane
led him to conclude that:
The writings of the mad can be read not just as symptoms of diseases or
syndromes, but as coherent communications in their own right....
• .. [T]heir testaments plainly echo, albeit often in an unconventional or
distorted idiom, the ideas, values, aspirations, hopes and fears of their
contemporaries. They use the language or their age, though often in ways which
are highly unorthodox. When we read the writings of the mad, we gain an
enhanced insight into the sheer range of what could be thought and felt, at the
margins. We might compare the way historians of popular culture have told us
,to listen sympathetically to the popular idiom of graffiti, to riddles, to the lore
and language of schoolchildren, or to the cosmologies of heretics arraigned
before the Inquisition.
R. PORTER, supra note 230, at 2.
327. THE POEMS OF EMILY DICKINSON 337 (T. Johnson ed. 1955).
328. See R. PORTER, supra note 230, at 3:
[W]hat the mad say is illuminating because it presents a world through the
looking-glass, or indeed holds up the mirror to the logic (and psycho-logic) of
sane society. It focuses and puts to the test the nature and limits of the
rationality, humanity and 'understanding' of the normal. In that sense, the late
French philosopher Michel Foucault was quite right to insist that the history of
unreason must be coterminous with the history of reason. They are doubles.
Furthermore, examined in this light, the consciousness of the mad confronts
that of the sane to constitute a kind of hall of mirrors. When we juxtapose the
mind of the insane with that of reason, society and culture, we see two facets, two
expressions, two faces, and each puts the question to the other. If normality
condemns madness as irrational, subhuman, perverse, madness typically replies
in kind, has its own tu quoque. Rather like children playing at being adults, the
mad highligh the hypocrisies, double standards and sheer callous obliviousness of
sane society. The writings of the mad challenge the discourse of the normal,
challenge its right to be the objective mouthpiece of the times. The assumption
that there exist definitive and unitary standards of truth and falsehood, reality
and delusion, is put to the test.
329. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
330. See supra notes 202-35 and accompanying text.
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only to expression that is deemed totally unrelated to the purposes of
the first amendment.13 1 Expression implicating first amendment values, however, even if of limited or no social utility, is within the protection of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has recognized the
"right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social
worth." '3 2 It has reiterated that first amendment protection does not
turn upon the "social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are
offered."3 3 3a Even ideas deemed "offensive, '3 3 4 "loathsome, 3 35 "noxious," '3 6 and "immoral" 33 7 may be protected. Thoughts deemed "disordered" would seem no less entitled to first amendment protection.
Furthermore, because the mentation and expressive conduct of the
mentally ill serve values within the core of those traditionally protected by the first amendment,3 3 8 the reduced scrutiny approach that
has emerged from cases involving what some members of the Court
regard as "lesser value" speech-the sexually explicit speech
presented in American Mini Theaters, Pacifica, and Playtime Theaters,33 9 and some forms of commercial speech3 4 ° would also seem
inapplicable.
Stanley v. Georgia,3 4' which involved the right to possess obscen331. Schauer, supra note 242, at 303-04.
332. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); see also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
507, 510 (1948) ("Though we can see nothing of any possible value to society in these
magazines, they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature.").
333. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (quoting NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-41
(1974) (false assertions of fact are protected by the first amendment even though they do not
contribute to the search for truth and hence have no constitutional value).
334. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2544 (1989) (citing cases).
335. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Thus,
although loathsome, the ideas of the Nazi party are protected by the first amendment. See
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of Skokie
v. National Socialist Party of Am., 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978). See generally A.
NEIER, DEFENDING
FREEDOM (1979).

MY

ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE, AND THE RISKS OF

336. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, J.J., concurring).
337. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 n.8 (1969) (quoting Henkins, Morals and the
Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 395 (1963)); see also Kingsley
Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959) (invalidating
statute prohibiting exhibition of motion pictures portraying adultery favorably as inconsistent
with the first amendment, which "is not confined to the expression of ideas that are
conventional or shared by a majority").
338. See supra notes 202-35 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 251-62 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text. For an analysis concluding that
commercial speech does not serve the core values of the first amendment, see Jackson &
Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV.
1 (1979).
341. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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ity in the privacy of the home, seems especially relevant to the question of first amendment protection for "disordered" thought and
expression. In Stanley, the Court rejected as inconsistent with the
first amendment the state's assertion of the right "to protect the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity. ' 34 2 Many would
undoubtedly label as "disordered" the thoughts and emotions of the
individual observing obscene films. Thus, the Court's rejection of the
state's argument as little more than an "assertion that the State has
the right to control the moral content of a person's thoughts"34' 3
should preclude a similar argument that the state may intervene into
mental processes to protect the individual's mind from "disordered"
thoughts.
Stanley can be reconciled with the cases holding that obscenity is
outside the ambit of the first amendment by drawing a distinction
between the public display or distribution of obscenity and its private
possession for personal use in the home. 344 Although the government
may prohibit the former, the first amendment insulates from government control "a person's private thoughts"3 4 even if they are
regarded as disordered. The Court in Stanley endorsed the views
expressed in Justice Brandeis' celebrated dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States.346 Brandeis, writing in the 1928 wiretapping
case, had warned against future advances in science and technology
that could provide "means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts
and emotions. ' 347 The Constitution, Brandeis affirmed, protects
against such intrusions:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect ....

They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their

thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred as
against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most com348
prehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
Justice Brandeis' eloquent language has frequently been quoted. On
one such occasion, former Chief Justice Burger, while a judge on the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
invoked Brandeis' words to reject the notion that the exercise of con342. Id. at 565.
343. Id.
344. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
345. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566.
346. Id. at 564 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
347. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474.
348. Id. at 478.
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stitutional rights may turn on a judgment concerning the wisdom or
propriety of an individual's choices:
Nothing in this utterance suggests that Justice Brandeis thought an
individual possessed these rights only as to sensible beliefs, valid
thoughts, reasonable emotions, or well-founded sensations. I suggest he intended to include a great many foolish, unreasonable and
even absurd ideas which do not conform, such as refusing medical
treatment even at great risk.349
Full first amendment protection should therefore extend to all
thoughts and mental processes, even those labeled as insane or
disordered.
B.

Is the First Amendment Implicated by Treatment that Restores
Mental Processes to a "Normal" or "Healthy" State?

The above analysis will also meet the related contention that
mental health treatment cannot raise first amendment problems
because, rather than interfering with mental processes, such treatment
enhances the patient's capacity to think and liberates the mind by
freeing it from mental illness.35 ° It is true that when properly used,
many of these treatments-the psychotropic drugs, for example-are
"'normative in their mechanism of action: that is, they restore existing
imbalance toward the balanced norm."3 5 ' The fact remains, however,
that even though these treatments may be beneficial and clinically
desirable they nonetheless constitute government alteration of
thought processes. Distinguishing "normal" from "abnormal"
mental states may be no easier and no less dangerous than distinguishing "sane" from "disordered" thought.3" 2 Moreover, treatment
designed to restore the thought processes of a patient or offender to a
"normal" state of functioning seems analogous to governmental
efforts to inculcate patriotic values in school children by use of the
349. In re President of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1010, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
(separate statement of Burger, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc).
350. See Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 265, at 311-12; Cole, Patients' Rights vs.
Doctors' Rights.: Which Should Take Precedence?, in REFUSING TREATMENT IN MENTAL
HEALTH INSTITUTIONS-VALUES IN CONFLICT

56, 69 (A. Doudera & J. Swazey eds. 1982);

Gutheil, In Search of True Freedom: Drug Refusal, Involuntary Medication, and "Rotting with
Your Rights On," 137 AM. J.PSYCHIATRY 327, 327 (1980).
351. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 265, at 308; see also Gutheil & Appelbaum, "Mind
Control," "Synthetic Sanity," "Artificial Competence," and Genuine Confusion: Legally
Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic Medication, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77, 101 (1983) (the
"acknowledged normalizing effects of the antipsychotic medications"); id. at 118 (referring to
the "normalizing effects" of the drugs; the drugs facilitate "the re-emergence of normal
patterns of cognition"; "their effect is to alter mental functioning in the direction of
normality").
352. See supra notes 266-308 and accompanying text.
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compulsory flag salute invalidated in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette,35 3 or to protect the minds of citizens from the
effects of obscenity by the methods condemned in Stanley v. Georgia.3 54 In both Barnette and Stanley the governmental intrusions into
mental privacy can be defended as attempts to bring about a state of
normality. The analogy is particularly strong in Stanley because the
prohibition on private possession and use of obscenity involved there
could be defended as an attempt to enhance the citizen's capacity to
think normally and liberate his mind by freeing it from invasion by
material that tends "to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are
'3
open to such immoral influeices. 11
Mental processes must remain presumptively immune from governmental control in a system committed to the values of the first
amendment. Government alteration of mental processes, even if
designed to restore the individual to some prior or "normal" mental
state, or to accomplish other beneficial results, should be subject to
scrutiny under the first amendment. In a related context, a California
appellate court applied first amendment scrutiny to statutory requirements that imposed procedural impediments on a patient's choice of
undergoing psychosurgery and electroconvulsive therapy.3 56 These
regulations on the use of psychosurgery and ECT were designed to
protect patients from what the legislature viewed as intrusive and hazardous treatments. The regulations mandated special consent and
record-keeping procedures, and a review of the patient's capacity to
consent by three appointed physicians.3 57 The court recognized that
these were plainly not attempts by the state "to control ... what is
thought by mental patients, nor how they think ....
",358 Rather, they
were exercises of the state's police power designed to protect patient
safety. 35 9 Nonetheless, the court found that "despite the lack of any
showing the state has attempted to regulate freedom of thought, this
legislation may diminish this right." 3" These statutory impediments
on patient access to therapies that "touch upon thought processes in
significant ways"
accordingly required strict constitutional
353. 319 U.S. 624 (1943); see supra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
354. 394 U.S. 557 (1969); see supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
355. This was the test for obscenity put forth by Lord Chief Justice Cockburn in Regina v.
Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360, 368 (1868), a test that was widely adopted by American courts. See
L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 12-16, at 906.
356. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
357. Id. at 669, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
358. Id. at 679, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
359. Id. at 678-80, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 545-46.
360. Id. at 679, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
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36

scrutiny. 1
Subjecting the imposition of mental health treatment to first
amendment scrutiny does not necessarily condemn the mentally ill to
their psychoses, so that they may enjoy merely the dubious freedom
to "rot with their rights on," as some commentators have suggested.3 62 Rather, it erects a presumption against forced governmental intrusion into the mind, one that may be overcome only on a
showing of compelling necessity, thus requiring careful scrutiny both
of the ends sought by intrusive treatment and the means selected to
accomplish those ends. In this sense the contention that the first
amendment should not be implicated by mental health treatment
designed to restore the individual's control over his own mind by liberating it from the effects of his illness misses the mark. Although
this argument may be relevant, and indeed perhaps even persuasive
on the question of whether an individual's first amendment right to
resist unwanted mental intrusions may be outweighed in particular
circumstances, as an argument against first amendment consideration
of these issues, it must be rejected.
VI.

JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
REFUSE TREATMENT: THE LOWER COURT DECISIONS

A number of state and lower federal court decisions that recognize a first amendment basis for a right of patients to refuse treatment
have reached the conclusion that government alteration of mental
processes through mental health treatment is also subject to first
amendment scrutiny. As the first amendment protects freedom of
expression, these courts reason, then it must also protect the more
basic right to generate and to hold ideas. The first such case to apply
the first amendment in this context was Kaimowitz v. Michigan
Department of Mental Health,36 3 a 1973 state court decision arising
out of an attempt to administer psychosurgery, the most intrusive of
the mental health treatment techniques. 364 Kaimowitz involved a
defendant charged with murder and rape who was held in a state
mental hospital under the Michigan sexual psychopath law. The
defendant, "John Doe," was transferred to the Lafayette Clinic, a
facility operated by the state department of mental health, for the purposes of experimental psychosurgery for the treatment of uncontrolla361. Id.
362. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 265; Gutheil, supra note 350.
363. Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct. [Wayne Cty.] July 10, 1973), reprinted in A.
BROOKS, supra note 2, at 902.
364. See infra notes 389-93 and accompanying text.
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ble aggression. The proposed study in which Doe was to participate,
funded by the legislature, involved an experimental design comparing
the effects of surgery on the amygdaloid portion of the limbic system
of the brain with the effects of a drug on male hormone flow.
Although Doe had signed an "informed consent" form to become an
experimental subject and although the procedure was approved by
both a scientific review committee and a human rights committee, a
public interest lawyer learned of the experiment and filed suit to
enjoin it. Finding psychosurgery to be clearly experimental and posing substantial and in some cases unknown dangers to research subjects, the court ruled that its imposition on an involuntarily detained
patient would violate the first amendment. 36 The court held that the
first amendment protects the individual's "mental processes, the communication of ideas, and the generation of ideas, "366 reasoning that
"to the extent that the First Amendment protects the dissemination of
ideas and the expression of thoughts it equally must protect the individual's right to generate ideas. '3 67 Finding that psychosurgery seriously and irreversibly impairs "the power to generate 36ideas,"
the
8
court held that its imposition would be unconstitutional:
Government has no power or right to control men's minds,
thoughts, and expressions. This is the command of the First
Amendment .... [I]f the First Amendment protects the freedom

to express ideas, it necessarily follows that it must protect the freedom to generate ideas. Without the latter protection, the former is
meaningless....

The State's interest in performing psychosurgery

...must bow to the First Amendment, which protects the generation and free flow of ideas from unwarranted interference with
one's mental processes. 369

The first federal court opinion to suggest the possibility that the
first amendment might limit involuntary treatment was Mackey v.
Procunier.370 That case involved the involuntary use of the drug succinycholine in an aversive conditioning program at a state prison
medical facility. The drug, characterized as a "breath-stopping and
365. Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir.
Ct. [Wayne Cty.] July 10, 1973), reprinted in A. BROOKS, supra note 2, at 918-19.
366. Id., reprinted in A. BROOKS, supra note 2, at 917.

367. Id.
368. Id., reprinted in A. BROOKS, supra note 2, at 918; see also Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal.

App. 3d 662, 679-80, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 546 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (statutory procedures
impeding patient access to psychosurgery and electroconvulsive therapy implicate first
amendment freedom of thought).
369. Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir.
Ct. [Wayne Cty.] July 10, 1973), reprinted in A. BROOKS, supra note 2, at 918-19.
370. 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
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paralyzing 'fright drug,' " resulted in the prisoner-subject regularly
suffering "nightmares in which he relives the frightening experience
and awakens unable to breathe."3 7' 1 These allegations of mental intrusion and effect were sufficient for the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit to rule that the prisoner's complaint raised serious constitutional questions of "impermissible tinkering with the
3 72
mental processes.
The first amendment has also been invoked in a number of cases
involving the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication
to state mental hospital patients and pretrial detainees. In Scott v.
Plante,3 7 3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed the dismissal for failure to state a claim of a complaint filed
by a patient at a state mental hospital that attacked the involuntary
administration of antipsychotic medication. The court held that "the
involuntary administration of drugs which affect mental processes, if
it occurred, could amount, under an appropriate set of facts, to an
374
interference with Scott's rights under the First Amendment.
Because of the procedural posture of the case, the appellate court did
not determine what would be an appropriate set of facts sufficient to
violate the first amendment, but merely decided that Scott's complaint should not have been dismissed because it was possible that the
evidence would show a first amendment violation.3 75
In Bee v. Greaves, pretrial detainees challenged the involuntary
administration of antipsychotic drugs. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, finding that the drugs can affect the
"ability to think and communicate, "376 recognized a right to refuse
them protected by the first amendment, which the court held implicitly protects "the capacity to produce ideas. '3 77 The district court in
Rogers v. Okin,378 the Boston State Hospital case, also found a first
amendment basis for a right to refuse psychotropic drugs, which the
court concluded have "the potential to affect and change a patient's
371. Id. at 877.
372. Id. at 878.
373. 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1101 (1982).
374. Id. at 946 (citing Mackey and Kaimowitz).
375. The court cited the customary rule that "[a] complaint should not be dismissed for
insufficiency unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any

state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim." Id. at 945.
376. 744 F.2d 1387, 1394 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985).
377. Id.; accord Girouard v. O'Brien, No. 83-3316-0 (D. Kan. April 4, 1988) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist. file) (1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4342).
378. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,
634 F.2d 650 (Ist Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291
(1982), on remand, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).
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mood, attitude and capacity to think."37' 9 The court found the "right
to produce a thought-or refuse to do so" to be protected by the first
amendment.3 " "Without the capacity to think, we merely exist, not
function," the court reasoned.38 "Realistically, the capacity to think
and decide is a fundamental element of freedom. 38 2 The court
derived the "right to produce a thought" from the first amendment's
protection of the communication of ideas which, in the court's view,
"presupposes a capacity to produce ideas." 38' 3 "Whatever powers the
Constitution has granted our government," the court concluded,
"involuntary mind control is not one of them, absent extraordinary
384
circumstances."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
applied this approach to the imposition of unwanted electroconvulsive
therapy in a tort suit brought by a voluntary patient in a Veteran's
Administration hospital.38 5 Noting that "compulsory treatment with
mind-altering drugs may invade a patient's First Amendment interests in being able to think and communicate freely," the court found
the same interests to be implicated by compulsory electroconvulsive
therapy. 8 6
VII.

MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT TECHNIQUES AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT:

A

CONTINUUM OF

INTRUSIVENESS

Although these lower court cases fail to analyze the issues in
379. Id. at 1366.
380. Id. at 1367.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, affirming
based on privacy grounds, found it unnecessary to address the first amendment issue. Rogers
v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653, 654 n.2 (1st Cir. 1980); see also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp.
915, 933 (N.D. Ohio 1980), discussing the first amendment, but grounding a right to refuse
psychotropic medication on constitutional privacy. The court noted that the forced
administration of these drugs "implicates a person's interest in being able to think and to
communicate freely." 506 F. Supp. at 933. At another point, the court, mentioning the
"serious, long term, if not permanent, side effects" of the drugs, stated that they "deaden the
patient's ability to think." Id. at 936. Referring to the state's "attempts to use treatment as a
means of controlling thought, either by inhibiting an inmate's ability to think or by coercing
acceptance of particular thoughts and beliefs," the court suggested that "government action
which directly affects the mental processes would be unconstitutional under the First
Amendment." Id. at 933 (dicta).
385. Lojuk v. Quandt, 706 F.2d 1456 (7th Cir. 1983).
386. Id. at 1465; see also Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 679-80, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535,
546 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (statutory procedures impeding patient access to psychosurgery and
electroconvulsive therapy implicate first amendment freedom of thought).
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detail, their determination-that the first amendment limits the imposition of intrusive therapies-seems essentially correct. But to conclude that the first amendment protects mental processes against
certain kinds of governmental intrusions does not mean that all
mental health treatment techniques will raise first amendment questions. As previously noted, government in America has broad power
to communicate ideas and take other actions which undoubtedly have
enormous effects on the mental processes of at least some individuals."8 7 Surely these kinds of effects do not alone render the governmental conduct in question suspect under the first amendment. In a
complex society such as ours, in which government plays a significant
role, governmental attempts to educate, to persuade, and to induce a
variety of actions are essential to any meaningful exercise of governmental power. It is only when these government activities pass a certain threshold of intrusiveness-imposing particular beliefs or
thoughts, or displacing others, by means that may not be avoided or
resisted, and when the duration of these effects is sufficiently longlasting as not to fall within a de minimis category-that the first
amendment will be implicated.3"' Rather than concluding that all
involuntary mental health treatment automatically triggers first
amendment scrutiny, it therefore seems essential to examine separately each of the various treatment techniques. The critical question
is whether the nature, extent, and duration of the particular technique's effects will intrude sufficiently on mental processes to raise
first amendment concerns. It is appropriate, for this purpose, to construct a rough continuum of intrusiveness along which these treatment techniques may be considered based on their effects on first
amendment, values.
A.

Psychosurgery

Psychosurgery, at the upper reaches of the continuum, presents
the strongest case for first amendment scrutiny. It is difficult to imagine a more intrusive invasion of mental processes than this procedure,
which consists of the surgical removal or destruction of brain tissues
performed with the intent of altering emotions and behavior. 38 9 The
387. See supra text accompanying note 103.
388. See L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 15-8, at 1328-29; Shapiro, supra note 3, at 262-67;
Winick, Legal Limitations on Correctional Therapy and Research, supra note 3, at 35 1.
389. See generally V. MARK & F. ERVIN, VIOLENCE AND THE BRAIN (1970); MODERN
CONCEPTS IN PSYCHIATRIC SURGERY (R. Hitchcock, T. Ballantine & A. Meyerson eds. 1979);
OPERATING ON THE MIND: THE PSYCHOSURGERY CONFLICT (W. Gaylin, J. Meister & R.
Neville eds.

1975);

PERSPECTIVES

THE PSYCHOSURGERY DEBATE:

(E. Valenstein ed. 1980); S. SHUMAN,

SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL AND

ETHICAL

PSYCHOSURGERY AND THE MEDICAL
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procedure, now rarely used, typically has a massive impact on intellectual functioning. Aside from a number of substantial physical
risks, psychosurgery frequently results in intellectual deterioration
and emotional blunting.3 9 The Kaimowitz court, which found that
involuntary psychosurgery would violate the first amendment, premised its conclusion on extensive expert testimony concerning the
serious adverse affects of the procedure on mental processes. The
court stated: "Psychosurgery flattens emotional responses, leads to
lack of abstract reasoning ability, leads to a loss of capacity for new
learning, and causes general sedation and apathy. It can lead to
impairment of memory, and in some instances unexpected responses
to psychosurgery are observed." 39 ' Although the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, in its review of psychosurgery, found the Kaimowitz
court's conclusions concerning the hazards of the newer psychosurgical procedures to be somewhat overstated,39 2 it did not seriously question the conclusion that intellectual change frequently occurs.
Indeed, Dr. Valenstein's review of the literature, conducted for the
National Commission, rejected the claim that psychosurgery does not
result in intellectual change.39 3 Although the empirical evidence concerning the effects of the newer procedures is seriously incomplete,
there appears to be little doubt that what might be characterized as
unwanted personality changes following the surgery do occur, as does
some amount of intellectual deterioration.
Clearly, any impairment of intellectual and emotional capacities
brought about by psychosurgery would implicate first amendment
concerns, even if the incidence and duration of these serious effects
occur less frequently than is commonly supposed. Moreover, psychoAUTONOMY AND DEVIANCE (1977); E. VALENSTEIN, BRAIN
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF BRAIN STIMULATION AND PSYCHOSURGERY
(1973); Chorover, Psychosurgery: A Neuropsychological Perspective, 54 B.U.L. REV. 231
(1974); Winick, Legal Limitations on Correctional Therapy and Research, supra note 3.
390. See Chorover, supra note 389, at 247; Valenstein, The Practice of Psychosurgery: A
Survey of the Literature (1971-1976), in NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN
SUBJECTS
OF
BIOMEDICAL
AND
BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH,
Appendix to
CONTROL OF VIOLENCE:
CONTROL:

PSYCHOSURGERY

1-56, 1-80 (1977).

391. Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir.
Ct. [Wayne Cty.] July 10, 1973), reprintedin A. BROOKS, supra.note 2, at 909.

392.

NATIONAL

COMMISSION

FOR

THE

PROTECTION

OF

HUMAN

SUBJECTS

OF

22 (1977).
393. Valenstein, supra note 390, at 1-58. Dr. Valenstein did conclude, however, that
personality changes are "relatively infrequent and characterized as 'mild' and 'transient,' " id.
at 1-89, and that "[t]he risk of permanent adverse intellectual, emotional, and physical side
effects is reported as minimal . . .in sharp contrast to the results from the older lobotomy
operations." Id. at 1-96.
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, PSYCHOSURGERY
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surgery is irreversible, at least in the sense that destroyed brain tissue
does not regenerate, and perhaps also in the sense that permanent
alteration in personality may result in at least some cases. Psychosurgery is a direct intervention into the brain itself, incapable of being
resisted by the subject, that surgically alters the individual's thoughts,
feelings, behavior, and perhaps his very identity. Based on the substantial risks of psychosurgery, and at least until new research can
demonstrate that the newer, more refined procedures do not have
these effects, courts will agree with the basic conclusion of Kaimowitz,
the only case to consider the issue, that psychosurgery imposed on an
involuntary basis will at least presumptively violate the first
amendment.
B.

Electronic Stimulation of the Brain

Electronic Stimulation of the Brain (ESB),3 94 another surgical
intervention into the brain itself, although somewhat less threatening
to first amendment values than psychosurgery, should also trigger
first amendment scrutiny. Electrodes are planted directly into certain
regions of the brain and stimulated electrically, inducing or inhibiting
behaviors and sensations. ESB has been used for "inducing and
blocking ... an assortment of thought patterns, hullucinations [sic],
laughter, memories, sexual expressions, and pleasant shifts of moods
... ,99
It can be used directly to interfere with thought and
communication:
[T]hinking has been blocked by ESB, so that people oriented in
time and space and able to follow the doctor's instructions in other
ways, could not answer questions or pronounce a single word. "I
could not coordinate my thoughts," one explained. "My head felt
as if I had drunk a lot of beer." Another said, "I don't know why,
'39 6
but I could not speak."
ESB operates with a "peculiar directness of effect which removes it
from the subject's monitoring or control. ' 39 7 In general, the effects of
ESB seem to be short-lived. 39" Even if only of short duration, however-and there is virtually no empirical evidence concerning the
long-term effects of this highly experimental procedure-the ability of
394. See generally J. DELGADO, PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE MIND:
PSYCHOCIVILIZED SOCIETY (1969); E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 389; Heath,

TOWARD A

Modulation of
Emotion With a Brain Pacemaker, 165 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 300 (1977); Winick,
Legal Limitations on CorrectionalTherapy and Research, supra note 3, at 370-71.
395. P. LONDON, BEHAVIOR CONTROL 146 (1969).
396. Id. at 147.
397. Vaughan, Psychosurgery and Brain Stimulation in Historical Perspective, in
OPERATING ON THE MIND: THE PSYCHOSURGERY CONFLICT, supra note 389, at 24.
398. E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 389, at 105; Vaughan, supra note 397, at 60.
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ESB to block thoughts and communication by directly modifying the
state of the brain itself in a manner the patient is incapable of resisting
raises fundamental first amendment concerns. Like psychosurgery,
ESB's direct interference with mental processes must be regarded as
presumptively invalid under the first amendment.
C.

Electroconvulsive Therapy

Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT)

99

also directly affects the

brain. Electrical current is passed directly through the brain, inducing convulsions and unconsciousness (unless unconsciousness has previously been induced through general anesthesia). Although the
period of unconsciousness lasts only several minutes, patients remain
in a state of confusion and disorientation for fifteen to thirty minutes,
and some patients claim persisting confusion and loss of memory.
After several treatments, periods of disorientation and confusion lasting several days occur.
The mental confusion and loss of memory that occurs in virtually
all cases 4' directly implicate first amendment concerns. The more
ECT treatments administered, and the older the patient, the longer
such confusion and memory loss will continue. 40 1 Although there is
considerable controversy concerning whether ECT results in brain
damage and permanent memory loss, many patients claim permanent
memory impairment. 4°2 Because ECT traditionally has been so controversial, the National Institute of Health in conjunction with the
National Institute of Mental Health convened a Consensus Development Conference on ECT in 1985.403 After hearing reports from
experts, health professionals, and former patients, a consensus panel
representing psychiatry, psychology, neurology, psychopharmacology, epidemiology, law, and the general public issued a consensus
399. See generally T. DETRE & H. GARECKI, MODERN PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 635-55
(1971); PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF CONVULSIVE THERAPY (M. Fink, S. Kety, J. McGaugh & T.
Williams eds. 1974); L. KALINOWSKY & P. HOCH, SOMATIC TREATMENT IN PSYCHIATRY
128-207 (1961); Hurwitz, Electroconvulsive Therapy.- A Review, 15 COMPREHENSIVE
PSYCHIATRY 303 (1974); Winick, Legal Limitations on Correctional Therapy and Research,
supra note 3, at 368-70.
400. T. DETRE & H. JARECKI, supra note 399, at 641-44; Dornbush & Williams, Memory
and ECT, in PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF CONVULSIVE THERAPY, supra note 399, at 199; Harper &
Wiens, Electroconvulsive Therapy and Memory, 161 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASES 245
(1975).
401. T. DETRE & H. JARECKI, supra note 399, at 642-43.
402. Id. at 643.
403. 5 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH & NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH,
ELECTROCONVULSIVE THERAPY: CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT,

No. 11 (1985), reprintedin R. SPRING, R. LACOURSIERE & G. WEISSENBERGER, PATIENTS,
PSYCHIATRISTS AND LAWYERS: LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 129 (1989).
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statement. It concluded that it was "well established" that ECT produces deficits in memory function "which have been demonstrated
objectively and repeatedly, [and which] persist after termination of a
normal course of ECT."' 4°4 The consensus statement also concluded

that the "ability to learn and retain new information is adversely
affected" for several weeks following the administration of ECT.4 °5
Although "objective evidence based on neuropsychological testing"
was found to demonstrate loss of memory for several weeks, such
"objective tests have not firmly established persistent or permanent
deficits for a more extensive period ....

4

Nevertheless, research

conducted as long as three years after treatment found that many
patients report continued impairment of memory.40 7 Some patients
were found to perceive ECT as a "terrifying experience," "an abusive
invasion of personal autonomy," and the cause of "extreme distress
from persistent memory deficits. " 40 s
Because it induces unconsciousness, mental confusion, and memory loss, ECT certainly raises first amendment problems. Further, the
effects of the procedure are incapable of being resisted and, at least in
some cases, ECT may result in irreversible memory impairment. As
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found in
Lojuk v. Quandt,40 9 the effects of ECT on mental processes, and particularly on memory, clearly implicate first amendment concerns.41°
D. PsychotropicMedication
Psychotropic drugs by definition are compounds that affect the
" '
mind, intellectual functions, perception, moods, and emotions.41
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Mills v. Rogers acknowledged that
these drugs are "'mind-altering.' Their effectiveness resides in their
capacity to achieve such effects."141 2 They directly intrude upon
mental processes and cannot be resisted. Moreover, not only do their
primary effects work an alteration of mental processes (usually in a
clinically beneficial way, although a change nonetheless), but the toxic
reactions and adverse side effects accompanying most of the drugs
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.

Id. at 132.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
706 F.2d 1456 (7th Cir. 1983); see supra notes 385-86 and accompanying text.

410. Lojuk, 706 F.2d at 1465.
411. V. LONGO, NEUROPHARMACOLOGY

AND BEHAVIOR 182 (1972); Klerman,
Psychotropic Drugs as Therapeutic Agents, 2 HASTINGS CENTER STUD., Jan. 1974, at 81, 82
n.1; see supra note 4.
412. 457 U.S. 291, 293 n.1 (1982).
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also frequently have a debilitating effect on mental processes. Because
the differing classes of drugs present somewhat different effects, they
will be analyzed separately.
1.

ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS

4 1 3 have a
Antipsychotic drugs, the treatment involved in Harper,
dramatic effect on mental processes, often in a beneficial direction, by
promoting thought coherence and reducing thought disorder in the
schizophrenic. Schizophrenia is typically marked by disturbances in
content of thought, such as bizarre delusions; form of thought, such
as loosening of associations, in which ideas shift from one subject to
an unrelated one; perception, such as auditory or visual hallucinations; and affect, such as blunting, flattening, or inappropriateness of
emotional response.4 14 Antipsychotic drugs reduce these and other
symptoms of schizophrenia,4 1 5 altering mental functioning in the
direction of normality,4 1 6 but altering it nonetheless.
In a 1983 article Professors Gutheil and Appelbaum conducted a
review of the literature concerning the effects of antipsychotic medication on mentation 1 7 in order to challenge the conclusion reached in
several of the right to refuse treatment cases that these drugs affect
thought processes in ways that can be described as "mind control."41
Three of four studies testing the effects of the drugs on memory concluded that there was no effect, although one study showed a significant decrease in the ability of patients to recall digits.41 9 Most
experimental studies of the effects of the drugs on psychomotor functioning showed no effect, although some earlier studies found some
impairment. Furthermore, considerable clinical experience documented in the literature revealed that impaired motor function was
often one of the side effects of the drugs.4 20 Studies of the effects of
the drugs on attention and perception showed mixed results, with
roughly equal numbers of studies showing impairment in function,
413. State v. Harper, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 759 P.2d 358 (1988) (en banc), cert. granted, 109 S.
Ct. 1337 (1989).
414. DSM-III-R, supra note 270, at 194-95.
415. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 351, at 100-01 (citing studies).
416. Id. at 118.
417. Id. at 101-17.
418. See, e.g., Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 933 (N.D. Ohio 1980) ("controlling
thought"); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1367 (D. Mass. 1979) ("involuntary mind
control"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on othergrounds, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated
and remandedsub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on remand, 738 F.2d I(1st Cir.
1984).
419. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 351, at 104-05.
420. Id. at 104-09.
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improvement in function, or no change.4 2' Most studies of the effects
on complex cognitive functions indicated that the drugs improve
422
functioning, although a few studies demonstrated negative effects.
Gutheil and Appelbaum concluded that the available evidence suggests "that antipsychotic medications lack the subtle, deleterious
effects on mental functioning" attributed to them in several of the
right to refuse treatment cases.4 23 In their view, this evidence is
inconsistent with a conception of the drugs as "mind-altering,
thoughtinhibiting, or destructive of personality in a negative
sense." 42 4 Although the specter of "mind control" brought about by
these drugs may thus be misleading, the studies examined by Gutheil
and Appelbaum demonstrate that the drugs do affect mental
processes. Although the effect on mental functioning is usually positive, some of the studies did show impairment in functioning. Moreover, Gutheil and Appelbaum concede that some of the side effects of
the drugs, particularly akinesia and akathisia, often affect mentation
adversely.42 5
The side effects of antipsychotic drugs426 cannot be ignored in
analyzing the first amendment question. Indeed, it has always seemed
to me to be misleading to call them "side effects," a label that denigrates their impact on patients. Although these side effects are unintended, they are intrinsic to the drugs' benevolent properties and
should not be trivialized, particularly since patients frequently experience them to be distressing enough to outweigh the drugs' positive
clinical effects. All of the antipsychotic drugs are sedating, particularly the low-potency phenothiazines.4 27 In early periods of drug
administration, the subject often experiences heavy sedation, clouding
of consciousness, and impairment of judgment. 428 The sedation itself
has a dramatic effect on mental processes, frequently interfering with
421. Id. at 110-13.
422. Id. at 113-17.
423. Id. at 119.

424. Id.
425. Id. at 106-09, 119.
426. For a summary of these side effects, see Winick, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic
Medication,supra note 3, at 10-11; Winick, PsychotropicMedication and Competency to Stand
Trial,supra note 4, at 782-83 (citing authorities). The following discussion of drug side effects
is drawn largely from these prior articles.
427. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DRUG EVALUATIONS 111-50 (6th ed. 1986),
reprinted in R. SPRING, R. LACOURSIERE & G. WEISSENBERGER, PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS
AND LAWYERS: LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 104, 109-10 (1989).
428. See Jarvik, Drugs Used in the Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, in THE
PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 151, 167 (L. Goodman & A. Gilman eds.
1970).
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the ability to think and almost always curtailing concentration.4 29
Although many patients become habituated to the drugs over time,
with the result that after several days or weeks cognitive functions are
little affected and sedation is minimal, some patients never accommodate to the effects of the drugs.4 3 °
Many of the physical side effects accompanying these drugs,
although not directly affecting mental processes, are so distressing
that they frequently interfere with a patient's power of concentration
and ability to think clearly. Among the autonomic side effects of
these drugs, for example, dizziness, faintness, drowsiness, and fatigue
all interfere with concentration. Hypotension, resulting in decreased
blood flow to the brain, leaves patients feeling light-headed, and also
interferes with concentration. The extrapyramidal reactions to these.
drugs, although again primarily physical in effect, also often are so
distressing that concentration is affected. Akathisia, in particular,
presents this problem. The patient experiences a constant motor restlessness and fidgeting, and is driven to pace about impatiently and tap
his foot incessantly. Dystonia, involving bizarre muscular spasms
accompanied by facial grimacing, and involuntary spasms of the
tongue, can seriously interfere with communicative ability. Similarly,
the dyskinesias produce a broad range of bizarre tongue, face, and
neck movements, which substantially limit both verbal and non-verbal communication, and often impair concentration. Tardive dyskinesia, a persistent neurological syndrome affecting a substantial
percentage of patients subjected to long-term antipsychotic drug
treatment, 3 1 is often experienced as extremely distressing, to the
extent that concentration is impaired. There is no known effective
treatment for the condition, and it is thought to effect permanent
429. Appelbaum, Can Mental PatientsSay No to Drugs?, N.Y. Times, March 21, 1982, § 6
(Magazine), at 46, 51 ("The drugs' sedative effects may lead to drowsiness or, in the extreme, a
spaced-out state in which thinking itself becomes difficult.").
430. See Solow, Drug Therapy ofMental Illness: Tranquilizersand Other DepressantDrugs,
in AN INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 289, 307 (R. Rech & K. Moore eds. 1971).
431. An American Psychiatric Association Task Force reported that 10% to 20% of
patients given antipsychotic drugs for one year or more develop the condition. AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON LATE NEUROLOGICAL EFFECTS OF
ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS, TARDIVE DYSKINESIA 43-44 (1979) [hereinafter TARDIVE
DYSKINESIA]. More recent estimates are much higher. See SCHATZBERG & COLE, MANUAL

OF CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 99 (1986) (50% to 60%); Hollister, Antipsychotic and
Antimanic Drugs (Lithium), in REVIEW OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 507 (H. Goldman ed.
1984) (20% to 40%); Jeste & Wyatt, Changing Epidemiology of Tardive Dyskinesia: An
Overview, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 297 (1981) (25%, with prevalence progressively rising).
Moreover, the condition is "underdiagnosed at an alarming rate." Weiden, Mann, Hass,
Mattson & Francis, Clinical NonRecognition of Neuroleptic-Induced Movement Disorders: A
CautionaryStudy, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1148, 1151 (1987).
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structural changes in the brain.432 Another serious side effect is
neuroleptic malignant syndrome, a rare but underdiagnosed condition
that is fatal in twenty-five percent of cases.433 This condition is characterized by muscular rigidity, rhythmic movements, and alterations
in consciousness.
Professor Brooks has summarized the "cognitive side effects" of
the antipsychotic drugs as follows: "Some patients cannot concentrate or think straight because of their medications. Reading or talking becomes impossible, and the patient retreats into an intellectual
vacuum. For a patient who has even modest intellectual interests,
cognitive side effects can be extremely distressing. ' 43 Moreover, the
antipsychotic drugs have similarly dramatic emotional side effects.
All of them produce a depression of mood.435 Patients experience the
typical "flattening" of emotional affect as boredom, lethargy, docility,
listlessness, apathy, and purposelessness.436 It is this effect that
patients frequently complain of when they describe the drugs as plac4' 3
ing them in a "chemical straight-jacket" or inducing "zombiism. 1
Although tardive dyskinesia may be an irreversible condition, the
other side effects of the drugs are short-acting, and disappear within
hours or days of drug discontinuation. Similarly, the primary therapeutic effects of the drugs are only short-acting. With the exception
of Prolixin and other long-acting phenothiazines, the effects of which
last for several weeks, the primary effects of the drugs may last only
several hours or days. Nevertheless, many patients are continued on
the drugs for lengthy periods and thus experience the effects on a continued basis. Long-term drug treatment may impair memory, reasoning ability, mental speed, learning capacity, and efficiency of mental
432. TARDIVE DYSKINESIA, supra note 431, at 57; SCHATZBERG & COLE. supra note 431,
at 100; Christensen, Moller & Faurbye, Neuropathological Investigation of 28 Brains from
Patients with Dyskinesia, 46 ACTA PSYCHIATRY SCAND. 14 (1970).

433. See Addonizio, Susman & Roth, Symptoms of Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome in 82
Consecutive Inpatients, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1587 (1986); Pope, Keck & McElroy,
Frequency of Presentationof Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome in A Large PsychiatricHospital,
143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1227 (1986).
434. Brooks, The Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication, 8 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 179, 184 (1980). A prisoner who was given the drugs described the
mental effects as follows: "Your thoughts are broken, incoherent; you can't hold a train of
thought for even a minute. Your mind is like a slot machine, every wheel spinning a different
thought .... " Opton, Psychiatric Violence Against Prisoners.- When Therapy is Punishment,
45 Miss. L.J. 605, 641 (1974).
435. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 427, reprinted in R. SPRING, R.
LACOURSIERE & G. WEISSENBERGER, supra note 427, at 109.
436. Van Putten & May, Subjective Response as a Predictor of Outcome of
Pharmacotherapy,35 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 477, 479 (1978).

437. See Brooks, supra note 434, at 184.
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functioning in general.4 3 8 Plainly these results directly implicate basic
first amendment values.
The primary effects of antipsychotic drugs are concededly normalizing or restorative, and reduce the level of grossly distorted
thinking characteristic of schizophrenia.4 39 The drugs "are generally
incapable of creating thoughts, views, ideas, or opinions de novo or of
permanently inhibiting the process of thought generation."'
In view
of the beneficial effects of the drugs on mental processes, it may seem
paradoxical to regard them as intrusions on mental processes that
trigger first amendment scrutiny. Nonetheless, they are undeniably
"mind-altering,"'" even if not "mind-controlling." And, although
for most patients the drugs do restore the ability to concentrate that
had been so impaired by the patient's psychosis, some patients experience the drugs themselves as interfering with concentration, particularly in view of the serious side effects they produce.
Antipsychotic drugs thus have both positive and negative effects
on mental processes. These effects on mentation have led virtually all
courts that have considered the question to conclude that the first
amendment provides a basis for a right to refuse antipsychotic drug
treatment." 2 One court, however, has expressly rejected a first
amendment theory, finding instead a right to refuse the drugs
grounded in constitutional privacy. 4" 3 Although accepting the premise that the first amendment protects against certain kinds of interferences with mental processes, the district court in Rennie v. Klein
declined to apply the first amendment to the facts before it."'
Because the plaintiff, a mental patient, had asserted a desire to be
cured, and indeed had claimed a right to treatment, the Rennie court
in effect found that he had waived any first amendment right which he
might have raised in objection to the hospital's efforts to treat his
thought disorder with medication. Moreover, the court based its deci438. See DiMascio, Shader & Giller, Behavioral Toxicity Part III Perceptual-Cognitive
Functions and Part IV- Emotional (Mood) States, in PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS SIDE EFFECTS
132, 133 (R. Shader & A. DiMascio eds. 1977).
439. Davis, Antipsychotic Drugs, in 3 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra
note 319, at 2257, 2260.
440. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 265, at 308.
441. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 293 n.1 (1982); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1360
(D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on remand, 738 F.2d 1
(1st Cir. 1984).
442. See supra note 81 (cases); see also supra notes 372-83 and accompanying text.
443. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), aff'd in part, modified in part, and
remanded, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119
banc).
(1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (en
444. Id. at 1144,
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sion on the evidence that the patient's ability to perform on intelligence tests was not impaired and that the drugs' side effects were
"temporary and expected to last only a few days or a couple of
weeks."" 5 In the court's view, these effects on "mentation" differed
sharply from the effects involved in the Kaimowitz psychosurgery
case." 6 The court concluded that "if forced medication is otherwise
proper"-a conclusion that it thereafter questioned on privacy
grounds-"the temporary dulling of the senses accompanying it does
not rise to the level of the First Amendment violations found in
Kaimowitz."447

Every other court to have considered a first amendment contention in the context of antipsychotic drugs has found a first amendment
basis for drug refusal, and in light of the Rennie court's acceptance of
a constitutional privacy basis for such a right, its rejection of the contention must be considered dicta. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit in Bee v. Greaves" 8 found that the first amendment implicitly protects "the capacity to produce ideas."" 9 Finding
that "[a]ntipsychotic drugs have the capacity to severely and even
permanently affect an individual's ability to think and communicate, '450 the court recognized a first amendment right of pretrial
detainees to resist the drugs.45 ' The district court in Rogers v. Okin
based its finding of a first amendment violation on evidence showing
that "psychotropic medication has the potential to affect and change a
patient's mood, attitude and capacity to think. '4 2 Although conceding that such effects may be considered "positive steps on the road to
recovery, ' 453 the court noted that "the validity of psychotropic drugs
as a reasonable course of medical treatment is not the core issue
here. ' 45 4 Rather, the court found the fundamental question to be
whether the state may impose upon the patient "by forcibly injecting
'455
mind-altering drugs into his system in a non-emergency situation.
The courts in Bee and Rogers both correctly concluded that
445. Id.

446. Id.
447. Id.
448. 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1187 (1985).
449. Id. at 1394.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1366 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 634 F.2d 650 (Ist Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457
U.S. 291 (1982), on remand, 738 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1984).
453. Id. at 1366-67.
454. Id. at 1367.
455. Id.
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antipsychotic drugs have the capacity to affect the patient's ability to
think and communicate. Administered in sufficiently high dosages
and for long periods, these drugs undeniably have serious effects on
mentation and communication, and should accordingly receive first
amendment scrutiny. However, the Rennie dicta suggests that future
application of the first amendment to psychotropic medication may
turn upon the evidentiary showing concerning the effects of the drug
in question on the particular patient involved. Some of the antipsychotic drugs intrude more on mental processes than others, and the
length of drug administration and perhaps even the dosage used will
also be relevant to the first amendment question. Thus, brief administration of one of the milder drugs, or administration in a moderate
dosage that is not heavily sedating, may be thought of as not intruding sufficiently on first amendment values. The courts may also draw
a distinction between a brief course of emergency treatment to stabilize an acute patient and long-term drug administration for a chronic
4 56
patient where the risk of serious and lingering side effects is greater.
On the other hand, all of these drugs by their nature have an
effect upon mental processes even if administered for only a brief
period. When the side effects interfere with concentration and the
ability to think and to communicate, first amendment values are
plainly implicated. Although there may well be a de minimis level of
intrusion below which the courts will not apply first amendment scrutiny,4 57 a typical course of treatment with medication for hospitalized
patients will pass any such threshold. The conclusion that involuntary treatment with these drugs generally requires scrutiny under the
first amendment thus seems correct.
At this stage of the inquiry we need not determine whether the
governmental interest in imposing such therapy justifies involuntary
drug treatment; rather, the question here is whether such treatment
must receive first amendment consideration. The question of whether
such treatment can be justified, even though it implicates first amendment values, is beyond the scope of this Article.45 At this point it is
sufficient to conclude that the dramatic effects of the antipsychotic
456. See infra notes 577-91 and accompanying text.
457. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (1989) ("It is possible to find some
kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes-for example, walking down
the street, or meeting one's friends at a shopping mall-but such a kernel is not sufficient to
bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment.") (rejecting first amendment
freedom of association claim against licensing of dance halls in which admission was restricted
to persons between the ages of 14 and 18 on the ground that coming together to engage in
recreational dancing is not protected by the first amendment).
458. See supra note 30.
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drugs on mental processes demand first amendment scrutiny,459 thus
erecting a presumption (that may in appropriate cases be rebutted)
against such treatment and requiring strict scrutiny of government
attempts to impose it.
2.

ANTIDEPRESSANT DRUGS

Antidepressant drugs act largely on mood or emotion, rather
than on thoughts, but, of course, emotions and thoughts are closely
interrelated. Indeed, emotion and emotional expression are essential
elements of any definition of personality. An individual's emotions
and how he expresses them vitally affect both the content and the
form and style of communication.
Moreover, the physical side effects accompanying use of most of
the antidepressant drugs, albeit not usually as serious as those related
to the antipsychotic drugs, are essentially similar. 46" Like the antipsychotic drugs, the antidepressants are often highly sedating, and
therefore interfere with concentration. Antidepressants occasionally
result in confusion, memory impairment, disorientation, and episodes
of schizophrenic excitement or mania, although these symptoms usually subside within one to two days after withdrawal of the drug. 46 I
In general, the antidepressant drugs have the effect of restoring
the ability to concentrate, but some patients report the opposite effect.
Although considerably less serious than the effects of the antipsychotic drugs, the effects of the antidepressants on mental processes
also appear to be sufficiently intrusive to trigger first amendment
scrutiny.
3.

ANTIANXIETY DRUGS

Although the antianxiety drugs are rarely administered on an
involuntary basis, their occasional coercive use merits constitutional
consideration. The side effects of these drugs are relatively minor

compared to those of the antipsychotics and antidepressants. The
drugs do not cause extrapyramidal or autonomic effects. These drugs
do, however, depress the central nervous system, causing their most
common side effects, sedation and drowsiness. 46 2 In some patients,
459. For an analysis of these issues, see Winick, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic
Medication, supra note 3, at 16-21 (mental patients); Winick, Legal Limitationson Correctional
Therapy and Research, supra note 3, at 373-83 (criminal offenders).
460. See Winick, PsychotropicMedication and Competency to Stand Trial, supra note 4, at
786-89.
461. Davis, Antidepressant Drugs, in 3 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY,
supra note 319, at 2290, 2299.
462. Davis, Minor Tranquilizers, Sedatives, and Hypnotics, in 3 COMPREHENSIVE
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particularly the elderly, visual-motor performance and judgment may
be impaired.46 3 Because these effects are short-acting, the antianxiety

drugs, particularly at low dosages, may not be sufficient to trigger first
amendment scrutiny. On the other hand, at dosages sufficient to produce sedation and resulting impairment of concentration the effects
on mental processes are arguably sufficient to implicate the first
amendment.
4.

LITHIUM

Lithium functions as a mood normalizer, preventing the severe
mood swings that characterize bipolar (formerly known as manicdepressive) illness, a major affective disorder in which recurring periods of mania alternate with periods of depression. Lithium functions
to stabilize the patient's mood within a range deemed more clinically
acceptable. At proper therapeutic levels, lithium rarely causes
adverse reactions; 4 however, administration of excessive amounts of
lithium, or failure of renal mechanisms properly to eliminate the
drug, may result in lithium toxicity, a serious condition involving the
central nervous system that may cause confusion, impairment of consciousness, and even coma.465 Because therapeutic and toxic levels of
the drug are so close, toxicity is a constant risk and must be closely
monitored.466 At therapeutic levels, none of the relatively omild side
effects of the drug interfere with mental processes. Unlike the 4other
67
psychotropic drugs, lithium has no general sedating properties.
The most troubling first amendment issue concerning the use of
lithium relates to its effect on creativity. There appears to be a definite association between mood swings and creativity. In fact, many of
the world's great artists-the composers Handel, Rossini, and Schumann, writers such as Balzac and Hemingway, artists such as Van
Gogh and Jackson Pollock, and theatrical director Joshua Logan, to
name a few, have been either manic or manic depressive.468 Periods
supra note 319, at 2328; T. DETRE & H. JARECKI, supra note
399, at 599; Jarvik, supra note 428, at 176; Meyers & Solomon, Psychopharmacology, in
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 427, 436-37 (P. Solomon & V. Patch eds. 2d ed. 1974).
463. Meyers & Solomon, supra note 462, at 436-37.
464. Brown, Side Effects of Lithium Therapy and Their Treatment, 21 CAN. PSYCHIATRY
ASS'N J. 13 (1976).
465. Brown, supra note 464, at 18-19; Fieve, Lithium Therapy, in 3 COMPREHENSIVE
TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 319, at 2350.
466. Fieve, supra note 464, at 2351.
467. Jarvik, supra note 428, at 193; Meyers & Solomon, supra note 462, at 448.
468. R. FIEVE, MOODSWING: THE THIRD REVOLUTION IN PSYCHIATRY 55-59 (Morrow
Book ed. 1975). Although some have suggested that Jackson Pollock suffered from
schizophrenia, this diagnosis is in dispute, and his symptoms strongly suggest the possibility of
TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY,
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of great creativity frequently coincide with the manic phase of the
condition.4 69 "There is a fine and at times invisible line between
mania and creativity. ' 47 ° Dr. Fieve, one of the pioneers in the use of
lithium, concedes that treatment with lithium may interfere with creativity. Because many artists fear that such treatment will deprive
them of their talent, the drug's effects on creativity present difficult
questions for psychiatrists.47 ' In a study of 24 artists treated with
lithium, 4 72 six thought that the treatment lowered their creativity, and

four stopped treatment for this reason. Six artists reported no change
in creativity, and twelve reported positive effects-greater quantity
and quality, and more artistic discipline. Plainly, at least for some
artists, their mood inspires and enhances their creativity. The mood
and emotion expressed in the work of certain artists, composers, and
writers is what we respond to so strongly. Indeed, that expression is
precisely what has led us to classify the work of some such artistsVan Gogh and Jackson Pollock, for example, as Expressionists.
Dr. Fieve concludes that moods, energy states, and creativity are
inextricably linked, but that when abnormally low or high moods
occur in the creative artist, his creative work will suffer.473 Lithium
may therefore assist many creative patients. Although Dr. Fieve concludes that overall creative output becomes more consistent with lithium, and that the drug does not interfere with the quality of the work,
he concedes that the potential effect on creativity may make lithium
treatment inadvisable when symptoms of mood swing are not
debilitating or destructive.474 In Dr. Fieve's view, each patient should
be considered on an individual basis. "Some artists become so accommodated to their mild highs and lows that they consider these episodes as basic facets of their personalities and really want475no change
in their way of life. These patients should be left alone.
Although lithium is undeniably helpful in the treatment of bipolar or manic-depressive illness, some patients complain that it "controls" them, by controlling their mood. Clearly the possibility that
lithium may blunt creative processes or capacity raises grave first
amendment concerns for patients who wish to resist this treatment.
manic depressive illness. See B. FRIEDMAN, JACKSON POLLOCK: ENERGY MADE VISIBLE 42,
47 (1972) ("depressive mania," "overintensity").
469. R. FIEVE, supra note 468, at 55.
470. Id. at 60.
471. Id.

472. Shou, Artistic Productivity and Lithium Prophylaxis in Manic Depressive Illness, 135
BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 97 (1979).

473. R. FIEVE, supra note 468, at 69.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 69-70.
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Lithium treatment to control a patient's emotional tone or mood by
keeping it within some government official's notion of acceptable
levels may be compared to and distinguished from the regulation of
sound levels at concerts in the park, recently Upheld by the Supreme
Court against a first amendment challenge. In Ward v. Rock Against
Racism,476 the Court considered guidelines mandated by the New
York City Department of Parks and Recreation for concerts held at
the Central Park Bandshell. In order to control excessive volume at
such concerts in the interests of other users of the park and residents
of nearby areas, the guidelines required use of sound equipment furnished by the Department and administered by an independent professional sound technician. During musical performances, the city's
sound technicians controlled the sound and volume, but they gave
sponsors of the events autonomy with respect to sound mix and balance.4 77 Conceding that "[m]usic, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment, '471 the Court
found the regulations at issue to be content-neutral-justified without
regard to the artistic content of the performance.4 79 The Court conceded, however, that any attempt by government to interfere with
purposes "would raise serious First Amendsound mix for aesthetic
480
concerns.
ment
Regulating a patient's mood within governmentally approved
levels would seem more like government interference in artistic judgment, such as by controlling the sound mix or balance at a concert,
than the reasonable restrictions on time, place, and manner that the
Court found the volume regulations in Ward to be. Mood is an inherent and significant component of personality itself. The content and
expression of ideas are heavily influenced by mood. In this sense, regulation of mood inevitably regulates the content of expression. For
this reason, involuntary imposition of lithium should be deemed to
trigger first amendment scrutiny.
Psychotropic drugs in general thus present primary and side
effects that are mentally intrusive, rapidly occurring, and incapable of
being resisted by unwilling patients. Although the primary effects of
the drugs may last only several hours, the side effects of many may be
long-lasting and in some cases irreversible. Not surprisingly, patients
frequently consider the side effects of some of these drugs to be highly
unpleasant, painful, and debilitating. Frequently, the effects are so
476. 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).
477. Id. at 2752.
478. Id. at 2753.
479. Id. at 2754.

480. Id. at 2755.
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distressing that they interfere with the ability to concentrate and to
communicate. Because of their direct effect upon mental processes
and intellectual functioning, involuntary use of psychotropic medication, as several lower courts have concluded, should 'aise first amendment problems.
E. Behavior Therapy
Behavior therapy 48 ' focuses not on mental processes but on
behavior. Unlike even the verbal techniques, which focus upon
changing thought processes and perceptions as a means to change
behavior, the behavioral techniques focus exclusively upon changing
the external environment, and ignore mental processes.482 Both in
theory and usually in practice, therefore, the behavioral techniques
are the least intrusive upon mental processes.483 These techniques
may well raise constitutional privacy concerns. Moreover, some aversive conditioning techniques-using drugs, electric shocks, and other
physically intrusive stimuli-may infringe a liberty interest in personal security. With extremely few exceptions, however, these techniques do not appear to present sufficiently serious effects on mental
processes to trigger first amendment scrutiny.
Not only do these techniques not change mental processes, but
there is evidence that they bring about behavioral changes only in
cooperative patients. For treatment to be successful, it cannot be
forced on patients against their will. 48 4 Reinforcers do not work in a
mechanical fashion to induce behavior change automatically without
the cooperation of the subject, but function as "motivators," depending for their success on the "incentive preferences of those undergoing
''48 5

change.

481. "Behavior therapy, often called behavior modification, involves clinical application of
experimentally derived principles of psychological learning theory, using systematic
manipulation of the environment to teach adaptive behavior or modify maladaptive behavior."
Winick, Legal Limitations on Correctional Therapy and Research, supra note 3, at 357. For a
description of several of the behavioral techniques and of the constitutional issues they present,
see id. at 357-65.
482. See R. SCHWITZGEBEL, supra note 3, at 66.

483. Id.
484. See E. ERWIN, BEHAVIOR THERAPY:

SCIENTIFIC, PHILOSOPHICAL AND MORAL

FOUNDATIONS 180-81 (1978) (citing Marks, The Current Status of Behavioral Psychotherapy:

Theory and Practice, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 253, 255 (1976)); Winick, Legal Limitations on
Correctional Therapy and Research, supra note 3, at 360.
485. Bandura, Behavior Therapy and the Models of Man, 29 AM.PSYCHOLOGIST 859, 862
(1974); Winick, Legal Limitationson CorrectionalTherapy and Research, supra note 3, at 36061.
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1.

POSITIVE REINFORCEMENT TECHNIQUES

The positive reinforcement techniques seem to raise few first
amendment concerns. Surely the use of certain reinforcers may prove
too tantalizing for at least some patients and offenders to resist--color
TV, air conditioning, better physical conditions, more appetizing
food, monetary rewards, or the approval of the parole board or hospital release committee, for example. But even these strong inducements to change do not seem to alter mental processes in any way
sufficient to trigger constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, society outside of
prisons and hospitals is pervaded by governmental incentives designed
to induce a variety of behaviors and attitudes. Businessmen are
offered an investment tax credit. Students are given "A's" if they perform well in school. Army recruits are given bonuses and other
incentives to persuade them to enlist. Moreover, variable reinforcers,
such as the chance to hit the financial jackpot in the lottery, are powerful inducers of gambling behavior. Even within the prison, inmates
are granted "good time" credit toward parole eligibility for good conduct and participation in rehabilitative programs as "a tangible
reward for positive efforts made during incarceration. '486 In each
case the government provides rewards for the explicit purpose of
inducing or reinforcing certain behavior. However, few would contend that these positive reinforcements implicate first amendment
freedom of thought.4 87 Although the use of reinforcers in a structured
behavior modification program in a hospital or prison may induce
behavior change more effectively than outside such an environment, it
is difficult to see how a patient or offender who decides to alter his
behavior in order to obtain a color TV or other reward could argue
that his first amendment rights have thereby been violated.4 88
Whatever effects positive reinforcement may have, considerable
evidence suggests that these effects are short-lived, and perhaps
restricted to the controlled clinical setting in which conditioning
occurs. 489 Nor do these techniques appear to work in such a direct
486. N.Y. Comp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 260.1(a) (1983).
487. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1977) ("There is a basic difference between
direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative
activity consonant with legislative policy ... [w]hen the State attempts to impose its will by
force of law; the State's power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is
necessarily far broader.") (footnote omitted); accord Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs.,
109 S. Ct. 3040, 3052 (1989).
488. Winick, Legal Limitationson CorrectionalTherapy and Research, supra note 3, at 36162.
489. See

B.

BROWN,

L.

WIENCKOWSKI

&

S.

STOLz,

BEHAVIOR

MODIFICATION:

PERSPECTIVES ON A CURRENT ISSUE 14 (1975); Gruber, Behavior Therapy: Problems in
Generalization, 2 BEHAV. THERAPY 361, 361-68 (1971).
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and intrusive fashion as to deprive the subject of effective control over
his own behavior, as do the organic therapies. In view of the temporary nature of the effects of positive reinforcement and the subject's
ability to resist behavioral changes facilitated by this technique, it
seems unlikely that application of these techniques without consent
will be found to violate the first amendment.
2.

AVERSIVE THERAPY

The aversive techniques could present differing problems,
depending upon the aversive stimulus that is used. For example, the
court in Mackey v. Procunier found that the use of the drug succinycholine in a prison mental hospital aversive conditioning program
raised serious first amendment concerns.4 90 So distressing were the
effects of this drug, which paralyzed the diaphragm, producing sensations of suffocation and drowning, that the court concluded that the
prisoner's allegations of mental intrusion and effect were sufficient to
raise serious constitutional questions of "impermissible tinkering with
the mental processes." 4 9 1 Aside from the use of negative stimuli
which either directly or indirectly affect mental processes, however,
the aversive techniques do not seem to raise first amendment concerns. Like other behavioral approaches, they are ineffective with
uncooperative subjects.4 92 Any behavioral changes accomplished
against the subject's will are impermanent and reversible. In this
respect, even the aversive approaches are substantially distinct from
the more direct, mentally intrusive organic techniques, which do not
depend for their effects on the subject's cooperation.
3.

OTHER BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT TECHNIQUES

Other behavioral techniques, such as systematic desensitization,
shaping, and contingency contracting, are also purely dependent upon
the subject's willing cooperation, and do not seem to involve any
mental intrusions. Modeling presents the least difficulties of any technique considered, and would certainly raise no first amendment concerns. In general, although some of the behavioral techniques may
raise other constitutional problems, the first amendment does not
seem implicated by these approaches.
490. 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973); see supra notes 370-72 and accompanying text.
491. Mackey, 477 F.2d at 878.
492. See Bandura, The Ethical and Social Purposes of Behavior Modification, in ANNUAL
REVIEW OF BEHAVIOR THERAPY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 16 (C. Franks & G. Wilson eds.
1975); Note, Aversion Therapy.- Its Limited Potentialfor Use in a CorrectionalSetting, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1327 (1974).
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F. Psychotherapy and Other Verbal Techniques
At the lower end of the intrusiveness continuum are the verbal
techniques-psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, counseling, and educational programs. These verbal techniques, unlike the behavioral therapies, usually focus upon changing thought processes, emotions, and
perceptions. Moreover, when successful, they can have a massive
impact upon attitudes, beliefs, and personality. Nevertheless, the verbal techniques work in essentially a non-intrusive fashion. Those
compelled to participate in a verbal therapy program who seek to
resist attitudinal or personality change seem readily able to frustrate
these approaches and avoid their effects simply by withholding
cooperation.
1.

PSYCHOTHERAPY

Psychotherapy works slowly, affording the patients time to contemplate the meaning of behavior change and to accept or resist such
change.49 3 Unlike with the organic therapies, which are incapable of
being resisted, the patient retains a veto over the ability of the verbal
techniques to effect changes in attitudes and behavior. "[W]e imagine
ourselves as patients to be free agents throughout the process, free to
reject it and free to leave with no more scar than in any other human
'
transaction."494
A patient who seeks to resist the effects of psychotherapy can thus totally frustrate treatment by withholding his cooperation. The "fundamental rule" of psychotherapy requires the
patient to communicate openly and candidly with his therapist.49
The therapeutic process cannot progress if the patient is unwilling to
play this role. Trust is an indispensable condition for successful therapy. Moreover, even if the patient does cooperate in at least the surface rituals of the therapeutic process, he can effectively avoid the
493. See Halleck, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Behavior Control, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
381, 381 (1974); Katz, The Rights to Treatment-An EnchantingLegal Fiction?, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 755, 777 (1969). In this sense psychotherapy should be distinguished from the more
concentrated application of techniques that have come to be known as "brainwashing" or
"coercive persuasion." See generally Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Minn. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981); R. LIFTON, THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
TOTALISM (1961); E. SCHEIN, COERCIVE PERSUASION (1961); Delgado, Ascription of Criminal
States of Mind. Toward a Defense Theory for the Coercively Persuaded ("Brainwashed")
Defendant, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1978).
494. Michels, Ethical Issues of Psychological and Psychotherapeutic Means of Behavior
Control: Is the Moral ContractBeing Observed?, 3 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 11, 11 (1973).
495. See S.FREUD, AN OUTLINE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS, in 23 STANDARD EDITION OF THE
COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 141 (1964); Stewart, Psychoanalysis
and PsychoanalyticalPsychotherapy, in 2 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, Supra
note 272, at 2113, 2117; Schwartz & Solomon, Psychoanalysis,in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY
489, 513 (P. Solomon & V. Patch eds. 2d ed. 1974).
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gradual and non-intrusive effects of psychotherapy with a minimal
degree of mental resistance. "[I]n the psychotherapy scheme one may
go through treatment as a form of game playing, such as showing up
for appointments and even making verbal utterances, in the absence
of the type and degree of commitment required for a meaningful therapeutic relationship. ' 496 A patient who is resistant to therapy can
thus avoid' its effects even if compelled to play the role of patient.
2.

COUNSELING PROGRAMS FOR OFFENDERS

Certainly if a patient in psychotherapy can resist or avoid the
effects of this technique at will, an offender can even more easily avoid
the intrusions of the "counseling" provided by counselors in prison
and community programs who generally lack the professional abilities
of those administering psychotherapy. This was confirmed by a
review of thirteen studies of correctional psychotherapy in institutional and community settings, which concluded that such therapy is
more likely to be effective, if at all, "when
497 the subjects are amenable to
treatment rather than nonamenable.
Educational and vocational programs, which prisoners and
offenders in the community are frequently required to attend, are no
more effective or intrusive than counseling for those disinterested in
learning. Students in primary and secondary schools, in their "most
formative and impressionable years, "498 may be vulnerable to the
socialization process that occurs in our educational systems whether
or not they are willing participants, 99 although all students no doubt
496. COMMITTEE ON PSYCHIATRY & LAW OF THE GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHIATRY AND SEX PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION: THE 30S TO THE 80s, at
889 (1977).

497. D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL
TREATMENT 213 (1975).
498. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 894 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
499. The essential role of the public schools in America has been recognized by the
Supreme Court to be one of "inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system." Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.. 68, 77 (1979); accord Bethel
School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) ("The inculcation of ... values is truly the
'work of the schools.' ") (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 508 (1969)); Pico, 457 U.S. at 864 (plurality opinion) ("local school boards must be
permitted 'to establish and apply their curriculum in such a way as to transmit community
values' "); id. at 876 (referring to "the essential socializing function of schools") (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (public school is "the primary vehicle for
transmitting the values on which our society rests") (quoting Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76); see J.
DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION

2-4, 8-9 (1916); E.

DURKHEIM, EDUCATION AND

SOCIOLOGY 71-78, 123-24 (S.Fox trans. 1956); R. HESS & J. TORNEY, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN CHILDREN 101 (1967) ("The public school appears to be the

most important and effective instrument of political socialization in the United States."); id. at
101-15 (empirical study); J. KOZOL, THE NIGHT IS DARK AND I AM FAR FROM HOME I
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share the common experience of having been able to "tune out" the
(1975) (arguing that the term "socialization" is a euphemism for "state indoctrination");
Arons & Lawrence, supra note 187; Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The
Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEX. L. REV. 477 (1981); Goldstein, The Asserted
ConstitutionalRight of Pub;icSchool Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L.
REV. 1293, 1342-43 (1976); van Geel, supra note 186.
Yet despite this essentially inculcative function of the school and the vulnerability of
school age students to its socializing function, few would consider compulsory education to
violate the first amendment. See J. TUSSMAN, supra note 102, at 129; M. YUDOF, supra note
103, at 52-55, 213-22; Garvey, supra note 235, at 1769; Goldstein, supra, at 1350-51; Shapiro,
supra note 185, at 261; Yudof, When Government Speaks: Toward a Theory of Government
Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863, 874-75 (1979). But see van Geel,
supra note 186 (urging that value inculcation in the public schools should be deemed to violate
the first amendment). Although schools may present a significant enough impact on mental
processes to justify first amendment scrutiny, courts will undoubtedly find the state interest in
compulsory education sufficiently compelling to survive first amendment challenge. See Plyler,
457 U.S. at 221 ("education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society";
"the pivotal role of education in sustaining our political and cultural heritage"); Ambach, 441
U.S. at 76 ("The importance of public schools in the preparation of individuals for
participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests, long
has been recognized by our decisions"); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (referring to "the public school as a most vital civic
institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government"); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments.").
Moreover, a number of Supreme Court cases dealing with education have applied the
Constitution in ways that tend substantially to mitigate the concern that public education
undermines first amendment values. The Court has "long recognized certain constitutional
limits upon the power of the State to control even the curriculum and classroom." Pico, 457
U.S. at 861 (plurality opinion); e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (declaring
unconstitutional a state law prohibiting the teaching of the Darwinian theory of evolution in
any state-supported school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating a state law
forbidding the teaching of modern foreign languages in public and private schools); see also
Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)' (local school boards may not remove books from school library
because they dislike the ideas they convey). The Court has stressed that public schools may
not be "enclaves of totalitarianism" and that "students may not be regarded as closed-circuit
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
The Court has also observed that "[t]he classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas' "
and that "students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new
maturity and understanding." Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
Moreover in a number of cases the Court has ruled that "the First Amendment... does not
tolerate laws which cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom." Id.; see Epperson, 393 U.S.
at 104-05; West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). In addition, the
Court recognizes academic freedom for teachers. E.g., Epperson, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); see T.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION,

supra note 181, at 593-626; Goldstein,

supra; Van Alstyne, The ConstitutionalRights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L. J.
841. Thus, by providing a measure of teacher independence, the Court has substantially
mitigated the potential for governmental indoctrination through compulsory education. M.
YUDOF, supra note 103, at 215-18.
Perhaps an ultimate safety valve, for first amendment purposes, is the freedom of parents
to satisfy compulsory schooling laws by placing their children in private rather than public
schools. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (unconstitutional to require
compulsory education in public schools only); M. YUDOF, supra note 103, at 227-30; van Geel,
supra note 186, at 242-43. Parents could also satisfy compulsory schooling laws by, in limited
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efforts of their teachers. In any event, prisoners and even adolescents
adjudged juvenile delinquents, long past their formative years, generally have the power to resist unwanted education."°
Even the strong verbal exhortation of prison inmates, bordering
on threats of physical abuse and typical of direct confrontation-style
programs, such as the Juvenile Awareness Project at Rahway State
Prison portrayed in the film "Scared Straight," are within the complete power of the listener to accept or reject. Rutgers University
School of Criminal Justice completed two evaluations of the Juvenile
Awareness Project which confirm this observation." ° The evaluations compared attitude and behavior changes in a group of juveniles
that had attended the project with a control group that had not. The
results were mixed, with no significant changes in attitude or behavior
shown conclusively to be due to participation in the project. Thus it
would seem that the participants were able to accept or reject what
circumstances, removing their children from school altogether. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish parents could remove their children from school after the eighth grade
on religious grounds); J. COONS & S. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR

(1978); J. HOLT, TEACH YOUR OWN: A HOPEFUL PATH FOR EDUCATION
271-95 (1981) (discussing state cases upholding right of parents to educate their children at
home); M. YUDOF, supra note 103, at 233 (instruction at home sanctioned in many states).
Finally, parents can satisfy the schooling laws by removing children from certain portions of
the compulsory school curriculum. See id. (states commonly provide for parental control over
attendance in controversial courses like sex education); Hirschoff, Parents and the Public
School Curriculum: Is There a Right to Have One's Child Excused from Objectionable
Instruction?, 50 S.CAL. L. REV. 871 (1977).
In any event, "the public school remains an open institution," Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 670 (1977), open to public scrutiny and substantial supervision by parents and the
community:
[T]he governance of elementary and secondary education traditionally has been
placed in the hands of a local board, responsible locally to the parents and
citizens of school districts. Through parent-teacher associations (PTA's), and
even less formal arrangements that vary with schools, parents are informed and
often may influence decisions of the board. Frequently, parents know the
teachers and visit classes. It is fair to say that no single agency of government at
any level is closer to the people whom it serves than the typical school board.
dissenting). Moreover, children in school "are captive only a
Pico, 457 U.S. at 894 (Powell, J.,
few hours a day, they have ready access to information outside of the school environment, and
school messages tend to be consistent with what other important sources of socialization (family, church, clubs, etc.) are imparting." M. YUDOF, supra note 103, at 213.
500. But see Garvey, supra note 235, at 1769 ("[I]t would be a massive infringement of the
first amendment for the state to herd adults together and propagandize them for seven hours a
day."); Yudof, supra note 499, at 902 (suggesting that the degree to which the government has
captured its audience, the maturity of the audience, the techniques of persuasion employed and
the receptiveness of the institution and its captive audience to counter messages are critical
factors in assessing the constitutionality of government speech).
501. J. Finckenhauer & J. Storti, Juvenile Awareness Project Help: Evaluation Report No.
1 (1979) (unpublished); J. Finckenhauer, Juvenile Awareness Project Evaluation Report No. 2
(April 18, 1979) (unpublished).
FAMILY CONTROL
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the program offered. On the other hand, although, these programs
apparently effected, no profound changes in attitude or behavior,
prison confinement-which such programs are designed to scare
future offenders into avoiding-may itself produce profound changes
in both. Indeed, the Supreme Court, in another context, recognized
"the institutional goal of modifying the behavior and value systems of
prison inmates sufficiently to permit them to live within the law when
they are released." 5 °2 The prison, particularly its correctional therapy
and educational programs, had long been dominated by the attempt
to indoctrinate inmates in traditional middle-class values. 50 3 Nevertheless, confinement alone, whatever its effects on mental processes, is
not thought to violate the first amendment. 5" This is so in part for
reasons that apply as well to verbal rehabilitative approaches: any
changes in attitude and behavior they produce are gradual and capable of being resisted. Despite the great potential for indoctrination
within "total institutions" such as prisons and hospitals, 505 there is
little evidence that these attempts have succeeded in instilling attitudinal or behavioral change in unwilling inmates. We speak of prisoners
who "take advantage" of these rehabilitative programs, implying that
the choice is largely voluntary.
Prison and parole systems place a premium on participation in
rehabilitative programs, and most prisoners are well aware of this. In
fact, much inmate participation in educational programs may be
motivated by little more than the desire to increase their chances for
parole.56 In any event, even if this motivation produces attendance
that can be regarded as involuntary, participation in verbal rehabilitative efforts does not ensure accomplishment of program goals, particularly for the many prisoners for whom participation is little more
than a facade.50 7 Even if inmate participation is coerced by the potential rewards, prisoners remain free to reject any substantial intrusion
or permanent change in mental processes. However, education programs and treatment efforts in general are constitutionally limited by
the principle expressed in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,"' the compulsory flag salute case, that the state may not
attempt to impose orthodoxy of belief.59 Neither patients nor offend502. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562-63 (1974).
503. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 43 (1971) [hereinafter STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE].

504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.

See L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 15-8, at 1327; Shapiro, supra note 185, at 261.
See generally E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961).
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 503, at 97-98.
Id.
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977); Wooley v. Maynard,
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ers, therefore, may be required to affirm their belief in any officially
held view on a matter of religion, politics, or opinion."' 0
Only two reported decisions have involved challenges to the
involuntary application of purely verbal techniques. Both suits arose
from compulsory attendance at prison education classes in Arkansas.
In Rutherford v. Hutto,5 1' the prisoner, classified as illiterate although
possessing some slight ability to read and write, was forced to attend
classes at the prison pursuant to an Arkansas statute. He claimed
that such compulsory attendance violated his first amendment rights
as well as other constitutional provisions. The prison school required
eight hours of attendance one day a week; classes were ungraded, and
students were permitted to move along at their own pace. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas noted that
"no particular pressure [is] put on any student to achieve or to
achieve at any particular rate. No sanctions are imposed if a student
performs poorly."'5 12 Although it noted that an inmate "cannot be
forced to learn," the court concluded that the state may "lead the
horse to water even though it knows that the horse cannot be made to
drink."5" 3 In view of the state's authority to compel the performance
of uncompensated labor, the court could find nothing constitutionally
objectionable in compelling participation in the school program.
Declaring there is no "constitutional right to be ignorant" or "to
remain uneducated," the court rejected the prisoner's constitutional
challenge.I54
In the second Arkansas prison education case, Jackson v. McLemore,51 5 a prisoner, forced to attend an education program, was
placed in segregated confinement for refusing his teacher's order to
spell certain words. The district court dismissed the complaint, which
had asserted a "constitutional right to be let alone, ' 5 6 and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.' 1 7 Expressing agreement with the approach taken in Rutherford, the circuit
430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1968); Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (first amendment "does not tolerate laws that cast a pall
of orthodoxy over the classroom"); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp., 374 U.S. 203, 222-24
(1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425, 435 (1962); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642; supra notes
104-34 and accompanying text.
510. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
511. 377 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Ark. 1974).
512. Id. at 271.
513. Id. at 272-73.
514. Id. at 272.
515. 523 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1975).
516. Id. at 839.
517. Id. at 840.
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court stressed that "[ilt would defeat the purpose of rehabilitation if
access to [rehabilitative] programs could be at the option of the prisoner."' The court, ,however, limited its holding to the type of rehabilitative program before it, finding that no showing had been made
that the program was "being purposefully used to infringe upon protected constitutional rights. ' 51 9 Moreover, the court indicated that
although a prisoner may be required to participate in the school program, he "may not be punished simply because he failed to learn,
either through inability or lack of motivation."5 20
A 1952 Supreme Court case, involving a captive audience of a
quite different kind, also suggests that unwanted verbal exhortation
may not create constitutional difficulties. 521 A transit company regulated by an agency of the District of Columbia installed FM radios in
its buses and street cars which broadcast commercial advertising.
Two passengers protested in the .federal courts, but the Supreme
Court rejected their claim that, as captive auditors, their first amend22
ment or fifth amendment privacy rights had been violated.
Although public buses and public prisons and hospitals have little in
common, the effects of mandatory "verbal programming," in terms of
the listener's ability to resist, are nonetheless substantially similar.
Even the subtle kind of persuasion that marksmuch of psychotherapy, including sophisticated manipulation of transference and
counter-transference phenomena, occurs so gradually and is so dependent upon the willingness of the subject to participate meaningfully
and to seek change that it should not be deemed to intrude sufficiently
on mental processes to trigger first amendment scrutiny. In view of
the ability of patients and offenders to resist the effects of these essentially verbal interventions, they may readily be distinguished from the
more coercive treatment methods found to violate the first amendment in cases involving psychosurgery, electroconvulsive therapy, or
psychotropic medication. In this sense, the verbal techniques are similar to the behavioral therapies; both can effectively change attitudes
and behavior, but both are ultimately dependent upon the subject's
cooperation and willingness to change. Accordingly, neither of these
518. Id. at 839.
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
522. Id. at 461-63; see also Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967) (reversing
obscenity convictions on the basis that there was no "assault upon individual privacy by
publication in a manner so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to

avoid exposure to it.").
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the first

amendment.
VIII.

THE BURDEN IMPOSED ON GOVERNMENT TO JUSTIFY
ABRIDGMENTS OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

Although the first amendment should be construed to protect
mental processes against the kinds of intrusions characterized by the
organic therapies, this conclusion does not mean that such protection
is absolute.52 3 Constitutional rights are not absolute, and even fundamental rights, such as those protected by the first amendment, must
yield to government restriction when necessary to advance a compelling governmental interest.5 24 Thus, in other first amendment contexts, the Supreme Court has subjected to "the most exacting
scrutiny"5 25 state attempts to abridge protected interests. The Court

has indicated that in balancing individual interests against governmental interests, "the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling. '5 26 The governmental interest
advanced "must be paramount, one of vital importance, and the burden is on the government to show the existence of such an interest. ' '5 27 "To characterize the quality of the governmental interest
which must appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive
terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent;
5 28

strong."
Even when this heavy burden is carried, the government is
required to employ means "narrowly tailored"5 29 or "closely drawn to
avoid unnecessary abridgment" 3° of the first amendment interest in
523. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
524. E.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) ("The right to
associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute.").
525. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2543 (1989); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321
(1988); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
362 (1976).
526. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786; Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
527. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362; see Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969).
528. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (footnote omitted); see also
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2613 (1989) ("a state interest of the highest order").
529. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2613; Boos, 485 U.S. at 329; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986) (plurality opinion); Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 610 (1982); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980).
530. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53-54
(1982); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786; see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943);
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939); L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 12-8, at 833 ("The
Court also requires an especially close nexus between ends and means. A statute must be
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question. The "limitation of First Amendment freedoms" must be
"no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved."15 3 ' To justify an infringement
on first amendment rights, it must be found that the state interest
"cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive" of
the right involved.53 2
This "exacting scrutiny"-insisting on compelling governmental
interests and least restrictive means to accomplish them in order to
justify infringement of first amendment protected activity-is applied
generally in first amendment cases, but not in certain contexts. As
previously discussed, 533 in certain limited areas the Supreme Court
has used less stringent standards of review-for example, in cases
dealing with sexually explicit speech,5 34 child pornography,5 35 and
commercial speech.5 36 Unlike these activities, however, the mentation
and expressive conduct of the mentally ill serve important values
within the core of those traditionally protected by the first amendment.53 7 As a result, this lesser scrutiny applied in cases involving
what some members of the Court regard as "lower value" speech
should be inapplicable in the context of forced treatment of the mentally ill. Because freedom of mental processes is a predicate for the
narrowly drawn so that a challenged act of government is clearly an efficacious means to
achieve permissible objectives of government and is narrowly aimed at those permissible
objectives so as not unnecessarily to reach expressive conduct protected by the first
amendment,"). The Court most recently put the test this way:
The government may serve this legitimate interest, but to withstand
constitutional scrutiny, "it must do so by narrowly drawn regulations designed to
serve those interests without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment
freedoms." It is not enough to show that the government's ends are compelling;
the means must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends.
Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2836 (1989) (citations omitted).
531. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
532. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); see Brown v. Socialist
Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1982); Democratic Party v. Wisconsin,
450 U.S. 107, 124 (1981); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25;
Button, 371 U.S. at 438; Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488.
533. See supra notes 244-47 & 251-64 and accompanying text.
534. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976) (plurality opinion); see supra notes 251-58 and accompanying text.
535. Ferber v. New York, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); see supra notes 244-47 and accompanying
text.
536. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986); Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); supra notes 26264 and accompanying text.
537. See supra notes 319-40 and accompanying text.
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exercise of all first amendment protected rights,53 it should be entitled to full first amendment protection, including the "exacting scrutiny" typically applied in the first amendment context.
The Supreme Court also has applied lesser scrutiny to "contentneutral" restrictions on first amendment activity.5 39 For example,
laws prohibiting speech near hospitals, banning billboards in residential communities, imposing license fees for demonstrations, or forbidding the distribution of leaflets in public places54° are content-neutral
restrictions which limit communication without regard to the message
conveyed.541 By contrast, "content-based" restrictions, which are
subject to exacting scrutiny, limit communication because of the
message conveyed. 4 2 Content-neutral restrictions are subjected to
lesser scrutiny, under which the Court employs a balancing test considering the extent to which the restriction limits communication,
whether it is "narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest," and whether it "leave[s] open ample alternative channels of
'
communication."543
Unlike content-based restrictions, which are presumed to violate the first amendment, " 'content-neutral' time, place
and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are designed to
serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably
limit alternative avenues of communication." 5 "
Is involuntary mental health treatment content-based or contentneutral within this dichotomy? The distinction seems awkward in the
context of mental health treatment, which is directed not primarily at
communication, but rather at mental processes. But, mental health
treatment restricts thoughts, beliefs, and mental attitudes precisely
538. See supra notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
539. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (1989); Frisby v. Schultz, 108
S. Ct. 2495, 2500-01 (1988); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986);
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Heffron v. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981); see also Stephan, The First
Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203 (1982); Stone, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983); Note, supra note
180.
540. Stone, supra note 539, at 189-90.
541. See Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2753; Stone, supra note 539, at 189.
542. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138 (1988);
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984); Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Stone, supra note 539, at 190.
543. Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2753; Frisby, 108 S. Ct. at 2501 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). To be "narrowly tailored" to serve the
government's interest, the Court recently clarified, does not require that it be "the leastrestrictive or least-intrusive means of doing so." Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2757-58.
544. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986); accord Frisby, 108 S.
Ct. at 2501; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
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because they are deemed disordered, that is, because of their content.
It simply cannot be said that the justification for such treatment
"'ha[s] nothing to do with content.' "'I' Moreover, such treatment
would seem content-based because it restricts the opportunity for the
expression itself-the very ability to maintain the thoughts, beliefs,
and mental attitudes that "themselves are the precursors to expression-not merely a particular means of expression. Such treatment
therefore does not merely restrict the time, place, and manner of
expression or of the exercise of mental processes; it directly changes
mental processes. Nothing could be a greater threat' to first amendment values. Because mental processes unimpaired by government
are a predicate to the exercise of all other first amendment protected
interests, intrusive treatment designed to change such processes
should generally be subjected to the exacting scrutiny usually applied
in the first amendment area, rather than the balancing approach
applied to content-neutral restrictions.
The conclusion that strict first amendment scrutiny should be
applied to intrusive treatment imposed on an involuntary basis could
be subject to one other potential qualification. The Supreme Court
has recognized that "First Amendment guarantees must be 'applied in
light of the speical characteristics of the ... environment.' "546 In the
prison context, the Court has shown special sensitivity to the need to
maintain institutional security, applying a form of intermediate scrutiny in cases involving certain first amendment claims raised by prisoners. 54 7 In these cases the Court has relaxed the rigors of traditional
strict scrutiny that would apply in contexts outside of the prison, particularly the requirement that the means chosen by correctional
administrators to accomplish compelling ends be the "least restrictive
alternative" available.
The Court has justified this relaxed scrutiny on the basis that in
prison, first amendment and other constitutional rights "must be exercised with due regard for the 'inordinate difficult undertaking' that is
modern prison administration." '4 8 In these cases the Court has
emphasized that "protecting prison security" is a purpose that is
545. Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2754 (quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at 320).
546. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974), overruled in part, Thornburg v.
Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
547. E.g., Thornburg v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342 (1987); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979);
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977); Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), overruled in part, Thornburg
v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989).
548. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. at 1878 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 85).
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"central to all other correctional goals. 5' 49 Acknowledging the expertise of prison officials in matters of maintaining order and security and
that "the judiciary is 'ill equipped' to deal with the difficult and delicate problems of prison management," the Court has afforded "considerable deference to the determinations of prison administrators
regulate the relations between prisonwho, in the interest of security,
550
ers and the outside world.
5 5 ' the Court refused to invalidate a prison
In Pell v. Procunier,
ban on face-to-face interviews with members of the press. The Court
noted that alternative means of communication were available to
inmates, including their relatively unfettered ability to communicate
in writing to the press. The Court emphasized that the "internal
problems of state prisons involve issues . . . peculiarly within state
authority and expertise, ' 55 2 and found that "security considerations
are sufficiently paramount in the administration of the prison" to justify the limitations on first amendment rights at issue.55 3 Similarly, in
Bell v. Wolfish, 5 4 the Court concluded that "[p]rison administrators
... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and
execution of policies and practices that in their judgement are needed
to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security. ' 555 The Court in Bell upheld a rule prohibiting inmate
receipt of hardback books unless mailed directly from publishers,
book clubs, or bookstores, because the rule was a "rational response
by prison officials to an obvious security problem, ' 55 6 and because
alternative means of obtaining reading material were readily available. 57 In Jones v. North CarolinaPrisoners'LaborUnion, Inc.,558 the
Court sustained regulations that permitted membership in a prisoner
union but prohibited inmate solicitation of other inmates to join the
union, barred union meetings, and banned bulk mailing by the union.
The Court deemed these limitations "rationally related to the reason'
finding first amendable ... objectives of prison administration,"559
'
56
ment speech rights to be "barely implicated. 0 Although conceding
549.
550.
551.
552.
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.
558.
559.
560.

Id. at 1882 (quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 823).
Id. at 1878 (quoting Martinez, 416 U.S. at 404-05).
417 U.S. 817 (1974).
Id. at 826.
Id. at 827.
441 U.S. 520 (1979).
Id. at 547.
Id. at 550.
Id. at 552.
433 U.S. 119 (1977).
Id. at 129.
Id. at 130.
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that first amendment associational rights were "perhaps more directly
implicated," 56 ' the Court found that they nevertheless must "give way
'
to the reasonable considerations of penal management."562
56
3
In Procunier v. Martinez, the Court, although showing deference to prison authorities, applied a form of the "least restrictive
alternative" principle. The Court held that censorship of prison mail
may be justified only if the regulation or practice in question furthers
a "substantial governmental interest" and is "no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental
interest involved. ' ' 6" The Court characterized this as a form of
"intermediate" scrutiny. 65 Finding the censorship of prisoner mail
involved "far broader than any legitimate interest of penal administration demands," the Court invalidated the restrictions.566
In Thornburg v. Abbott567 and other recent cases,56 the Court
has backed away from the "least restrictive alternative" language of
Martinez. Limiting Martinez to regulations concerning outgoing correspondence from the prison,56 9 which presents implications for
prison security "of a categorically lesser magnitude than the implications of incoming materials, ' 570 the Court rejected a "least restrictive
alternative" test for censorship of such incoming material. Instead,
the Court applied "a standard of review that focuses on the reasonableness of prison regulations: the relevant inquiry is whether the
actions of prison officials were 'reasonably related to legitimate penalogical interests.' ",17' Concerned that the language in Martinez
"could be (and had been) read to require a strict 'least restrictive
alternative' analysis, without sufficient sensitivity to the need for discretion in meeting legitimate prison needs, '57 2 the Court determined
that "such a strict standard simply was not appropriate for consideration of regulations that are centrally concerned with the maintenance
of order and security within prisons.

' 573

The "reasonableness stan-

dard" adopted by the Court, is not, however, the equivalent of a
561.
562.
563.
564.

Id. at 132.
Id.
416 U.S. 396 (1974), overruled in part, Thornburg v. Abbott, 109 S.Ct. 1874 (1989).
Id. at 413.

565. Id. at 407.
566. Id. at 416.
567. 109 S.Ct. 1874 (1989).
568. Id. at 1879-85; O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350 (1987); Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987).
569. Abbott, 109 S.Ct. at 1881.
570. Id.
571. Id. at 1879 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).

572. Id. at 1880.
573. Id. at 1879.
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"rational basis" test, under which any conceivable rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest will suffice; rather,
the
574
Court warned, its reasonableness standard "is not toothless.
Will the Court apply its newly adopted "reasonableness standard" in the context of mental health .treatment administered in correctional facilities, or perhaps even in mental hospitals, which
sometimes present similar security problems? The intrusive mental
health therapies in question would seem distinguishable from the
restrictions involved in the prison cases. The regulations involved in
the prison cases were security measures which controlled the entry of
materials and individuals into the institution, and can be seen as
merely incidental restrictions on first amendment rights in light of the
alternative means of expression and communication available. By
contrast, the intrusive therapies discussed here are not, with limited
exceptions, justified as security measures. Moreover, rather than
being merely incidental restrictions on first amendment activities,
they result in direct, severe, and long-lasting invasions of mental
processes and impede the very capacity to generate ideas. Unlike the
interview and mail restrictions involved in the prison cases, there are
no alternative means of exercising the fundamental rights invaded by
involuntary imposition of organic therapies. Moreover, at.least some
of the organic therapies intrude on mental processes in a way that is
permanent and irreversible. The fact of confinement and the need for
prison security and order certainly may make some first amendment
restrictions necessary, but these considerations do not justify the
imposition of intrusive therapy. Prison restrictions related to "security considerations . .:. paramount in the administration of the

prison" 575 are accordingly entitled to considerably more deference
than correctional choices of rehabilitative techniques. Rehabilitation
is a less important governmental interest than the need to protect
institutional order and security. Furthermore, prison authorities may
be expert in matters of security, but in view of the total absence of
consensus as to "what works" in the way of correctional rehabilitation,5 76 correctional authorities can make no similar claim for judicial
574. Id. at 1882.
575. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974).
576. See D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL
TREATMENT (1975); Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform,
35 PUB. INTEREST 22 (1974); SUB-COMM. ON PENITENTIARIES AND CORRECTIONS OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ANNUAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 95-909, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978). But see T. PALMER, CORRECTIONAL INTERVENTION AND RESEARCH 15-36

(1978). Although noting that more recent programs may show more promise, a recent study
of offender rehabilitation performed under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences
found Lipton, Martinson and Wilks' conclusions to be "reasonably accurate and fair." See
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deference in their choice of rehabilitative means.
The justifications for an especially deferential approach to
restrictions grounded in security considerations are substantially
reduced in contexts outside of the prison. In the case of communitybased correctional programs, some of which are not residential, security considerations and the deference they justify would seem minor or
even nonexistent. Moreover, to whatever extent the Supreme Court
may feel inclined to apply its "reasonableness standard" adopted in
the prison context to mental institutions, in view of the security needs
of such facilities, patients receiving treatment in community settings
would similarly not present the concern for security that animates the
prison cases. Nor, for that matter, is it likely that this concern would
arise often in mental hospital wards housing exclusively parenspatriae
patients who are committed because of their treatment needs, rather
than any danger they may present to the community.
Indeed, even within an institution-either prison or hospitalthere would seem to be only one context in which involuntary administration of intrusive mental health treatment would even arguably
merit the deferential approach applied to first amendment restrictions
in the prison. That context is the use of psychotropic drugs to tranquilize a prisoner or patient in an effort to defuse an emergency in
which that individual's behavior is manifestly dangerous to the individual himself, other inmates, or institutional staff.577 Although isolating or restraining the patient or prisoner will in most cases be
sufficient to defuse such an emergency situation,5"' institutional
administrators who choose what might be termed a "chemical
PANEL ON RESEARCH ON REHABILITATIVE TECHNIQUES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 5 (L.
Sechrest, S. White & E. Brown eds. 1979). However, the study found that Palmer's
"optimistic view cannot be supported .. " Id. at 31. The Panel study concluded that:
The entire body of research appears to justify only the conclusion that we do not
now know of any program or method of rehabilitation that could be guaranteed
to reduce the criminal activity of released offenders. Although a generous
reviewer of the literature might discern some glimmers of hope, those glimmers
are so few, so scattered, and so inconsistent that they do not serve as a basis for
any recommendation other than continued research.
Id. at 3. For a critical analysis of the evaluation literature finding most studies inadequate for
failure to measure the "strength" or intensity of the treatment, or its "integrity" or consistency
in administration, see Sechrest & Redner, Strength and Integrity in Evaluation Studies, in
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE, How WELL DOES IT WORK? REVIEW
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE EVALUATION, 1978, at 19 (1979).
577. See Tupin, Psychopharmacology and Aggression, in CLINICAL TREATMENT OF THE
VIOLENT PERSON 79, 80-81 (L. Roth ed. 1987).
578. Solaff, Physical Controls.- The Use of Seclusion and Restraint in Modern Psychiatric
Practice, in CLINICAL TREATMENT OF THE VIOLENT PERSON, supra note 577, at .119. See
generally THE PSYCHIATRIC USES OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT (K. Tardiff ed. 1984).
THE
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restraint" in such circumstances may assert a claim to deference in
their choice of means to regain institutional order and security. Particularly since a single administration of such medication will usually
not present a substantial risk of irreversible side effects such as tardive
dyskinesia,57 9 and because the high-potency antipsychotic drugs usually used for this purpose are less sedating,580 and consequently present a lesser intrusion on first amendment interests, the arguments in
favor of a more deferential judicial approach to the brief use of such
drugs in an emergency may be persuasive. Indeed, a number of state
and lower federal courts have recognized that the government's police
power interest in protecting hospital or prison staff and other patients
or prisoners from violence is sufficiently compelling to justify forced
medication, at least in an emergency. 581 Although in these cases the
courts did not discuss the first amendment, and as a result made no
attempt to square their conclusions with traditional first amendment
scrutiny, their approach seems consistent with first amendment
doctrine.
In the case of a patient or prisoner who is behaving violently
toward a fellow inmate or an institutional staff member, the government's compelling interests in restoring order and maintaining safety
and security certainly justify a suitable intervention into the conduct
of the patient or prisoner. When, as here, the intervention involved
affects not only the conduct of the individual, but his first amendment
interests as well, additional scrutiny should be required. Under traditional first amendment doctrine, a regulation of conduct that also
affects first amendment interests is permitted only if the effect on first
579. TARDIVE DYSKINESIA, supra note 431, at 24-25; Tupin, supra note 577, at 82.
580. Tupin, supra note 577, at 82-83.
581. See, e.g., Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1394 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.

1214 (1985) (In an emergency, a "jail's duty to maintain security and to prevent a violent and
dangerous mentally ill prisoner from injuring himself and others" would justify forcible
medication with antipsychotic drugs.); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1983) (en
banc) (Antipsychotic drugs constitutionally may be administered to members of a class of
dangerous involuntarily committed patients "whenever, in the exercise of professional
judgment, such an action is deemed necessary to prevent the patient from endangering himself
or others."); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 656-57 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub
noma.
Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); William v. Martin, 589 F. Supp. 680, 682 (W.D.
Okla. 1984); Weiss v. Missouri Dep't of Mental Health, 587 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (E.D. Mo.
1984); Project Release v. Prevost, 551 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d
960 (2d Cir.. 1983); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 934-38 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Large v.
Superior Court, 148 Ariz. 229, 236-39, 714 P.2d 399, 406-08 (1986) (en banc); People v.
Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973-74 (Colo. 1985) (en banc); In re Orr, 176 Ill.
App. 3d 498, 507, 531
N.E.2d 64, 72 (1988); Rogers v. Commissioner, 390 Mass. 489, 507-11, 458 N.E.2d 308, 31922 (1983); Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 554, 561, 465 A.2d 484, 489 (1983); Rivers v.
Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495-96, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 80, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343 (1986); In re K.K.B.,
609 P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1980).
,
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amendment freedoms is merely incidental, and the government interest in regulating the conduct in question is sufficiently important and
5 2
is unrelated to the suppression of first amendment freedoms.
These standards would seem to be satisfied when the government, in an effort to defuse an emergency, seeks to administer a
psychotropic drug to a patient or prisoner who, in the midst of a
psychotic episode, is acting violently. Although my intent here is to
identify and analyze the appropriate standards of review mandated by
the first amendment, rather than to discuss how these standards
would apply to various justifications for involuntary treatment, a brief
analysis of how these standards would apply in the context of a drug
administered for reasons of institutional security is appropriate. A
single administration of such a drug would directly affect mental
processes for a period lasting only several hours. The risk of adverse
side effects lasting longer than this is small. Such drug administration
will not prevent the generation or maintenance of ideas, and will only
at most temporarily affect expression or communication. Although
such use of psychotropic drugs undeniably affects mental processes,
the duration of the impact on such processes is sufficiently short that
the effects can be characterized as merely incidental to the government's regulation of the individual's conduct. Moreover, the government's interests in protecting institutional security and order and the
safety of inmates and staff would seem both compelling and unrelated
to the suppression of the patient's first amendment interests.
Although the patient's conduct is being suppressed, by a means which
incidentally limits his first amendment protected mentation, and
although the patient's mental processes may well be related to his violent conduct, the government interest is in suppressing the conduct
itself, without regard to the mental processes that may have brought it
about. Thus, first amendment standards would seem to be satisfied by
the administration of drugs in an emergency situation, when the
patient is acting violently or such violence appears imminent.
When violence is not imminent, however, administration of
psychotropic drugs on an on-going basis as a preventative measure
would not seem to satisfy these standards. When violent conduct is
not at least imminent, the government interest in administering such
drugs as a preventative would be directed primarily at the patient's
mental processes themselves and their potential to produce future
conduct of a violent nature. When the invasion of first amendment
interests is as serious and long-lasting as it is here, the mere preven582. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2538-39 (1989); Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1974); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
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tion of future dangerous conduct predicted to occur as a result of the
patient's disordered mental processes should not suffice to invoke the
reduced scrutiny justified by deference to the need to maintain institutional security unless the danger to be prevented has some degree of
imminence.5 8 3 In other first amendment contexts, when the government has attempted to interfere directly with speech or other first
amendment protected activity on the ground that it is thought likely
to produce crime, riot, revolution, or some other substantive harm
within the government's power to prevent, the Supreme Court has
insisted that there be a "clear and present danger" that those substantive evils will occur.58 4 Thus, the Court has not "permitted the Government to assume that every expression of a provocative idea will
incite a riot," but has instead engaged in "careful consideration of the
actual circumstances surrounding such expression, asking whether
the expression 'is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.' "85 Similarly,
the government's direct interference with protected first amendment
mental processes through on-going administration of psychotropic
drugs designed to prevent future violence that is not imminent should
not qualify for the reduced scrutiny that might be appropriate for an
institution's response to an emergency. Although in the recent prison
security cases, the Court has not insisted on this degree of imminence,
upholding regulations that censored materials entering the prison
because of their potential impact on order and security, 8 6 these regulations imposed far less serious burdens on first amendment interests
than on-going intrusive treatment. The censorship of incoming
materials in Abbot, for example, left open a "broad range of publications" to be sent, received, and read by the prisoners.587 When the
583. See Johnson, 109 S.Ct. at 2542.(citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969))
("imminent lawless action"); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843

(1978).
584. E.g., Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 843 ("the imminence and magnitude of
the danger"); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 ("imminent lawless action"); Wood v. Georgia,
370 U.S. 375, 384 (1962) ("the degree of imminence [must be] extremely high"); Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 350 (1946) ("clearness and. immediacy"); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 532 (1945) ("grave and impending public danger"); id. at 536 ("clear and present, grave
and immediate danger"); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)
("grave and immediate danger"); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) ("the degree

of imminence [must be] extremely high"); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940)
("clear and present danger.., or other immediate threat"); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919) ("clear and present danger"). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 12-9.
585. Johnson, 109 S.Ct. at 2542 (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447).
586. E.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1878, 1883 (1989).
587. Id. at 1884. As a result, the Court found that there were "alternative means of
exercising the [first amendment] right that remain open to prison inmates." Id. at 1883
(quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987)).
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intrusions involved are as serious and long-lasting as the on-going use
of antipsychotic drugs, a higher degree of imminence should be
required. Just as the Court in Texas v. Johnson, the recent flag-burning case, rejected the state's argument that the mere "potential for a
breach of peace" should suffice as a basis for criminalizing flag-burning,5 88 the mere potential of future dangerous behavior by a mentally
ill patient or prisoner should not alone justify the long-term use of a
psychotropic drug as a preventative. The "likelihood, however great,
that a substantive evil will result" cannot alone suffice. 8 9 "[T]he substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high"59 0 before such direct and long-lasting invasions of
first amendment interests may be sanctioned, at least in the absence of
other justifications for such action that satisfy traditional strict first
amendment scrutiny.
Thus, in contexts other than the emergency use of medication,
decisions to impose intrusive mental health treatment, because such
treatment will be on-going and the resulting invasion of first amendment interests will be far from merely incidental, raise more serious
first amendment concerns. Such decisions should accordingly be subjected to the "exacting" scrutiny generally applied in other first
amendment contexts. 591
IX.

CONCLUSION

Whether and in what circumstances these "exacting" standards
can be satisfied in the context of involuntary mental health treatment
for either mental patients or criminal offenders is beyond the scope of
this Article. Its purpose has been to identify the first amendment
implications of the treatment involved in Washington v. Harper. In
my view, the first amendment provides the appropriate lens through
which the Supreme Court should resolve the difficult issues it is about
to confront. In any event, these issues should not be resolved without
an awareness of the significant first amendment values that are
implicated.
Harper does not involve medication administered in response to
an emergency affecting prison security or order. It does not involve
the prevention of imminent violence. Harper periodically assaulted
staff and other inmates;59 2 indeed, in 1981, his parole was revoked for
588.
589.
590.
591.
592.

Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2542.
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262 (1941).
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 384 (1962); Bridges, 314 U.S. at 263.
See supra notes 525-32 and accompanying text.
Brief of Respondent at 2, Washington v. Harper, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989) (No. 88-599).
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assaulting two -nurses at a state mental hospital.59 3 Harper's treating
physician decided to administer antipsychotic medication against

Harper's will under the belief that Harper's assaultiveness increased
when he was not taking his medication.5 94 Nevertheless, the record

does not show that Harper's assaultiveness was imminent at the time,
nor does it show that other means of preventing assaultive behaviorsegregation, 595 physical restraints,5 96 prison discipline, 59 7 or even psychotherapeutic5 98 or behavioral 599 techniques, for example-had been
attempted and proved unavailing.
Harper does not involve an isolated administration of antipsychotic drugs, or a treatment period of brief duration. For four to
five years, Harper had voluntarily undergone antipsychotic drug therapy.'
After he initially refused to continue taking the drugs, he was
administered them on an involuntary basis for an additional two and
two-thirds years before seeking an injunction."° Harper was thus
subjected to a prolonged course of drug treatment, augmenting the
risks of serious adverse side affects such as tardive dyskinesia, and
resulting in an interference with his mental processes for an extended
and continuous period. Moreover, although Harper is mentally ill,6 ° 2
there is no claim that his illness rendered him incompetent to participate in treatment decisionmaking, to weigh for himself the risks and
benefits of continuing a treatment he had tried for many years.
Harper,therefore, does not present an asserted justification for involuntary medication grounded in the state's parenspatriae power.6 °3
593. Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 874-75, 759 P.2d 358, 360 (1988) (en banc).

594. Id. at 875, 759 P.2d at 360.
595. See Soloff, supra note 578. See generally
RESTRAINT, supra note 578.

THE PSYCHIATRIC USES OF SECLUSION AND

596. See Soloff, supra note 578.
597. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974).
598. See Madden, Psychotherapeutic Approaches in the Treatment of Violent Persons, in
CLINICAL TREATMENT OF THE VIOLENT PERSON, supra note 577, at 54.
599. See Liberman & Wong, Behavior Analysis and Therapy ProceduresRelated to Seclusion
and Restraint, in THE PSYCHIATRIC USES OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT, supra note 578, at
35; Wong, Slama & Liberman, BehavioralAnalysis and Therapy for Aggressive Psychiatricand

Developmentally Disabled Patients, in

CLINICAL TREATMENT OF THE VIOLENT PERSON,

supra note 577, at 20.
600. Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 874, 759 P.2d 358, 360 (1988) (en banc).
601. Id. at 875, 759 P.2d at 360.
602. See supra note 10.
603. The parenspatriae power involves government decisionmaking in the best interest of
persons who by reason of age or disability are incapable of making such decisions for
themselves. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 296 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
426 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Bee
v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985); Project
Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 978 (2d Cir. 1983); Rogers v. Okin 634 F.2d 650, 657 (lst
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Viewed through the lens of the first amendment, Harper thus
raises the question of whether, in the absence of a demonstration that
other available and less intrusive means have failed, the state's interest
in preventing future but nonimminent harm within an institution
meets the "exacting" standards that I have argued the first amendment should compel for the involuntary administration of intrusive
treatments like antipsychotic medication.
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(1982); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68-71 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971);
Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 935-36 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Rogers v. Commissioner, 390
Mass. 489, 511-12, 458 N.E.2d 308, 322 (1983); Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 554, 560-61,
465 A.2d 484, 489-90 (1983); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 496-97, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 80, 495
N.E.2d 337, 343-44 (1986); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 750-52 (Okla. 1980); Winick, Legal
Limitationson CorrectionalTherapy and Research, supra note 3, at 374; Note, Developments in
the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally 111, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190,1212-16 (1974). The
courts have also recognized that the existence of mental illness alone cannot justify the
conclusion that the patient is incompetent to participate in treatment decisions. E.g., Rennie
v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 847 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S.
1119 (1982); Rogers, 634 F.2d at 591; Winters, 446 F.2d at 71; Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 935-36;
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